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Introduction 
This dissertation consists of three autonomous essays, discussing the following topics: 
1. the pricing of defaultable bonds, loans and plain vanilla credit derivatives, 
2. the use of risk-adjusted performance measurement, for optimal portfolio management 
in the banking, asset management and insurance industries 
3. return on economic capital as a measure of value created by the holding of bank 
assets and the operation of bank business units.. 
Even if, at a first glance, these three essays appear to be independent developed, it is possible 
to show how they belong to a single general framework: the analysis of the measurement and 
management of financial (market and credit) risk. This dissertation has the aim to shed some 
light on three aspects of this process: the first two being the valuation of the risky debt and 
the analysis of the risk adjusted performance of a portfolio (such as credit assets) exhibiting 
non-normal returns; the third the analysis of bank portfolio choice taking account of the 
conflicting interests of bond-holders and share-holders. 
The link between the first two essays can be explained by considering that to build a risk 
adjusted performance measure one needs to estimate the portfolio value distribution across 
time. To this aim the first chapter provide a tool to evaluate a portfolio of credit asset in 
different point in time by simultaneously taking in consideration the interaction of market 
(represented by the interest rate risk) and credit risk (the risk drivers being the transition risk 
and the recovery rate by the seniority of debt risk) 
. 
From the difference between the portfolio 
value in two point in time it is possible to estimate the portfolio loss (or eventually) gain 
distribution. Through the analysis of the probability density function (pdf) of the loss 
distribution it is possible to estimate the risk measures (downside risk measures, in the 
banking and asset management industry, "distorted" risk measures, in the insurance industry) 
presented in the first part of the second chapters. 
The analysis of the most important features a risk measure should possess is completed 
through the incorporation of the recent new developments in actuarial science, and applied to 
the insurance industry. These are discussed in the second part of the second essay. In fact, 
actuaries are the first claiming that risk measures should go beyond the coherence principles 
first introduced by Artzner and al. (1997). Nowadays the coherence framework for risk 
measures represents the best practice, both from an academic and professional perspective, in 
the asset management and banking industry. Actuaries (Wang 1997) claim that, to be 
successful in pro-active risk management one needs to carefully consider all the information 
In this work only the ex-ante perspective is considered. It is out of the scope of the dissertation to analyse the ex- 
post performance (performance evaluation) 
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incorporated in the whole loss distribution, not just the tail; this is because stochastic 
dominance matters. In this dissertation a risk adjusted performance that can be used in the 
banking and asset management industry on top of the newly built coherent and stochastic 
dominance compliant "distorted" risk measures is introduced and discussed with the aim of 
providing superior information for pro-active portfolio management and optimal economic 
capital analysis. 
Another important motivation for the second chapter is that through the use of distorted risk 
adjusted performance measurement the risk or asset manager can efficiently select an 
optimal portfolio whose financial asset show non-normality and fat tail (like the credit 
assets). It is therefore claimed that even if the underlying distribution shows this type of 
shape it is possible to provide, from a theoretical perspective, superior information because 
avoiding to include in the set of feasible portfolios also the stochastically dominated ones. 
Summarising, to optimise the risk-return-value profile of the portfolio at the hand risk 
managers need: 
" to evaluate the financial assets across time 
" to estimate the related pdf loss distribution 
" to adopt risk' adjusted performance measure (RAPM) that goes beyond coherence thus 
controlling for non-normality and fat tails of the loss distribution at the hand. 
The last aspect of the financial risk management process, analysed in the third chapter, 
analyses the determination of the optimal bank traget credit rating which allows to maximise 
the target cost of economic capital by considering, simultaneously, the response to two 
conflicting objectives: the shareholder and the bondholder perspective. The first two chapters 
show some "tools" that risk managers have to manage to extrapolate win-win strategies for 
the conflicting objectives of both shareholders and bondholders. In fact, bondholders main 
concern is that the bank may default thus loosing (fully or in part) the provided financial 
resources. Similar concern characterizes the regulators whose main objective is to ensure the 
stability of the financial market and the (ongoing) solvency of the financial institutions. It is 
therefore obvious that regulators in all financial industries focus their attention on the 
downside risk and therefore they pay attention to the tail risk incorporated in the pdf loss 
distribution. Regulators, consequently, to cope with the problem of estimating capital 
requirement to assure the ongoing solvency of the financial institutions suggest to use 
downside measures of risk which emphasizes the capability of financial institutions to remain 
solvent even in the presence of critical (stress) financial conditions. 
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On the other hand shareholders and top management are interested in the maximisation of the 
value of the financial institution (or, stated alternatively, the bank portfolio total return). This 
means that the shareholders consider a crucial indicator of the well being status of the 
financial institutions the (expected) portfolio values of the bank portfolio in the future. They 
are ultimately interested in measuring how the financial institutions are capable to generate 
superior risk adjusted returns and therefore their focus it is not the tail of the loss distribution 
but the mean of the portfolio value distribution across time. They know that the bank must 
remain solvent across time, but shareholders consider this a constraint and not an objective. 
They want to be successful by achieving the optimal risk adjusted return on the capital of the 
bank. 
The third area in which this dissertation seeks to make a contribution is in the analysis of the 
relationship between the risk capital (the capital that a bank has to have to remain solvent) 
and the economic capital (the capital a bank needs to have to reward the shareholders for the 
risk being taken). This distinction is crucial to identify how much capital a bank must have to 
avoid default and, at the same time, to be competitive in the financial market. In the third 
chapter is shown how to select investment alternatives and measure the contribution in risk 
adjusted value terms. It is claimed that, to this aim, a bank has to make use of a specific risk 
adjusted performance, namely the cost of economic capital, that is able simultaneously to 
provide inrormatit i to: 
1. 'reach the target credit rating (default probability) the bank is willing to achieve to be 
competitive in the financial market thus defining the amount of risk capital to have 
2. define how much leverage (debt to economic capital ratio) a bank has to use to 
maximise the shareholder value thus providing a superior risk premium to the 
shareholders. 
This explains how the third chapter is linked with the first and the second one. The third 
chapter consider an equilibrium framework and therefore the results provided should be 
interpreted accordingly. In another joint research with A. Milne "When does RAROC 
measure shareholder value? Theoretical diagnosis and practical prescription" this framework 
is extended to deal with non-normality and fat tail. 
Having now summarised the motivations for this thesis, we can briefly review some specific 
contributions of the different chapters. 
The main contribution of the first chapter is to define a general framework to price risky debt 
through an integrated reduced pricing model. In the integrated pricing model the pricing of 
any risky security is shown to reflect the return on a risk-free asset plus a risk margin. The 
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risk margin, in theory, must compensate the investor for all the risks assumed which are 
represented by: 
" transition and recovery (by seniority of debt) risk 
" liquidity risk 
" credit exposure risk 
" default correlation risk 
" collateral risk 
" concentration risk 
" market and credit correlation risk. 
In practice it is virtually impossible simultaneously consider the joint stochastic evolution of 
these risk sources. In the integrated pricing model only the risk coming from interest rates, 
transition and recovery (by seniority of debt) variations are (jointly) modelled within a no 
arbitrage framework. In this chapter the most widespread approaches which may be used to 
jointly model interest rates and credit spreads are discussed, namely reduced form models and 
structural models (Merton 1974). In particular this chapter discusses the ones directly 
modelling credit spread components (transition and recovery risk). The model described in 
this chapter can be considered as a generalization of the Das & Tufano (DT, 1996) model, 
which is an extension of the Jarrow-Lando-Turnbull (JLT, 1997) model, and uses credit 
ratings to characterize the transition risk. Unlike the JLT model, the DT model makes the 
recovery rate in the event of default stochastic, and provides a two-factor decomposition of 
credit spreads. In this essay this approach is generalised by considering different set-ups for 
different seniority classes of debt. Therefore, their main features are those of being mark to 
market (in contrast to the default mode paradigm) and that the spread term structure by rating 
class is adjusted for a spread term structure which is contingent on the seniority of debt 
within an arbitrage free framework. 
In the second chapter, for the sake of portfolio optimization and sound risk management, it is 
shown that it is essential for a risk measure to properly reflect the risk differentials in 
alternative strategies or portfolios. The main contribution of this essay is to show how a risk 
measure, although being coherent, ignores useful information in a large part of the loss 
distribution, and consequently lacks incentive for mitigating losses below quantile (VaR) risk 
measure. Therefore a good risk measures for pro-active portfolio management must go 
beyond coherence. When trying to asses the main appealing features a RAPM should show, 
it is also important to recognize that do exist many (and conflicting) objectives, the financial 
environment is uncertain, dynamic and complex, and the underlying financial instruments 
4 
(their returns) may show asymmetry, fat tails and liquidity problems besides the 
-traditional- 
financial and operational risks. 
In this set up, a further contribution is based on the intuition that the analyst has to clearly 
identify what are the answers the performance measure should correctly give and not worry 
about possible paradoxical cases that are out of the set of scenarios considered by the decision 
maker. This means that risk measures that have to answer the question of the right capital 
requirement a financial institution should have not necessarily must have the same features of 
a RAPM used for proactive risk management. Strictly speaking, in the first case there is no 
reason to know all the information incorporated in the whole loss distribution because for the 
aim of the regulators only the censored tail risk matters. But clearly from a business 
perspective the type of information the analyst have to ask to the portfolio value distribution 
is somewhat different and therefore the set of desirable properties change thus making the 
stochastic dominance principles matter. 
In order to be conscious of the limitations and shortcomings of the risk measures currently in 
use in the best practice in several financial applications in this chapter the understanding of 
the theoretical relationships that exist between the stochastic dominance principles and 
coherence axioms will be discussed with the final aim to provide guidelines for the risk 
adjusted performance measure correct use in this well defined context. 
The main contributions of the third chapter is to provide the combined first analysis of the 
impact of default probability, capital structure, limited liability, deposit insurance, franchise 
value and taxes on Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC or cost of economic capital) 
type risk measures. Previous work of Crouhy and al (1999) has addressed part of this problem 
but does not provide a complete analysis. The suggested model also adopts a rigorous 
equilibrium perspective by enforcing the pricing of banking assets using the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM). This alters significantly some of the results reported by Crouhy and 
al. (1999), in particular showing that their results greatly overstate the impact of volatility on 
the required "hurdle" for return on economic capital. Finally, this framework also clarifies the 
relationship amongst different measures of capital, namely the market value of the equity, the 
risk capital and the economic capital. 
Please note that the first chapter of this work is forthcoming in European Journal of 
Operational Research EJOR, Volume 163, Issue 16 May 2005, pages 65-82 (M. Onorato and 
E. Altman). The third chapter is jointly written with Alistair Milne. 
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1 We thank Giovanni Barone Adesi, Winfried Hallerbach, Anthony Saunders, Jaap Spronk, Rangaraian Sundaram, 
Constantine Thanassoulas 
, 
three anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Italian Banking Association, 
Milan, for helpful discussion of this study. Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the Annual Meetings of 
both Financial Management Association (Paris 2001) and European Financial Management Association (London 
2002) and at the Euro Working Group on Financial Modelling Meeting (Capri 2002). Please note that this chapter is 
a joint research paper with E. Altman, forthcoming in European Journal of Operational Research, Volume 163, Issue 
16 May 2005, pp 65-82. 
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Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
The 1988 Basle Capital Accord, which created a minimum risk-based capital adequacy 
requirement for banks, marked a major step forward in introducing risk differentiation into the 
regulatory framework but did not represent the "optimum" solution. 
The 1996 amendment to the Capital Accord aimed to correct some of the issues concerning the 
original accord, but it did not change the section regarding credit risk. As a consequence, 
regulatory capital was still not an appropriate basis for the capital allocation process. Financial 
institutions started developing their own internal credit risk systems using economic capital. 
In April 1999, regulators proposed a document, Credit Risk modelling: current practice and 
applications, which aimed at assessing the potential applications and limits of credit risk 
modelst for supervisory and regulatory purposes, in sight of the foreseeable amendment to the 
Capital Accord. The Basle Committee proposed the amendment in June 1999: A new capital 
adequacy framework. This event marked a breakthrough as regards the credit risk concept for 
capital adequacy. The committee's proposal dramatically modified the standard approach for 
capital requirements imposed by the 1988 Accord. A more realistic approach was introduced 
based on internal rating systems. Moreover, it presented the reclassification of securities taking 
into account credit risk in all its aspects: default, migration, recovery rates, credit spreads, 
aggregation and concentration risk. 
Over the last decade risk managers, regulators, academics and software vendors are devoted to 
define a sound credit (and market) risk measurement and management system. The main 
objective of this study is to define a general framework to price risky debt. The pricing of any 
risky security must reflect the return on a risk-free asset plus a risk margin. The risk margin 
must compensate the investor for the risk assumed which is represented by: the transition and 
recovery (by seniority of debt) risk, liquidity risk, credit exposure risk, default correlation risk, 
collateral risk and concentration risk. Moreover, in an integrated framework, another source of 
risk has to be considered, namely: market and credit correlation risk3. 
2 The document issued by the Basle Committee analyses in particular four widespread credit risk models: 
CreditmetricsTM(JP Morgan 1997); KMW Portfolio Manager T"i (Kealhofer 1998), CreditRisk+TM (Credit Suisse 
First Boston 1997), Credit Portfolio ViewTm (Wilson 1997 and 1998). As the recent literature shows Koyluoglu and 
Hickman (1998), these models fit within a single generalised framework.. 
3 Consequently, all the correlations among the market factors (which drive the price of securities) and credit risk 
factors-also called background factors- which affect the creditworthiness of obligors in the portfolio need to be 
identified and modelled. For an illustrative description of the background factors within the credit risk model 
framework refer to Koyluoglu and Hickman (1998) and Wilson (1997 and 1998). 
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Chapter 1 
There are several approaches, which may be used to jointly model interest rates and credit 
spreads. In this paper reduced4 form models and in particular the ones directly modelling credit 
spread components (transition and recovery risk) are considered. 
Our approach is a generalization of the Das & Tufano (DT) (1996) model, which is an 
extension of the Jarrow-Lando-Turnbull (JLT) (1997) model, and uses credit ratings to 
characterize the transition risk. Unlike the JLT model, the DT model makes the recovery rate in 
the event of default stochastic, and provides a two-factor decomposition of credit spreads. In 
this paper we generalise this approach by considering different set-ups for different seniority 
classes of debt. Therefore, its main features are those of being mark to market (MTM)5 and that 
the spread term structure by rating class (STSRC) is adjusted for a spread term structure which 
is contingent on the seniority of debt (SSD) within an arbitrage free framework. 
Summarising, in our integrated pricing model we take into account the risk coming from both 
interest rates variations and credit event verificationse. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 defines default and transition risk 
and it is aimed at illustrating both the most common methods to estimate them and the inherent 
empirical evidence. Section 3 analyses the same issues for the recovery rate by seniority of debt 
risk. Section 4 is the core of the paper. In this section the theoretical integrated pricing model is 
illustrated. The bulk of the suggested approach relies on the modelling of both the stochastic 
spread term structure by rating class and the spread contingent to the seniority of debt within a 
unified arbitrage-free framework. Section 5 illustrates possible applications of the integrated 
pricing model. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Default and Transition Risk 
Credit pricing and risk models attempt to measure credit losses. Losses are the consequence of 
the firm's financial position and asset quality deterioration, which then leads to the degradation 
of its creditworthiness (credit migration). The determination of the creditworthiness of the 
issuer is difficult as it is driven by many factors such as general economic conditions, industry 
Reduced form models are so called to contrast them to structural models (Merton 1974). The difference between 
structural and reduced form model is outlined in section 2 and 4. For a complete review of the inherent literature 
refer to the work of Acharya, Das and Sundaram (2002). 
s "In contrast to the default mode paradigm, within the mark to market (or, to be more accurate, mark to model) 
paradigm a credit loss can arise in response to deterioration in asset's credit quality shorts of default". For a detailed 
discussion on the topic please refer to the work of Basle Committee, pag. 2 1. 
6 If a credit event occurs, the credit quality of the issuer changes. Examples of credit events are given in section 2. 
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trends and specific issuer factors like the issuer's financial wealth, leverage, market value, 
equity value, asset value, capital structure and less tangible things such as reputation and 
management skills. 
The probability of a customer migrating from its current risk-rating category to any other 
category, within a pre-defined time horizon, is frequently expressed in terms of a rating 
transition matrix7. Rating migration probabilities are therefore collected in the transition 
(migration) matrices and describe the probability of migrating from any given credit rating to 
another one. Moreover, estimates of transition probabilities often suffer from small samples, 
either in the number of rated firms or in the number of events; in particular this happens when 
considering transition towards the most "distant" rating classes. This often results in biased 
estimates of these type of transition probabilities that has led the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision to impose a lower minimum probability of 0.0003 for rare events. In our analysis 
we will cluster obligors into obligor rating classes. In this matrix, the last column represents the 
worst internal grade (the worst state) which corresponds to the the default state8. 
Let us assume to deal with K rating classes (the Kth being the default state), then, the transition 
matrix is the collection of one-step transition probabilities of migrating from any class-i to any 
class 
-j at the given time-m, including the probabilities of remaining in the same class 
(corresponding to the off-diagonal values). The statistical, or actual, probabilities matrix can be 
represented as: 
9 (m) 
.. 
9, K (m)l 
G? im)=1v, 
r(m))= 
qz, (m) 9zz(mý 
"" 
9:, (m) 
9Ka (m) 4K. x (m) qKx (m) (m) 9, K(MY 
a 
qz, (m) 4n (m) 9sß (m) 
0001 
(2.1) 
Once the default state is reached, no other rating classes are possible to exist at the next time 
step, therefore all the transition probabilities are defined to be null, with the exception of the 
probability of staying in the K 
-state i. e. default. As a consequence of the definition of transition 
probability, another relevant property of the migration matrix is that the sum over the elements 
of the same row must equal one. 
7 See Altman (1998) for a complete discussion on the topic. 
8 In a two state default process, within the considered time horizon, there are only two possible events: "no default" 
and "default'. 
-i I 
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K 
Qi. I(m)=1; Vi 
In the integrated model, the statistical transition probabilities are derived from empirical data by 
using the mortality approach briefly described in the next section.. The process determining 
customer defaults or rating migrations can be modelled through two approaches: actuarial based 
methods and equity based methods. 
2.1 Actuarial based method 
The basic actuarial approach uses historical data on the default rates of borrowers to predict the 
expected default rates for similar customers. The actuarial (also called empirical) model is 
based on the estimation of statistical (or actual) transition probabilities9. This method uses 
historical data to evaluate the migration probabilities. In this model the inputs are represented 
by empirical data and the output will be the statistical estimation concerning these data. One of 
the most important criticisms to the empirical approach is the apparently static nature of the 
resulting average historical probabilities. In reality, actual transition and default probabilities 
are very dynamic and can vary quite substantially over one year, depending on general 
economic conditions and business cycleslo 
In our integrated pricing model we will estimate the actual transition probability by using the 
Altman (1998) mortality rate approach. This method determines the (expected) default rate, 
using an empirical method. An important element that needs to be observed is the aging 
effect", that is, the time between instruments' issue up to valuation time. This approach implies 
lower default probabilities in the first year than in the next years. The question is not whether a 
bond or another credit derivative is going to default or not but when it is going to default and 
what will be the likely recovery, given its original rating and its original seniority. Credit 
instruments are classified for issue time and rating classes. After this classification it is possible 
to calculate the default probability. In order to do this, it is necessary to calculate the marginal 
mortality rate and the cumulative mortality rate. 
The marginal mortality rate (MMR) is the probability that a credit instruments defaults over the 
first year, over the second and so on. The MMR can be expressed both in term of number and 
9 Here we refer to actual (statistical or empirical) transition probability in contrast to risk-neutral probability 
1° A real dilemma concerns the private companies that are neither rated by the agencies nor publicly traded. In fact a 
substantial proportion of these portfolios do not have very clear benchmark for estimating default and transition 
probabilities 
11 Altman's method (1998) is different from other methods determining the "aging effect". In fact Moody's and S&P 
use static pools (including all credit instruments), while Altman makes a distinction among instruments according to 
the issue date. The (actual) transition probability matrix in the integrated pricing model can be easily inferred from 
the migration matrix, which is estimated using the Altman mortality rate approach. For a more detailed illustration of 
the mortality (default) rate by rating and by age approach please refer to Altman (1998) 
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value. In the last case MMR is equal to the ratio between the total value of the corporate bonds 
included in a specific rating class defaulting over the planning horizon and the total value of 
corporate bonds included in the same rating class, at the beginning of the time horizon. 
MMR, 
= 
Total value of defaulted bonds in the its, year 
Total value of bonds issued at the beginning of the i,, year 
where i= 1.... NN= number of years12 
Consequently the survival rate (SR) is equal to SR; 1-MMR,. One can measure the cumulative 
mortality rate (CMRT) during a specific time period, subtracting the product of the surviving 
T 
populations over the previous time, that is CMRT=1-rlSRI. Altman derives the migration 
i-I 
probabilities for each rating class from CMRT, which represents the default probability. 
2.2 The equity based method 
The equity-based approach, often associated with the Merton model, is mainly used for 
estimating the Expected Default Frequencies (EDF) 13 of large and middle-market business 
customers, and is often used to crosscheck estimates generated by actuarial-based methods. 
This technique uses publicly available information on a firm's liabilities, the historical and 
current market value of its equity and the historical volatility of its equity to estimate the level 
and the rate of change of the volatility (at an annual rate) of the economic value of the firm's 
assets. There are at least three practical limitations to implement the option (Merton model) 
approach: 
1. It is necessary to know the market value of firm's asset. This is rarely possible as the 
typical firm has numerous complex outstanding debt contracts traded on an infrequent 
basis. 
2. It is necessary to estimate the return volatility of the firm's asset. Since the market prices 
cannot be observed for the firm's assets, the rate of return cannot be measured and 
volatilities cannot be computed. 
12 If, for example, the par vale outstanding of high-yield debt in 1997 was 335.400 ($ millions) and the par value 
defaults was 4.200 ($ millions), the MMR (or alternatively the default rates) was 1.252% 
--. 13 Expected default probabilities can be inferred from the option models under the assumption that default occurs 
when the value of a firm's assets falls below its liabilities. See Crosbie (1998) for a detailed description of how the 
EDF are estimated within the KMW model. 
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3. It is necessary to simultaneously price all the different types of liabilities senior to the 
corporate debt under consideration. Most corporations have complex liabilities structures14. 
Summarizing, the key ingredient of credit asset pricing and risk modelling is the default (or, in 
a multi-state framework, transition) risk, which is the uncertainty underlying a firm's ability to 
service its debts and obligations. Prior to default, there is no way to discriminate 
unambiguously between firms that will default and those that will not. At best we can only 
make probabilistic assessments about the default possibility. In practice, we use transition 
probabilities basically for two main reasons: 
1. In the trading book, to price credit sensitive instruments adjusting it through the risk neutral 
transition probability 
2. In the banking book, to measure the credit risk of portfolio losses of loans 
3. Recovery by seniority of debt risk 
The default is one of the main types of credit events which determines loss amount occurring 
once a credit has defaulted. This credit loss, also called loss given default (LGD), is defined as 
the difference between the (current) bank's credit exposure and the present value of the future 
net recoveries (cash payments from the borrower less workout expenses). Therefore the 
recovery rate (RR) is equal to the ratio between 1-LGD and the initial exposure15. LGD 
depends on a limited set of variables characterising the structure of a particular credit facility1e. 
These variables may include the type of product (e. g. business loan or credit card loan), its 
seniority, collateral and country of origination. '7. 
Reduced form model assume either a constant (Litterman and Iben, JLT, for example) or a 
stochastic recovery rate (Duffle and Singleton and DT for example). These models assume zero 
correlation among the LGDs of different borrowers, and hence no systematic risk is due to 
14 For an interesting and detailed analysis of the limitations of the equity approach see Jarrow and Turnbull (2000) 
15 The estimation of LGD depends on the availability of historical loss data that may be retrieved by the following 
possible sources: bank's own historical LGDs records, samples by risk segment; trade association and publicly 
available regulatory reports; consultants' proprietary data on client LGDs, and published rating agency data on the 
historical LGDs of corporate bonds. 
16 For portfolios characterised by distributions of exposure sizes that are highly skewed, the assumption that LGDs 
are known with certainty may tend to bias downwards the estimated tail of the PDF of credit losses 
17 In the Credit Risk+TM model the LGD is treated as a deterministic variable while in the other structural models is 
treated as a random variable. In these models the LGD probability distribution is assumed to take the form of a beta 
distribution because this result in a type of distribution whose shape is typically skewed to the right as shown in the 
empirical works of Altman and Kishore (1998), Carty and Lieberman (1996), Duffle and Singleton (1996), Castle, 
Keisman and Yang (2000) 
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LGD volatilityt8. Moreover, the empirical evidence shows that the recovery rates are both 
state19 and structure20 dependent. In particular, our analysis, based on the last three decades 
default and recovery data on US corporate bonds shows that the recovery rate changes depend 
on the seniority of debt. In fact, comparing senior secured and unsecured bonds one can see that 
the recovery distribution for the latter is more spread out and has a longer lower tail (see table 
1)21 
Recovery Rates by Seniority and Original Bond Rating, 1971-2001 
Seniority 
Number of 
Observations 
Recovery Rate 
Average Weighted Median 
Price Price Price 
Standard 
Deviation 
Senior Secured 
Investment Grade 35 $62.00 $66.00 $56.88 $19.70 
Non-Investment Grade 113 38.65 32.89 30.00 29.46 
Senior Unsecured 
Investment Grade 159 $53.14 $55.88 $50.00 $26.14 
Non-Investment Grade 275 33.16 30.17 31.00 25.28 
Senior Subordinate 
Investment Grade 10 $39.54 $42.04 $27.31 $24.23 
Non-Investment Grade 283 33.31 29.62 28.00 24.84 
Subordinated 
Investment Grade 10 $35.64 $23.55 $35.69 $32.05 
Non-Investment Grade 206 31.73 28.87 28.00 22.06 
Table 1 Recovery rates by seniority of debt (1971-2001) 
18 Furthermore, they assume independence among LGDs associated with the same borrower. The assumption that 
LGDs between borrowers are mutually independent may represent a serious shortcoming when the bank has 
significant industry concentrations of credits. Furthermore, the independence assumption is clearly false with respect 
to LGDs associated with similar (or equally ranked) facilities to the same borrower. The assumption of default 
intensities independence may contribute to an understatement of losses to the extent that LGDs associated with 
borrowers in a particular industry may increase when the industry as a whole is under stress. 
19 Some evidence consistent with the state-dependence of recovery rates is presented in the analysis, based on 
recovery rates, compiled by Moody's for the period 1974 through 1996 (Carty and Lieberman, 1996). However, even 
for senior secured bonds, there was substantial variation in the actual recovery rates. Although these data are also 
consistent with cross-sectional variation in recovery, that is not associated with stochastic variation in time of 
expected recovery, Moody's recovery data also exhibit a pronounced cyclical component. There is equally strong 
evidence that the level of LGD of corporate bonds vary with the business cycle (as is seen, for example, in Moody's 
data). Speculative-grade default rates tend to be higher during recessions, when interest rates and recovery rates are 
typically below their long-run means. 
20 See Castle, Keisman and Yang (2000) 
21 Also Duffle and Singleton found similar results. 
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The analysis also ranks the results in investment grade and non-investment grade. 
When evaluating an instrument at the first steps of its life the type of guarantee rate on the 
underlying security is an extremely relevant characteristic, which 
- 
according to historical data 
- 
implies that the credit is subject to a global lower risk. This is shown in Table 1, where the 
rating class, at the time of issuance, non investment grade in particular, is not influencing the 
average values as much as the seniority class does (see the senior secured and senior unsecured 
investment grade case). 
The most relevant issue is that the dominant factor influencing the evaluation of the security is 
the composition of both the recovery rate and default probability. Actually, low default rates do 
not assure that in case of default the recovery rate is low as well; on the other hand high 
recovery rate is not a credit low-risk index alone, since the security might by highly defaultable, 
implying the elevated investment risk. 
In the integrated model we will estimate spread term structure by rating class, to explicitly 
consider the credit rating (risk) transition and will adjust them by means of spread term 
structure of recovery rate by seniority of debt, both in a arbitrage free framework, in order to 
get a risk-neutral price of the financial instruments. 
4. The theoretical integrated pricing model 
There are two main approaches to pricing credit risky instruments: the structura122 and the 
reduced form approach. It is argued that the structural approaches are of limited value when 
applied to price interest rate and credit sensitive instruments and, consequently, in measuring 
and managing market and credit risk in an integrated fashion. Rosen (2002) shows that, since 
the main focus of structural model is the measure of the counterparty exposure risk, they 
assume deterministic market risk factors, such as interest rate risk. In contrast to structural 
models, which assume a specific microeconomic process generating customers' default and 
rating migrations, reduced-form models attempt to directly describe the arbitrage free evolution 
of risky debt values without reference to an underlying firm-value process. Acharya, Das and 
22 In fact, the structural approach assumes some explicit microeconomic model for the process that determines 
defaults or rating migrations of any single customers. A customer might be assumed to default if the underlying 
value of its assets falls below some specified threshold, such as the level of the customers' liabilities. The change in 
the value of a customer's assets in relation to various thresholds is often assumed to determine the change in its risk 
rating over the planning horizon. Structural approach models are Merton type models. 
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Sundaram (2002)23 show how this class of model have resulted in successful conjoint 
implementations of term-structure models with default models. The objective pursued within 
the suggested integrated pricing model is that of deriving a general framework for pricing risky 
debt, both plain vanilla (as for example corporate bond) and (credit) derivative. Present values 
of all cash flows are calculated by using both stochastic interest rate term structure (market 
risk) and stochastic credit spread term structure (credit risk). This last term can be decomposed 
in the following risk sources: 
1) stochastic recovery rates by seniority, 
2) correlation between interest rate term structure and stochastic recovery rates (correlation of 
market and credit risk) 
3) multi state transition probability at the m-th time step for the M-period process. 
In this set up the proposed integrated pricing model may be considered a multi-period mark to 
model framework. 
As for all reduced-form models, also in our integrated model we start modelling the risk free 
term structure by considering an underlying process for the evolution of risk-less rates. The 
objective is to build a lattice of risky rates on top of the risk-less rate process in an arbitrage- 
free manner by directly modelling credit spread components (transition and recovery risk). 
We generalise the Das & Tufano (DT) model, where the spread term structure by rating class is 
modelled through three main components: risk neutral probability matrix, stochastic recovery 
rate and its correlation with interest rates. In the DT model the first component is aimed at 
estimating the transition risk; the second one, the recovery risk;, the last one, the correlation 
between market and credit risk. In the integrated model different set-ups for different seniority 
classes are introduced within an arbitrage free framework. 
As the empirical evidence shows (see section 2 and 3) the mean recovery is mainly contingent 
on the seniority of debt rather than on the rating class alone (investment grade vs. non 
investment grade in our analysis) as it is almost invariably assumed in all reduced model. The 
major contribution of this work it is to correct each STSRC through a spread contingent on the 
seniority of debt (SSD) within a unique arbitrage free framework. As a result, this model allows 
23 Reduced-form models may differ depending on the procedure that is used, the input information required, the use 
of ratings-matrix and the recovery assumptions. As pointed out by Das and Sundaram (2000)[211 There are three 
commonly used assumptions concerning recovery rates in the event of default: recovery of par, where the recovery 
amount is specified as a fraction of par value due at maturity; recovery of treasury, where recovery amount is 
specified as a fraction of value of a default-free bond with the same maturity, recovery of market value, where the 
recovery amount is specified as a fraction of the immediately-preceding market value. 
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more variability in the spreads of risky debt. Moreover, by choosing different recovery rate 
processes for instruments within the same credit rating class, it allows variability of spreads to 
be instrument specific rather than rating class specific. 
4.1 The stochastic interest rate term structure model 
In the integrated model an interest term structure is assigned at each rating class i (where 0si5 
K, if we consider K rating classes). The i-th interest rate f at which cash flows are to be 
discounted is composed of forward risk-free interest rate plus a (forward) spread s associated 
to the same rating class as shown below: 
fi(t) = forward curve for rating class-i = forward risk free(t) + spread-i (4.1.1) 
In this context, the risk-free forward interest rate (stochastic) process, can be modelled by using 
any interest rate term structure model like, for example, the Heath-Jarrow-Morton (1992) or the 
Black-Derman-Toy [1990] model. It is not the purpose of this paper to enter details of the risk 
neutral set up model formulation for the evolution of the interest rate free term structure, for 
which specialised literature may be addressed. More relevant to the present paper purposes is to 
illustrate how the spread is modelled for which the following paragraphs are devoted to. 
4.2 The stochastic spread term structure model 
Recovery rates, risk of default and the seniority type are relevant parameters for assessing 
credit risk. Therefore, in the integrated model, the spread is decomposed in its two main 
determinants: recovery rates and default (transition) risk. In order to price the credit spread 
component of the interest rate term structure, both recovery rate and default variables need to 
be modelled. Let d be the default rate (i. e., the rate at which default occurs). This rate may be 
either constant, or function of time-to-maturity of the security or of any other factor in the 
economy. The recovery rate represents the fraction of the face value of the security that is 
recovered in case of default and is denoted O4. 
Considering the influence of recovery and default rates on credit instruments, it is possible to 
analyse a first simple relationship between these parameters and interest rate spreads. Let r be 
the one period risk-less rate of interest, then the risk-neutral value of a credit risky bond, 
maturing in a single period from now, must be equal to the discounted value of the expected 
cash flows in the future: 
24 It results by construction 0545.1. 
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B-dO+(1-d) 
1+r 
(4.2.1) 
where the parameters d and 0 have been set to their risk-neutral values. On the other hand the 
price of the risky bond B off the spread curve is given by: 
B= 
1 
1+r+s 
(4.2.2) 
By equating the right hand sides of Eq. (4.2.1) and Eq. (4.2.2) the required relationship between 
the spread s, which is the observed market spread for the generic security I, and the 
determinants of the spread may be derived. Solving by s we obtain: 
d(1-qSXl+r) 
1-d(1-0) 
(4.2.3) 
In general, the actuarial estimation of the default rate is different from its risk neutral value d, 
because the way through which the actuarial value is estimated is independent from the market 
price of that security. If, recalling eq. 2.1, the actuarial default rate is qik, we have: 
S` 9r, ß 
(t 
- 
cX1 + r) (4.2.4) 
where sac, differs from s. To calibrate the statistical value of the default rate one can use spread 
market data. Given s, it is possible to render qik risk neutral by summing to q,, the adjustment 
factor 'c 
S- 
(q,, k +'r)(1-cXl+r) 
1-(qi, k +7r)(1-0) 
Consequently d= q1k +; r. 
(4.2.5) 
This approach allows coupling the model of the stochastic process for the interest rate term- 
structure to the market data (i. e., theoretical and empirical data). 
From Eq. (4.2.3) it is possible to see that: 
a) the spread increases proportionally to the default rate d increase; this has a financial 
implication: as the default rate d increases the possibility of getting values far apart form the 
expected average value is higher. On the contrary, in the limiting case of default risk 
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approaching zero (d--ý 0; for d=0 the recovery rate looses its meaning) the spread tends to zero 
(s--* 0), allowing the certain value equal to the average 
b) the spread decreases proportionally to the recovery rate O increase, which means that 
- 
in 
case of default 
- 
the higher is the chance of getting back the invested amount, the more limited 
fluctuations from the average price are got; in other words high recovery rates assure low 
credit risk. In the limiting case, approaching total recovery (O- 1) the spread still tends to zero 
(s-o- 0), in the ideal limiting case s=0 representing the evolution of a risk-less process 
c) when the default rate tends to one (d--> 1) and the recovery rate tends to zero (0 
-- 
0) the 
spread tends asymptotically to become infinite. 
Of course limiting cases are never reached but their study helps visualising the trend of the 
functional dependence of the spread from the default risk and recovery rate. In fact, as pointed 
out by Das (2001), Eq. (4.2.3) expresses the spread as a function of the composite variable 
d(1-c), for this reason the above formulation does not allow expressing the spread as a function 
of default risk and recovery rate independently. Therefore a more elaborated interest rate spread 
modelling is needed. Considering, for example, the HJM model, it is possible to observe that its 
structure allows for the required effective two-factor decomposition of credit spreads. Under 
the risk-neutral measure, the expected risky cash flows discounted at risk-less rates must be 
equal to the value of expected risk-less cash flows discounted at risky discount rates: 
T T_I 
E exp 
- 
AZ J (t, ji) * Cd (m) = exp -A(, (t, jo) + s, (A)) *1 
m=e +l I=ä 
ö 
(4.2.6) 
where Cd(m) is the expected cash flow of the risky bond in case of default at the time step-m 
before maturity and 1 is the cash flow in case of non-default. 
In order to render Cd(m) in explicit form it is necessary to define the cumulative and one-period 
default probabilities associated to the rating class of the instrument at any given time, and to 
consider the recovery rate at the corresponding default time. 
Including the default risk, the recovery rate and the credit seniority information in Cd(m), by 
means of Eq. (4.2.3) it is possible to estimate the determinants of the interest rate term structure 
spread associated to the rating class I contingent to the seniority of debt. ' 
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In order to develop a consistent framework 
- 
since for the interest rate term structure model a 
risk-neutral world is assumed, the actual transition probabilities (estimated by using the 
mortality approach25 described in section 2) have to be risk-neutral adjusted. After having 
obtained the risk-neutral set up for the evolution of the term structure of interest rates, the 
integrated model derives the risk-neutral probabilities of the transition process to default. 
Summarising, we will first correlate the interest rate term with one recovery rate structure, then, 
we will generalise the results by considering s seniority type thus including the spread 
correction due to the recovery dependence on the seniority. 
Following this set up a new stochastic framework for the arbitrage-free pricing of risky debt is 
depicted. This framework is illustrated through the following three steps: 
1) construct a one period risk neutral probability matrix for each seniority type 
2) extend to a multi-period framework through the definition of a cumulative risk-neutral 
transition matrix which allows the obligor to default at any point in time 
3) estimate the STSRC contingent to the seniority of debt 
4.2.1 Risk-neutral probability transition matrix 
One of the key points in which the integrated model departs form other models is in the spread 
dependence assumption of both the recovery rate on seniority s and of the rating class. In 
general, in the integrated model, the recovery rate is assumed to follow any "reasonable" 
distribution. We suggest calibrating the model by using a beta distribution in according to the 
empirical evidence described in the second section. In practice any value for the recovery rate is 
possible with a non zero probability. The probability density function of the beta distribution, 
g,,, 
, 
is given by: 
lsas fý - 
r(as 
mý 
rl/ýs 
mý 
" Y'a mm 
_1 
' 
(1 
- 
I. 
s, m 
ßt 
m-l for 0< 0t, 
m 
<1 
gs, 
m 
os. 
m s, m s, m 
0 for qStm <0andqSt, 
m 
>1 (4.2.1.1) 
with s =1,..., 5 
where q,,, 
 
represents the fraction of recovery at time m associated to the seniority type s, 
g,,, 
 
(. ) represents the probability associated to that recovery rate (belonging to the s seniority 
Zs The statistical migration matrix is an input in this pricing model. One can also use other approach, like the S&P or 
Moody's method of estimating the migration matrix 
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class); the seniority type range is between I and 5 because the considered seniority classes are 
5: senior secured, senior unsecured, senior subordinated, subordinated, junior subordinated. 
Moreover I' stands for gamma distribution and a,.,,, e are two generic parameters which 
depend from both the seniority (s) and the time (m). Equation 4.2.2.1 has the required property 
that the recovery is bounded by 0 and 126. If 31,73% and q,, =22,06%, as for the 
subordinated non investment grade bond (see table 1), the pdf of the beta distribution is 
depicted in figure 1. 
pdf (BETA) subordinated non investment grade 
0.02 
d 0.015 
0.01 
ö 0.005 
a 
0 
recovery %4 
Figure I pdf beta distribution with fus,, r 31,73% and oass,,, =22,06%, 
Ehe figure illustrates the high degree of randomness of the recovery rates. 
The model objective is to develop a risk neutral lattice for pricing risky debt. In order to render 
the forward interest and recovery rate process tractable numerically, the corresponding state 
space27 should be discretised consistently through both the (discretised) time structure, m, and 
through the "shock" vectors v28, for the risk free term structure process, and z, for the recovery 
rate process. To implement the model, we make the standard discrete time assumption that v 
and z are binomial random variables. In particular, we assume that both v and z takes on the 
value ±1 with probability 0,5: 
26 The parameters can be computed since the mean and variance a2s, m of a beta distribution are given by: 
111,, 
 
= and 07, 
,= 
where fps, 
 
and a are the mean and standard 
a,.,, + 8,., 
n a,.,, + 
ß,,,,, a., +91.111+1) 
deviation of the actual empirical distribution of credit recovery belonging to seniority debt type-s. 
2' The state-space is defined as the ensemble of all possible states related to the stochastic process. 
2" If, for example, the HJM model is used to build the risk neutral set up for the estimation of the risk free term 
structure, v represent the random variable of the underlying stochastic process, 
i. e.: J '(t + nt, T) _/ (t, T) + a(t, T)in + a(t, T)v m, where a and a represent respectively both the drift and the 
volatility of the process. In a discrete time set up, periods are taken to be of length m>O, thus a typical time point, t, 
has the form Im for integer I. 
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+1 
-1 
_ 
Z_ 
+1 
-1 -1 
(4.2.1.2) 
Consequently, "dicretising", the recovery rate vector, function of each seniority type s at the 
given time m, becomes: 
+05m 
oa, 
m 
7Va. m lZý _; $=1ý... ý5 
- 
o:, 
m 
(4.2.1.3) 
From now on, to reduce the notational burden, we suppress the dependence from z and in the 
remainder we will consider 0,,. (z) = 0, (m) 
. 
We will remark the time dependence because we will allow in our model to choose different 
beta distribution parameterisation in different time, like for example, in different economic 
cycle. In a discrete time set up, in order to consider a consistent and integrated risk-neutral 
framework, it is necessary to correlate the state space recovery rates structure with the forward 
rates term structure at any given time. 
Let us define p as the (empirical) correlation between the term interest rate structure and the 
recovery rate2g, the assumed joint distribution is: 
(+ 1, +1), with prob p l l 
(+1, 
-I), withprob. =A 
l (4.2.1.4) 
I, +i) with prob. (1 p) 4 ( 
(-1, -1), with prob. 
(( 
Moreover, let us define p' as the risk neutral probability vector30 collecting the states 
probabilities of each branch of the lattice: 
29 The definition of the parameter p allows having one more degree of freedom, which 
. 
enables to perform the 
proper recovery rates and interest rates correlation choice according to the overall economy time-scale considered in 
the model. 
-. I 
"The vector is risk neutral by construction having assumed that v and z takes on the value ±1 with probability 0,5. 
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1+p 
4 
1-p 
4 p 1-p 
4 
l+p 
4. 
For computational needs (and for notation ease) it is useful to introduce another concept before 
to get the final explicit functional form for the forward spreads: the state-prices31. The state 
price (denoted by the variable w(m)) at time m+1 evaluated at time-m is defined as the price at 
time-m times the risk-neutral probability p' of being in that state at the time-m discounted at the 
risk-free interest rate, i. e.: 
W(md)= p'. W[(m-1)A]" 
+fm-gym 
(4.2.1.5) 
where the state prices are considered as four dimensional vectors (corresponding to the four 
possible states defined by the double stochastic structure) for each seniority and fn_I, m is the 
forward rate between time 1=(m-1)d and time t=md. 
Both the interest rate term structure and the recovery rate structure are implied in the definition 
of the state price, track of them can be found in the discount and probability factors, 
respectively. The cash-flow at time step-m is a function of recovery rates as well as transition 
rates. While recovery rates are correlated to the risk-neutral interest rate structure, the transition 
probabilities have to be rendered risk-neutral in order to preserve the overall framework 
consistency. 
For this purpose it is necessary to introduce the adjusting factors i(m) to the empirical 
transition probabilities defined for any time step-m. Let us consider the one-period transition 
from a generic time-m to time (m+1); this is performed by defining the unknown quantities 
31 As pointed out by Das and Sundaram (2000) "State prices are the current value of a security that pays off a dollar 
in a single specific state in the future and zero in all other states. For example, if there are only two possible states 
("up" and "down") at the same time in the future, then the state price of the "up" state would be the value of a dollar 
received in that state times the risk neutral probability of that state, discounted to the present, using a risk-less 
discount rate. State prices are useful since they allow computing the price of any security by multiplying the payoffs 
of the security by state prices in each node (state), and then adding these values up. Of course at time 0 the state price 
is simply unity. i. e. w(0)=1" 
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di(m) referred to the i-th rating class and to the s-th seniority type32 of the credit instrument at 
time step-m. 
qii (m) 
QS (m) 
=lq,. j 
ýmý}- q21 ýmý 
L0 
(m))'gii(m) 
'Y21 (M) 
2 
(m) 
0 
.... 
qiK (m) 
q22 (M) 
"" 
g2K(m) 
001 
q12 
(m) 
1 
(m) 
1-(1-7r (m)) 
. 22(m) 
0 
.. 
c1zK(m)'Ti (m) 
.. 
9M 
(M) 
"TS 2(M) 
.. 
1 
(4.2.1.6) 
where Q' (m) is the risk neutral representation of Q(m), when incorporating the seniority type 
effect in the transition matrix by rating class, as shown in the generic element q;, (m) 
. 
The 
element q, ', (m) , by construction, explicitly consider the adjustment factor di(m). Invoking the 
definition of state price, for the credit instrument of seniority type-s being in class-i at time-m, 
the following condition, in a risk neutral world, must be satisfied: 
w(m4). E[Cs(m)]=1+ {ý1` 
+s  mM 
(4.2.1.7); 
where fact is the actual forward interest in the period between time-m and maturity (time M), 
s is the market spread and the expected cash flow at time-m for the bond of rating class-i and 
seniority type-s is determined by: 
=q s1 (m), q-'2 (m), 
.... 
q s2 (m)..., q' (m)]" [1,1, 
..., 
1, 
..., 
0s (m)]= 1. I. K 11 
= 
[qr., (m s (m) q,. 2 (m)rs (m),..., 1- (1- qr. r S (my,..., qr. K (m); (m)]. 
" 
[1,1, 
..., 
1, 
..., 
Os (m)l 
(4.2.1.8) 
32 One reason behind the choice of K rating class and s seniority type is that there are well studied tables of default 
frequencies for standard ratings, and there is not enough data to distinguish between different seniority types. 
Another reason is that while rating is subject to random changes the seniority class remains unchanged during the life 
of an asset 
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Eq (4.2.1.7) and Eq. (4.2.1.8) provide the solutions for the unknown 7r; ' associated to the rating 
class-i and seniority type-s by calibrating those equations with the (average) market spread of 
the considered risky debt. In fact, making use of simple algebra, it is possible to show that Eq 
(4.2.1.7) is the generalisation of Eq (4.2.5) when considering the assumptions of the suggested 
integrated pricing model. 
Applying the above-mentioned market price calibration it is possible to find all the adjustment 
factors to get the risk neutral transition matrix for seniority type-s at time t. 
Five transition matrices for each rating class correspondent to the five seniority types are 
generated. Therefore the model can be split into five parallel models yielding specific 
information on the seniority for any rating class, at any time step. This information is then 
embedded in the final expression of the spread related to the seniority type. At this stage it is 
important to observe that, according to the data in table 1, default rates are not affected by the 
credit instrument dependence on seniority, while the recovery rate does. Within this unified risk 
neutral framework is possible to measure the contribution of the seniority type to the risk 
neutral spread curve. 
4.2.2 Multiple time horizon 
Up to now the attention was focussed on those variables, assumptions and parameters that have 
a direct impact on credit risk, without explicitly considering the time at which those quantities 
have been evaluated or defined. Another basic managerial aspect of credit risk is the time 
horizon of the risk measure. This measure of risk of a financial instrument is a critical issue. In 
fact, in this case, the problem of extrapolation, or interpolation, has to be faced in order to 
achieve the correct estimation of migration probabilities in the multiple time-horizons. 
Let us consider the one-period probabilities qSO (m) as the probability of migrating from rating 
class-i to rating classy in the time interval between time step (m-1) and step m with respect to a 
generic recovery rate structure s. It is important to point out that the probabilities previously 
considered in the transition matrix elements at the generic time step-m are regarded as 
cumulative probabilities. The (actual) cumulative probabilities are obtained by the one step 
probabilities through a recursive procedure. 
Under the assumption that the one period migration probabilities at subsequent time steps are 
independent, it is possible to obtain the actual rating class transition probabilities, from any 
class-i to any class j, at the subsequent time step, by multiplying the actual migration matrix at 
time-m with the one at time m+1. This procedure may be applied recursively yielding for the 
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actual transition matrix at time T. Applying the risk-neutral adjustment procedure at any time 
step, as outlined in previous paragraph, the risk-neutral transition matrix at time period m+1 is 
directly derived. Notice that this structure allows embedding in any transition probability at the 
given time-m all the information on transition probabilities at previous time steps (maintaining 
probabilities independence). Therefore the single one-period transition probability q'jjm) keeps 
the information on q'k, (n) for all states k, l and for all times steps-n (n<m). In particular, the 
default probabilities tf 4K(m) contain the information on the previous time step transition 
probabilities. 
This feature distinguishes the integrated model form the other reduced models outlined in 
section 1,2 and 4. Transition probability can change significantly over time. An investment 
grade has a higher chance of downgrade than of upgrade and viceversa33. This means that, in 
the high rated firms, transition risk (and default probability in particular) increases over time 
and, by contrast, high yield risky debt that do not default, are more likely to improve than 
deteriorate in credit quality, thus showing a decreasing default probability over time. 
4.2.3 One-period and cumulative transition probabilities 
Before deriving the formula for the spread curve it is interesting to focus on transition 
probabilities. Provided that K rating classes are considered, qj3K'° (mA) is defined as the one- 
period default probability, i. e. the probability of migration from the rating class i to class K 
(corresponding to the default state), over the period from [(m-1)d, md], associated to the state I 
and generic seniority s, 
The cumulative probability of default at the time period-m (t--mA) is defined as gs; K(md), and 
it is a function of the previous-time cumulative probability (probability of having got default 
until the previous time step) and the one-period default probability (probability of getting to 
default between (m-1)d and mA)) as follows: 
9, °K (m0) =q rc ((m -1)0) + [1- 4ir ((m -1)0)]. qir (mA) (4.2.3.1). 
Conversely, the one period probability of default in the period indexed by m may be expressed 
, 
o(md)- q-1(md)-q-'((m-1)d) q'" ` OK 1-q; 
x((m-1)d) (4.2.3.2) 
" This phenomenon is known as mean reversion in credit ratings 
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These definitions are useful to compute expected cash flows over time for a zero coupon risky 
bond. Since q'j1(md)>O, and the cumulative probability of default must be increasing: 
gsiK(m, 0)-gSiK((m-1)0)> 0 (4.2.3.3) 
then, default probabilities lie in the range [0,1] as required. In this formalisation it is important 
to point out that by means of the procedure outlined above, the risk-neutral adjusted transition 
probabilities to default carry on the information of all the actual transition probabilities. 
At this stage all the information required for deriving the spread structure as a function of its 
determinants has been derived and may be embedded into the cash flow evaluation. 
With reference to Eq. (4.2.6) and Eq. (4.2.1.8), the expected cash flow at the m-th time period 
for the given seniority class-s in its explicit form is: 
E[C, (m)]=1 
" 
[1- 9, ((m 
-1))I. 9s (miX). qS, mix, n) (4.2.3.4) 
which also generalise Eq. (4.2.1). 
In the integrated model, within the multiple time horizon approach: 
a) the one-period probabilities are given by the first transition probability 
b) the cumulative probabilities are derived recursively. 
The philosophy of the integrated model appears evident also at this stage since the strict 
correlation between the underlying model structure and the empirical data is assured at each 
step of the formulation: theory and actual data are interwoven in order to assure adherence 
between the theoretical process and the market dynamics. Recalling Eq. (4.2.3.4) it is possible to 
rewrite Eq. (4.2.6) in the following way: 
E exp 
-A 
M-1 f (t, j0) C'(m) 
= exp -Aý'(f(t,. lA)+spsiVO)) ; Vi (4.2.3.5) 
,t +l J. =ö 
Making use of both the definition of state prices and cash-flow in case of default (see Eq. 
4.2.1.7) at any time-step-m Eq. (4.2.3.5) becomes: 
' 
ii 1Yw(mA, 
n)[I-qik(m-I)A)lq*'O(mA)O, (mA, n)]=exp 
-AtV (tºJO) spsi )) bj (4.2.3.6) 
26 
Chapter 1 
4.3 Spread term structure by rating class contingent to the seniority of debt 
The term structure of forward credit spreads estimation is the problem to be solved in the last 
step of the process. For any rating class and seniority type the following spread, 
{Sp°; (t)} is 
evaluated 
(t) i=1,..., K; s=1,..., 5; t<T 6 't (4.3.1) 
In order to give the spread curve in its explicit form it is necessary to consider its integral 
formulation. The spread curve evaluated at time t for a given rating class-i is defined by all 
spreads computed at consequent time steps within the bond life-span, specifically in the time 
interval [t, TJ 
. 
Let us consider Eq. (4.2.3.6) and define the integral spread curve S(AM) 
between the, u-th and the M-th period (corresponding to any given time rE [t, T] and maturity 
t=T, respectively) 
T-1 
SP'. Q, ý 
-sp. (p, m)° es spsi(j)= 
j' 
T-1 
(4.3.2) 
T/e me 1rl 
-- " 
Lný ELE w(m0, n)1- qtk (m 
-1)A)]gik (m0)0(mL, n)] t-ý f(z, j0); 0 
m=s/e+l n=1 Js j'e 
In order to derive the spread curve at time step-p the following differential relation is used 
SP'+I I=SP't(u)=SP31(u, M)-SP', (U-1, M) (4.3.3) 
Finally, referring to Eq. (4.3.2) the forward interest rate spread is determined as: 
TE LEw(m0, n)[1-q'iK(m-1)A)]gs0jK(mA)O, (mL, n)ý 
s__ m=rIA+1 n=1 Sp'(a) 
A T/A rm - 
EIE w(mA, n)[1- q'iK (m 
-1)A)} q' rx (m0)O: (ms, n)] M=T/ 0 Ln-1 
T-1 T-1 
-Lf (r, j0)- J f(r -A, jA) ; i=1,..., K; s=1,..., 5; t: 5 r: 5 T (4.3.4) 
L J°ö J ö-1 
The last-period forward spread between time T and time T+d relative to the i-th rating class and 
adjusted for the seniority s is denoted by sps; (7)- sp'; (M), by computing node-T on the tree of 
the interest forward rate structure, the spread is derived considering the last period expected 
cash-flow in case of default without considering previous cash-flow events. Referring to 
Eq. (4.3.4) it is straightforward to derive the last-period spread as follows 
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exp[ dsp3i(T)l =E 1-gs'K(T+0)-gsrx(T)(1-0s(T+A)) 
, 
`di (4.3.5), 
1-q iK(T) 
which gives 
exp[ dspsi(T)]=E 1'-gs'K(T+0)-qsK(T)(1-0s(T+A)) di (4.3.6) 1- q'iK (T) 
11 
5. Applications 
Our model requires only easily available information as input, namely: the risk-free yield curve, 
the term structure of credit spreads for each rating class, the statistical transition matrix and 
both mean and standard deviation of the recovery rate by seniority of debt. The most important 
and useful resultant model information are: risk neutral transition matrix and risk neutral spread 
term structure both contingent to the seniority of debt. Moreover, the bivariate lattice, thorough 
which the STSRC and SSD has been estimated, was built by correlating risk-less interest rates 
and recovery rates thus considering the integration between market and credit risk. Using this 
information, the following products, among others, are priced by generating the necessary cash 
flows at each node on the lattice and discounting the cash flows back by multiplication by the 
state prices to obtain present values: plain-vanilla risky debt for any rating class and any 
seniority of debt; rating-sensitive debt, in particular, our model perform quite well to price such 
debt since the rating transition matrix provides risk-neutral information on rating changes 
(adjusted to the seniority) which can be directly used to generate cash flows at each node on the 
tree; spread-adjusted notes: the coupon may also be indexed to the spread at each node, this is 
achieved by computing the forward spread at each node on the lattice and, since the price of 
risky debt is known at each node, and so is the risk-less rate, it is quite simple to compute the 
credit spread at each node as well; spread option: given the computed spread at each node, it is 
possible to price spread option since cash flows may be generated at each node by comparing 
the spread at the node with the strike rate; total return swaps: since the price of any underlying 
risky bond is computable at each node on the tree, the total return on the bond may also be 
easily calculated. Although the model is rich and flexible enough to price many credit assets, 
both plain vanilla and derivative, we think is particularly appropriate to price defaultable loans 
and corporate bonds. 
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6. Conclusions and further research 
The stochastic spread structure model considered within the integrated model allows taking into 
account effects due to rating transitions (including default events) and recovery rates depending 
on seniority. The overall procedure allows discriminating the effects of the credit instrument 
belonging to a specified rating class at any given time; actually fixing the time step in the 
forward interest rate term structure, k-1 spreads corresponding to the defined rating classes are 
derived. More specifically, this model is aimed at computing the spread for credit instruments 
belonging to a defined rating class and having a specified seniority, so that to discriminate the 
information relative on the given seniority. This framework allows depicting the effects on 
spread curves due to the rating class and 
-for any given rating class- the effects due to the 
different seniority types using the risk neutral arbitrage set-up. 
Further research on this area will be devoted both on considering the influence of the economic 
cycle on the estimation of recovery contingent to seniority and analysing the structural 
interdependencies between recovery rate and default probability. Moreover the issue of default 
correlation and its impact on pricing risky debt should also be investigated. Finally, from a 
practical point of view, there are at least two other relevant issues that need to be carefully 
taken in consideration in future work, namely both liquidity risk and parameter calibration. Our 
intuition is that we need an integrated pricing and risk model to exploit in a coherent framework 
the risk and capital management banking problem. 
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Chapter 2 
A Framework for Risk 
Measures and Risk Adjusted 
Performance 
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Markowitz (1959) 
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Eltville Frankfurt Center for Financial Studies, Bundesbank Training Department and Milan, Italian Banking 
Association, for helpful discussion of this study. Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the Euro Working 
Group on Financial Modelling Meeting (Trondheim and New York 2000), at the Annual Meetings of both Financial 
Management Association (Toronto 2001) and European Financial Management Association (Helsinky 2003). 
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1. Introduction 
The comparison of expected returns with the standard deviation of portfolio returns, suggested 
by the mean-variance portfolio theory of Markowitz (1952) and Sharpe (1964), has long been the 
benchmark for performance measurement, both because of its tractability and because of the 
clear intuitions it provides about diversification and the efficiency of portfolio allocation. 
However, the strong assumptions and substantial practical limitations of mean-variance portfolio 
theory are also widely known. Financial returns exhibit asymmetry (skewness), fat tails 
(kurtosis) and are all too often subject to liquidity problems that markedly increase the level of 
downside risk in stressed situations. Traditional performance measures based on mean-variance 
theory, such as the Sharpe ratio, Treynor ratio, and the Jensen alfa, generate paradoxical results 
when applied to portfolios with non-normally distributed returns. 
Investors also exhibit a huge range of attitudes towards risk, typically either penalising extreme 
losses and/or valuing substantial gains to a much greater extent than would be predicted by a 
quadratic preference function. In theory, non-traditional performance evaluation techniques 
(based on other models of investor preferences and capital market equilibrium) can still be 
applied to non-normal returns, incorporating a range of different utility assumptions. 
Nevertheless, in practice, utility is not directly observed. Simple, intuitively tractable, measures 
of risk and performance are needed in order for portfolio managers and investors to communicate 
with each other and decide their investment policies. 
The limitations of mean-variance measures and the inapplicability of utility theory to practical 
decision making, explain the interest of portfolio managers in a great variety of other measures 
of risk, used to assist them with their investment decisions. Downside measures of risk such as 
expected shortfall, conditional tail expectation, or lower-partial moments are attractive as a tool 
that emphasises the potential for loss. Upside potential can be captured by such measures as the 
Sortino ratio (Sortino, 1991) and the Upside Potential ratio, Sortino and Forsey (2001). 
However, how are portfolio managers to compare these different measures, embodying wholly 
different approaches to summarizing risk? Since there exist many (and conflicting) objectives, 
choosing a single "correct" measure of risk is unrealistic. There are also great differences in 
return distributions so that a measure of risk appropriate for one type of exposure and return 
distribution 
- 
e. g. equity risk 
-- 
may be much less appealing when applied to another 
- 
e. g. 
credit risk-2. 
2 To complete the picture, it is worth to mention that recent research in the behavioural finance area describes how 
investors say they want to behave. In general, investors do not seek the highest return for a given level of risk, as 
31 
Chapter 2 
This chapter confronts these issues. It reviews the wide range of risk measures currently used in 
portfolio management, assessing them both from the perspective of stochastic dominance and 
from the coherence axioms of Antzner et. Al. (1997). It then proposes the use of a particular 
class of risk measures 
- 
the distortion risk measures 
- 
for portfolio management. 
Distortion risk measures have been developed by actuarial scientists (Wang 1995), providing an 
elegant mathematical solution to the problem of summarizing risk. One particular attraction of 
distortion risk measures is the clarification of conditions under which a risk measure satisfies 
both the axioms of coherence and the different orders of stochastic dominance. Distortion risk 
measures can be chosen that are coherent and satisfy at least the first two orders of stochastic 
dominance. Moreover, as we will emphasise, a portfolio manager can make a choice within a 
"family" of distortion measures, so as to achieve an appropriate balance of downside risk 
(potential losses) and upside risk (potential gains). Distorted measures of risk do not provide a 
single risk-measure applicable to all investment situations. What they do provide is a single 
treatment of risk-measurement that can incorporate varying preferences towards both upside and 
downside risks within a single measurement framework, whilst also ensuring that investment 
choices are consistent with both stochastic dominance and coherence;. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two provides an overview of the literature. Section 
three is aimed at briefly describing the most important appealing risk measures features: 
coherence and stochastic dominance. Section 4 reviews the most widespread used risk measures 
in the banking, insurance and asset management industry. In this section investors is considered 
to approach decision-making under uncertainty with different risk definitions, risk measures and 
risk risk-reward criteria. For this purpose through section 4.1,4.2 and 4.3 risks are categorized in 
four classes: 
0 Risk as maximum potential loss (given a set of possible states of nature), typically quantile 
risk measure such as Value at Risk (VaR); 
. 
Risk as the magnitude of deviation from a target (two sided and one side), typically 
conditional measure of shortfall risk such as expected shortfall (ES), conditional tail 
expectation (CTE) and tail VaR (TVaR); 
traditional portfolio theory assumes. Investors seek upside potential with downside protection. Investors desire 
consistency of return and therefore choose decision processes that preserve appropriate future financial flexibility. 
Rather than maximize the expected return, they want to maximize a "satisfiable" strategy. 
3 From a shareholder and management perspective, for the sake of portfolio optimization and sound risk management, 
it is essential for a risk measure to properly reflect the risk differentials in alternative strategies or portfolios. In this 
case a risk measure, although being coherent, ignores useful information in a large part of the loss of the distribution, 
and consequently lacks incentive for mitigating losses below the quantile VaR. A good risk measure for portfolio 
management must therefore go beyond coherence. 
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" Risk as the magnitude of deviation from the expected utility; 
" 
Risk as maximum potential loss defined as the difference between the wealth today and the 
end-of period wealth. 
In section five a risk measure used in actuarial science, namely the distortion risk measure with 
increasing and strictly concave distortion function, firstly introduced by S. Wang (1995), that are 
shown to be coherent and stochastic dominance compliant, is analysed. In section six the most 
widespread risk-adjusted performance used in the asset, banking and insurance industry are 
discussed, namely: Sharpe Ratio; Information Ratio; Jensen Alfa; Treynor Ratio (based on 
traditional equilibrium portfolio theory); ROVaR, Return on Value (or Capital) at Risk; 
Generalised Sharpe Ratio; Sortino Ratio; Kappa; Omega and the Upside Potential Ratio. Section 
7 will illustrate the key features, strengths and weaknesses of these RAPMs by considering an 
end user perspective within three different frameworks: quadratic utility theory, mean variance 
(normally distributed returns), deviation from investor target risk-return. Section 7.3 presents the 
main contribution of the paper. A RAPM based on distorted risk measure is introduced aimed at 
taking advantage, in term of pro-active risk-return management, of all information provided by 
the whole distribution of portfolio value (return). Section 8 concludes and summarises the main 
findings of this chapter. 
2. Overview of the literature 
Financial portfolio optimisation is a mature field that grew out of the Markowitz's mean- 
variance theory, and the theory of expected utility. Both theories rely on the numerical 
representation of the preference relation investors have for assets with random outcomes. It is 
also assumed that investors are averse to the variability of random outcomes (or risk). Once a 
numerical representation of the investors' behaviour is obtained, it is possible, in practice, to 
use different optimisation methods to compute the optimal allocation of assets for a particular 
investor. 
The process of performing an optimal asset allocation basically deals with the problem of 
finding a portfolio that maximizes the expected utility of the portfolio manager. As long as it is 
supposed that the returns of the portfolio assets follow a normal distribution, the return 
distribution of any portfolio considered will also be normal. In this case, as it is done 
throughout the traditional portfolio theory introduced by Markowitz (1952) and Sharpe (1964), 
the problem of finding an expected, utility-maximizing portfolio for a risk-averse portfolio 
manager, represented by a concave utility function, can be restricted to finding an optimal 
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combination of the two parameters mean and variance. This method dramatically simplifies the 
whole asset allocation process, and is known as mean-variance analysis. It is the aim of the 
portfolio manager to find a portfolio that maximizes his expected return under a given risk 
level or a portfolio that minimizes his risk under a given return level. Risk, in this case, is 
measured by the variance of the portfolio return. Unfortunately, selection rules based on the 
two parameters mean and variance are of limited generality as they are optimal only if the 
utility function is quadratic or the return distribution is normal. 
In deriving the CAPM, Sharpe, Lintner and Mossin assume expected utility (EU) 
maximization following the approach proposed by Markowitz, normal distributions and risk 
aversion. Kahneman & Tversky suggest Prospect Theory (PT) and Cumulative Prospect 
Theory (CPT) as an alternative paradigm to EU theory. They show that investors distort 
probabilities, make decisions based on change of wealth, exhibit loss aversion and maximize 
the expectation of an S-shaped value function that contains a risk-seeking segment. Employing 
change of wealth rather than total wealth contradicts EU theory. The subjective distortion of 
probabilities violates the CAPM assumptions of normality and homogeneous expectations, and 
the S-shaped value function violates the risk aversion assumption. Prospect Theory claims 
characteristics of investors' behavior which contradict the expected utility theory in general, 
and the classical assumptions of the CAPM in particular, but unfortunately it does not suggest 
any equilibrium pricing model which can substitute the existing expected utility model and in 
particular the CAPM. The Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin CAPM is derived by assuming that investors 
are risk-averse, that they maximize expected utility of total wealth, and that the returns are 
normally distributed with homogeneous expectations regarding these distributions°. 
Experimental studies cast doubt on the foundations of the CAPM. Based on experimental 
findings, Prospect Theory (PT) and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) (see Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992))', were developed as an alternative paradigm to expected utility. On the one 
hand, PT and CPT have become a cornerstone in economic research and are the foundation of 
behavioral finance and behavioral economics. 
On the other hand, the CAPM is still the most popular asset-pricing model. PT asserts that 
probabilities are distorted. This violates two assumptions of the CAPM: first, the normality 
4The normality assumption can be relaxed by adding the assumption of quadratic utility functions. Because the 
quadratic utility has two severe drawbacks (U'<0 from some critical value, and increasing absolute risk aversion) 
researchers generally are not willing to assume this utility function. There are other justifications of the CAPM. 
Merton (1973) assumes continuous portfolio revisions which leads to end of period lognormal distributions of returns 
and to an instantaneous CAPM. The CAPM can be obtained also as a special case of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
(APT), see Ross (1976). In this paper I use the classical Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin CAPM assumptions, i. e., normal 
distribution is assumed. 
s They prove in this paper that although CPT (and PT) is in conflict to EUT, and violates some of the CAPM's 
underlying assumptions, the security market line theorem (SMLT) of the CAPM is intact in the CPT framework. 
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assumption is violated, and secondly, as each investor has his/her subjective probability 
distortion, investors face heterogeneous probability distributions of returns, even if before the 
distortion they all face the same normal return distributions. Thus, the normality and the 
homogeneous expectation CAPM assumptions are violated. PT asserts that investors make 
decisions based on change of wealth that violates EUT asserting that decision-making should 
be based on total wealth rather than change of wealth. 
Moreover, no traditional (that is, based on capital market equilibrium models) performance 
evaluation technique applies when assessment the performance of investments in presence of 
non-normal return distribution and/or lacking liquidity. Traditional performance measures such 
as the Sharpe ratio, Treynor ratio, Jensen alfa usually generate paradox results when facing 
with non-normally distributed returns. This can be traced back to the definition of risk used by 
those measures. Variance, for example, is simply inappropriate for non-symmetrical return 
distribution. In addition, lacking market liquidity implies lacking market or benchmark index, 
lacking measures of co-movements (like co-variance) and lacking comparability between 
investments. Unfortunately, the Sharpe ratio is prone to manipulation 
- 
particularly by 
strategies that can change the shape of probability distribution of returns. 
For example, Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) show that non-linear payoffs limit the applicability 
of the Sharpe ratio to the problem of performance evaluation. More recently, Altman, Onorato 
and Pastorello (2000) show that Sharpe ratios are particularly misleading when the shape of the 
return distribution is far from normal. Other researchers, recognizing the limitations of the 
Sharpe ratio and its relatives, have sought alternatives to the reward-to-variability approach. 
These include stochastic-discount factor based performance measures (c. f. Chen and Knez 
(1996)). 
Moreover, the Sharpe ratio and other related reward-to-risk measures may be manipulated with 
option-like strategies. A detailed analysis of this topic can be found in W. Goetzmann and al. 
(2002)6. In this paper they derive the general conditions for achieving the maximum expected 
Sharpe ratio and static rules for achieving the maximum Sharpe ratio with two or more options, 
as well as a continuum of derivative contracts. The optimal strategy rules for increasing the 
Sharpe ratio. Their results have implications for performance measurement in any setting in 
which managers may use derivative contracts. In a performance measurement setting, they 
suggest that the distribution of high Sharpe ratio managers should be compared with that of the 
optimal Sharpe ratio strategy. This has particular application in the hedge fund industry where 
6 Nber Working Paper Series, Sharpening Sharpe Ratios, William Goetzmann, Jonathan Ingersoll, Matthew Spiegel, 
No Welch, Working Paper 9116, http: //www. nber. org/papers/w9ll6, national bureau of economic research, August 
2002. 
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use of derivatives is unconstrained and manager compensation itself induces a non-linear 
payoff. The shape of the optimal Sharpe ratio leads to further conjectures. Expected returns 
being held constant, high Sharpe ratio strategies are, by definition, strategies that generate 
regular modest profits punctuated by occasional crashes. Their evidence suggests that the "peso 
problem" may be ubiquitous in any investment management industry that rewards high Sharpe 
ratio managers 
As an alternative, risk measures based on moments of the underlying return distributions 
became very popular. The fundamental aspects of downside risk approaches were published in 
Roy (1952). His paper can be seen as the starting point for safety first and particularly for 
portfolio theory. An important and not very well known paper was written by Telser (1955). 
This paper examines shortfall restrictions, i. e. it restricts the universe of efficient portfolios to 
those, which can be characterized by reaching a certain minimum return with a minimum level 
of probability. The minimum return is called threshold return, the minimum probability for 
failing to reach the threshold return is usually referred to as shortfall probability. Both of them 
are concerned with the probability k for the stochastic portfolio return r lacking a certain 
level of benchmark return r*: k= P(r <_ r'). The abbreviation P represents "probability". In 
Roy (1952) this case is investigated for probability distributions characterized by the mean and 
the standard deviation by using the Tschebyscheff inequality. 
A straightforward, brief introduction to downside risk management for practitioners can be 
found in Sortino and van der Meer (1991). Pelsser and Vorst (1990) present an extremely 
advanced and significant working paper. It shows how the probability distributions of optioned 
portfolios can be estimated and how the consequences for the shortfall risk of optioned 
portfolios must be implemented. Although this paper provides insights especially for 
determining the probability distributions of optioned stock portfolios the authors analyze how 
to meet the needs of investors by imposing shortfall risk restrictions for an optioned stock 
portfolio. They use a similar method to specify those probability distributions as is the case in 
Bookstaber's and Clarke's (1983) approach 1. However, in contrast to Bookstaber and Clarke 
they use continuous time stochastic processes to describe the underlying stock prices. 
This allows them to specify the process of the stock prices in accordance with the assumptions 
of the Black and Scholes model for pricing options and excludes that negative stock prices can 
occur with positive probabilities. Pelsser and Vorst (1990) use a compounded Wiener process 
for the stock prices which provides a systematic and an unsystematic risk component. Then 
they identify optimum portfolios by maximizing the end-of-period wealth subject to shortfall 
restrictions. Although the shortfall risk of optioned portfolios is not based on normal 
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distributions they transform the shortfall restriction in order to receive linear restrictions. For a 
solution of the maximization problem a linear program has to be solved. 
The Leibowitz and Henriksson (1989) approach was constructed by paying special attention to 
the management of pension fund assets. In this framework the threshold return is typically 
assumed to be deterministic. This approach is known in the literature as the surplus management 
approach. In practice, the relevant threshold benchmark for pension fund managers may, for 
instance, be the growth rate of economic gross wages which randomly fluctuates. A more 
appropriate modeling of this fact can be found in Leibowitz and Kogelman and Bader (1991) 
where a two asset case is considered with stochastic liabilities. 
An extension of the surplus shortfall constraint concept is provided by Wolter (1993). He gives a 
generalization for a portfolio consisting of n assets where the variance of surplus returns, i. e. of 
the return differential between assets and liabilities, is minimized. As in the case of the classical 
mean/variance optimization the resulting function is characterized by a hyperbola. The safety 
first approach provides a method which characterizes adequately the decision situations of 
pension fund managers. However, a serious disadvantage of the shortfall probability k as a 
measure of risk is that the extension of failing to attain the threshold return does not play a 
considerable role: The extent of falling short relative to a threshold return is not respected. For 
instance, whether the threshold return is missed by 0.1% or 10% does not influence the decision, 
since merely the probability of falling short of a threshold return is relevant rather than the extent 
of the shortfalls. Therefore, a generalization of the safety first approach was provided with lower 
partial moments (LPM). Harlow (1991) gives an easily understandable introduction to lower 
partial moments. He defines lower partial moments as downside risk measures as follows 
LPM, = Jý PP(r ;) 
(r 
- 
r*f dr 
r< r 
A lower partial moment of order 1 is defined as the expected value of the downside deviations to 
the power of 1 of a portfolio return from a certain level of threshold return r*. 
For instance, if 1=0 the lower partial moment LPMo exactly equals the shortfall probability k, the 
base of the exponential term strictly equals one, consequently the extent of deviations of the 
portfolio return from the threshold return is not respected. If 1 equals one, then LPM1 may be 
interpreted as the expected portfolio return below the threshold return. Furthermore, for 1=2 the 
Harlow definition is similar to the general definition of the variance except for the fact that the 
threshold return does not necessarily equal the expected portfolio return, and except for the fact 
that the integral is limited at the top by the threshold return. Thus, characterization as downside 
variance and in the case of the square root as downside volatility would be an appropriate 
description. The downside volatility is also characterized in Wolter (1992). Harlow shows how to 
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construct a portfolio selection program, where the LPM1 is minimized instead of the variance of 
the portfolio. He points out that lower partial moments are useful if the portfolio returns are not 
significantly normally distributed, especially if they are skewed. The latter effect is typically 
provoked by using options in stock portfolios or by using credit asset in credit portfolio risk 
management. 
Since lower partial moments characterize portfolios whose return distributions are skewed, 
downside risk measures and probability distributions of optioned stock portfolios are in tight 
context. Moreover, the literature concerning the (credit asset and optioned portfolios) density 
functions of both LPMs and probability distributions cannot be separated. A more advanced 
application of the lower partial moments is in Harlow and Rao (1989). They provide an asset 
pricing model in a very general mean/lower partial moment framework (MLPM). In their paper 
they refer to Bawa (1975 and 1978), where it is shown that a MLPM framework is consistent 
with a very general set of utility functions and asset return distributions. Especially the HARA 
(hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) class of utility functions is completely consistent with LPM1, 
whereas LPM2 is consistent with all risk averse utility functions where the first and the third 
derivatives are positive and the second derivative is negative, i. e. for all utility functions 
displaying a skewness preference. For positive third derivatives of the utility functions, 
maximizing the expected utility in 
E[U(W)]=EU(W)+[2U"(W)]o. w(W)+§fi Ul'1(W)Jm, (W) 
requires maximizing Y1 Ull m, which implies maximizing 
1 U3m3 
. 
Since m3 represents the 
1=3i! 6 
skewness of the probability distribution, maximizing expected utility implies maximizing the 
skewness and hence truncating the downside potential of portfolio returns and maintaining the 
upside potential. It follows that the skewness preference of investors is obtained by constructing 
utility functions with positive third derivatives, i. e. for investors with decreasing absolute risk 
aversion. 
The authors also refer to Bawa and Lindberg's (1977) model where the threshold return is 
assumed to be the riskfree rate of interest. Harlow and Rao (1989) provide an asset pricing model 
where the expected portfolio return is linearly dependent on changes in the market portfolio in 
the same manner as in the CAPM. The beta factor is modified and becomes a ratio where the 
generalized co-lower partial moment between the portfolio and the market portfolio is divided by 
the generalized lower partial moment of the market portfolio. Special attention has to be paid for 
the tests of their empirical findings. Harlow and Rao (1989) provide evidence that the new model 
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cannot be rejected whereas the CAPM is rejected. They specify different levels of target returns 
and obtain the best results when the target return is chosen as the average market return. This 
shows that the market participants are merely concerned with the downside risk of their holdings 
subject to the expected market return and less with the beta risk. 
As was already discussed before, this is an extremely interesting approach to downside risk, due 
to the fact that options are included in stock portfolios here. A technique for estimating the return 
distribution of such portfolios is given and then applied to arbitrary portfolios consisting of 
stocks, call and put options. The selection of assets is optimized subject to certain shortfall 
constraints. An extremely important issue in the context of shortfall risk is the role of the 
investment time horizon effect. In this context Harlow (1991) showed that the shortfall risk is not 
an appropriate measure of risk if using put options skews the probability distribution of the 
portfolio. Furthermore he points out that the shortfall risk, given a constant annualized threshold 
return, is a function of the investment time horizon. The practical implication for pension funds 
is that the deviation of investment time horizon, which is typically very long termed, and the 
reporting horizon, normally one year, force suboptimal portfolios to be chosen. That is, 
portfolios, which are not volatile enough, provide too low returns. 
One way to overcome these paradoxes is define what are the appealing features a risk measure 
should have and what rule of rationality should obey when selecting investment alternatives 
especially in the most general case of non-normal return distributions. In this thesis two main 
attributes are believed to be appropriate for measure of performance that cope with non normal 
distributed returns, and therefore show asymmetry and kurtosis7: stochastic dominance and 
coherence. 
Stochastic dominance principles were first discussed in the seminal paper of Bava (1975). 
Extensive research has been done to derive concepts for ordering uncertain prospects resulting in 
principles such as the stochastic dominance of order 1,2 or 3 (see, e. g., Bawa 1975 or Martin et 
al. 1988). Bawa argues that it is quite reasonable to assume that the average investor makes a 
decision that is consistent with a finite, increasing and concave utility function with decreasing, 
absolute-risk aversion 
A performance measure is coherent (first introduced by Artzner and al. (1997/99)) if shows the 
following properties: subadditivity, positive homogeneity, decreasing monotonicity and 
7 Skewness measures the asymmetry of a return distribution. Positive skewness denotes a distribution where more 
occurrences are located below the mean but in a limited range, while there is significant upward potential in the return 
distribution. Preference for positive skewness means that from two return distributions, other relevant factors being 
equal, investors prefer the positively (or right) skewed one. Preference for positive skewness also implies that 
investors are willing to give up some expected return in order to participate in chances of much larger gains. Kurtosis 
describes the degree to which the distribution is weighted toward its tails. Aversion toward kurtosis means that 
investors dislike dispersion in terms of larger fat tails of the probability distributions, that is, occurrences on both ends 
of the probability distribution receive more weight than in the definition of the variance. 
39 
Chapter 2 
translation invariance. End users/decision makers when ranking investment alternatives 
implicitly accept these properties. The issues is that well known and widespread used risk 
adjusted performance measures like the Return on Value at Risk (ROVaR) do not comply with 
these properties and therefore decision making can be heavily biased. 
From a portfolio management perspective, it is possible to observe that during the last few years 
some academics have started to address the problem of incorporating VaR and other related 
measures in the optimization of portfolios. Wang (2000) proposed a Mean-Variance-VaR 
approach that uses both variance and VaR as a double risk measure simultaneously. Grootveld & 
Hallerbach (2000) investigated the properties of a Mean-VaR optimization problem when 
applied in practice analyzing the effect of estimation risk on portfolio composition. Acerbi & 
Tasche (2002) proposed the use of the Expected Shortfall as an alternative to VaR in order to 
overcome the flaws that VaR has as an incoherent risk measure. 
The axiomatic approach to risk measures is an important and very active subject, which applies 
to different topics of actuarial and financial interest like premium calculation and capital 
requirements. Besides the coherent risk measures by Arztner et al., one is interested in the 
distortion risk measures were introduced in the actuarial industry by Wang (1995/96) and Wang 
et al. (1997). Under certain circumstances, distortion risk measures are coherent risk measures 
(e. g. Wang et al. (1997), Theorem 3). For this reason, they can be used to determine the capital 
requirements of a risky business, as suggested by several authors including Wirch and Hardy 
(1999), Goovaerts et al. (2002) and Wang (2002). On top of each class of risk measures risk 
adjusted performance are built up by means a classical risk-reward approach. In this chapter, 
strengths and weaknesses of each of them are analysed in light of coherence and stochastic 
dominance assumptions, on one hand, and the use in portfolio management, in the other hand. 
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3 Appealing features of risk measures: stochastic dominance and 
coherence 8 
Consider a decision maker faced with a number of risks. A risk measure is defined as a mapping 
from the set of random variables representing the risks at hand to the real line. Note that in the 
sequel, I will always consider random variables, for notation easy from now on X=X, as 
losses9. In the next sections the following definitions and notations will be used: 
X= (X1, X2,.... X)T : n-dimensional random vector 
p(X) general risk measure associated with the loss random variable with p(X) E 91 
Fx (XI, x2, 
..., 
x) = P(X1 <_ x1, X2 S x2 
,..., 
X S x): cumulative distribution function (cdf)1° 
c denotes the standard normal cdf 
d-' denotes the inverse of the standard normal cdf 
Fx 
=1- Fx : tail function"; 
ö"Fr(x,, x1,..., xn fx (xl, X2,..., xýr : öxi 
... 
OX 
n 
density function (pdf) 
 
V= O(z) denotes the pdf of the standard normal distribution'2 
xpl p`h quantile with Fx(xp)=1- p 
The p-quantile risk measure of Fx can also be written as 
Fz (p) =Qp(X)=xp =inf(xE JlIFx(x) ý: p) PE(O, 1) 
The expectation of X, E[X], if it exists, can also be written as13 
8 These section is based on the following research papers: McCarl, (1996) Stochastic Dominance Notes, working 
paper. R. D. MacMinn (1987) Notes on Stochastic Dominance, working paper. A. Diederich (1998) Conflict and the 
Stochastic Dominance Principle of Decision Making Indiana University Cognitive Science Program Tech Report 224. 
Jay R. Lund (2003) Probabilistic Design and Optimization working paper, Spring, 2003 University of California, 
Davis. H. Grootveld, W. Hallerbach, (1999), Variance vs downside risk: Is there really that much difference? European 
Journal of Operational Research 114,304-319. J. Dhaene, R. J. A. Laeven, S. Vanduffel, G. Darkiewicz, M. J. 
Goovaerts, (2004)Can a coherent risk measure be too subadditive?, working paper, University of Amsterdam. 
Goovaerts, De Vylder & Haezendonck (1984), or also chapter 5 in Kaas, Goovaerts, Dhaene & Denuit (2001). F. 
Delbaen (2000), Coherent Risk Measures, working paper 
, 
University of Pisa. Artzner, P., Delbaen, F., Eber, J. 
-M. and 
D. Heath (1997). Thinking coherently. RISK 10(11), 68-71. Artzner, P., Delbaen, F., Eber, J: M. and D. Heath (1999). 
Coherent measures of risk, Mathematical Finance 9(3), 203-28. 
9A negative outcome for the loss variable means that a gain has occurred 
10 A cdf is, by construction, both a monotone increasing and right-continuous function. 
1' Also, obviously, results: Fx =1- Fx and Fx (x,. x1,..., x) = P(Xi > xi, X2 > xZ,..., X. > x 
12 O(z) 
=1eZ with z standard normal variable. q5(z) therefore denotes the density function of the 2nv 
standard normal distribution. For example let FX (p) = (D-' (p), where F is standard normal, and p=0.05 i. e. consider an 
interval confidence of 95%. Substituting results: FF (0.05) = (1)-' (0.05 = Q,. 05(X) =1.644 =z and 
V= 0(1.644) 
= 
0.1031, where ('represents the probability mass function evaluated at z=1.644. 
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Figure 1 The expected value integral representation 
3.1 Stochastic Dominance 
Decision rules are all based on known risk prelcrence of a decision maker that has to be 
quantifiable. However, in reality, the preference is usually not known and difficult to acquire 
through elicitation. Rather than simply assuming the preference, Stochastic Dominance (SI)) 
rules provide a way to make decisions based on little or limited knowledge of a decision maker's 
risk preference. 
There are three important assumptions at the core of the SI) paradigm: 
1. Individuals are expected utility maximizers. 
2. Two alternatives are to be compared and these are mutually exclusive' 4 
3. Analysis is developed based on population probability distributions. 
3.1.1 First Degree Stochastic Dominance (FDS[)) 
As previously observed, SD assumes expected utility of wealth maximization, Max L: [U(x)], with 
x the level oC wealth. 
" This integral representation ut'the expectation ut'a random %ariahlc and its geometric interpretation (see figure I) is 
described in "Risk Measures and Optimal Porriüliu Selection (with applications to elliptical distributions); J. Dhacnex, 
E. A. Valdezz and T. Iloedcmakcrs, Samos 2004 Workshop, Risk Measures and Optimal Portfolio Selection, pag 17. 
Proof' of this result %%hen considering a discrete random variable can be found in I'. 13remaud (I(. o)4) pag. 56 and pag. 
76 or in V. Berger (2001) pp. 345-350. 
I his means that one or the other must he chosen not a cum ex combination of both. 
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Proposition 1 The FDSD rule 
Given two probability distributions f(x) and g(x), distribution f(x) dominates distribution 
g(x) by FDSD if. 
1. the decision maker has positive marginal utility of wealth for all x (u'(x) > 0) 
2. cdf of f(x) is less than or equal to cdf under the g(x) distribution, for all x with strict 
inequality for some x. 
Proof. 
See Appendix 1 
Mathematically, if f(x) is preferred to g(x) then results f u(x)[f (x) 
- 
g(x)klx >0. 
This is clearly a very weak requirement, but allows one to characterize the choices between two 
risky distributions for every utility "maximizer" that prefers more wealth to less. The only 
knowledge about decision makers (DM) required is they prefer more to less, which is very 
general and acceptable. It does not matter if the DMs are risk loving or risk averse. FDSD says 
choice F is always preferred to choice G by this type of DMs if the cdf associated with G is not 
less than that with F for any outcome level and is greater than it for at least one outcome level15. 
3.1.2 Second Degree Stochastic Dominance (SDSD) 
The above SD development while theoretically elegant is not terribly useful. This means that 
when comparing two return distributions one always outperforms the other. This may not always 
be the case. The next development in SD involves making an assumption about risk aversion. 
Proposition 2 The SDSD rule. 
If 
1) An individual has positive marginal utility (non-satiation), u'(x) >0 
2) An individual has diminishing marginal utility of income u"(x)<0 
3) [F2 (x) 
- 
G2 (x)] 50 for all x, with strict inequality for some x 
where F2(x) and G2(x) are the second integral of F and G with respect to x, i. e.: 
F2 (x) =fff (x)dx = F(x)dx 
xx G2 (x) =ff g(x)dx =f G(x)dx 
-, o -0 -., 
with 
" In many cases only limited information about the behaviour of the investor (for example it is known that only he or 
she is risk averse and non-satiable) is available. Still, it is possible to determine some conditions in which 
unambiguously one risky asset will be preferred over another, even if it is not possible to establish a complete order 
among risky assets. 
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F(x) = If (x)dx 
-00 
G(x)= f g(x)dx 
Then 
f(x) dominates g(x) by a SDSD. 
Proof 
See Appendix 2 
Mathematically, if f(x) is preferred to g(x) then results f u'(x)[F(x)- G(x)]dx 
-00 
SDSD reveals decision-making principles for DMs who prefer more to less and are risk averse. 
SDSD says choice F is always preferred to choice G by this type of DMs if the integral of cdf 
associated with G is not less than that with F for any outcome level and is greater than it for at 
least one outcome level. If the condition for FDSD is satisfied, it must be satisfied for SDSD, not 
vise versa 16. Therefore, SDSD applies to a wider range of situations. However, again, there are 
cases that SDSD is not sufficient to lead to a decision'7. 
3.1.3 Remarks on Stochastic Dominance 
In the more than half-century since modern utility theory was first developed and despite its 
theoretical appeal and long-standing academic calls for its use, it has been used only very rarely 
in practice". From a pure technical perspective, it is also important to note that: 
1. there is a trade off in the strictness between the DMs preference and the outcome 
distribution. The more one knows about the investors preferences the less information one 
requires for the distribution. The final aim of the SD rule is to identify an "efficient set" of 
investment alternatives. If there is only one choice in the efficient set, it is the decision. 
Nevertheless, usually there are multiple elements in the efficient set, even using high 
degree SD rules. In this case the bottom line is that there is no single decision to be 
recommended. 
16 This means the conditions on the distribution of the outcomes is lenient for the second degree comparing to that for 
the first degree 
" It is also possible to define rules of decision making based on Higher Degree Stochastic Dominance, such as Third 
Degree Stochastic Dominance (TDSD). TDSD requires the decision maker to be decreasing absolute risk averse, i. e., 
DARA Decision-Makers. Whitmore and Hammond made up a third degree stochastic dominance rule by extending 
this approach once more: the implied decision rules is optimal for every individual who prefers more to less, who 
exhibits risk aversion and who displays decreasing absolute risk aversion. They find that if one assumes that the first 
derivative is positive, the second derivative negative and the third derivative positive and that the third integral of the 
probability function off is always smaller than that of g(x) then f(x) dominates g(x). The logical intuition is that a risk 
averter with diminishing absolute risk aversion is found. 
18 See also section 4.3 to investigate reasons explaining why utility-based risk measures have been rarely used in 
practice. 
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2. A second difficulty to use SD is that each pair of actions has to be compared for all 
possible outcomes. This is extremely hard if both decision choice and outcome are 
continuous. 
3. A third disadvantage is there is no welfare measure in SD to compare alternatives. 
4. Another important complication is the lack of ability to discriminate among cases with low 
crossings. SD requires the dominant distribution to always have a greater minimum than 
the dominated distribution. If the distribution shows a vast improvement under all the 
observations but the lowest one, then SD will not hold in any form. The real question is 
how risk adverse individuals are. SD assumes that the individuals fall in the class of all 
risk averters that includes infinitely risk adverse individuals. It assumes someone can 
possess a risk aversion parameter that is so large that the utility of the small difference at 
the lowest observation is extraordinary important. Furthermore it assumes that the 
alternatives are mutually exclusive. When one performs this type of analysis one ignores 
the possibility that the alternatives could be diversified. This is perfectly reasonable when 
dealing with two mutually exclusive alternatives but not with portfolio of assets. A 
problem in SD involves potential presence of a portfolio. 
5. Finally a stochastic dominance selection rule is subject to sampling error. In fact, if 
distribution means and variances get close together then the probability of improper 
dominance conclusions can become quite high. 19 
Summarising, SD analysis is used to identify conditions under which one risky outcome would 
be preferable to another. Unfortunately, the question of how much better action F is than action 
G remains unanswered. Moreover, SD is not a necessary condition. In fact, if an appropriate SD 
condition is met, it is a sufficient condition for proving that Alternative A is better than 
Alternative B. However, if a SD condition is not met, Alternative A might still be better than 
Alternative B. While SD cannot always yield selection of the best alternative, these criteria are 
easy to apply and can sometimes yield a single optimal solution or a smaller sub-set of solutions 
without the need to specify a complete utility function. 
3.2 Coherence 
Another desirable set of attributes a reasonable risk measure should possess have been firstly 
described by Artzner and al. (ADEH) (1997; 1999a). The set up in (ADEH) is the following: 
consider a capital market with a finite number K of outcomes or states of the world. Let x and y 
be k-dimensional vectors representing the possible state-contingent payoffs of two different 
portfolios, p(x) and p(y) the portfolios' risk measures, a and b arbitrary constant (with a>O), 
19 Of course, the smaller the sample size the more likely one is to have errors 
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and r the risk-free interest rate. ADEH argue that any reasonable risk measure should satisfy the 
following four properties: 
i. P(x+. v)-<p(x)+P(Y) (sub-additivity) (3.2.1) 
ii. p(ax)=ap(x) Vaý: 0 
iii. P(x)ý: P(Y), fx <Y 
iv. p(x+b)=p(x)+b 
(positive homogeneity) (3.2.2) 
(decreasing monotonicity) (3.2.3) 
(translation invariance) (3.2.4) 
The first property says that the risk measure of an aggregate portfolio must: 
1. Be less than or equal to the sum of the risk measures of the smaller portfolios that constitute it 
2. Ensure that the risk measure should reflect the impact of hedge or offsets. 
If condition (i) is not satisfied, then one can reduce the risk of portfolio by splitting it into two or 
more parts20. For a sub-additive measure, portfolio diversification always leads to risk reduction, 
while for measures which violate this axiom diversification may produce an increase in their 
value even when partial risks are triggered by mutually exclusive events. Therefore, though one 
can perfectly think of possible alternative axiomatic definitions of risk measure, it is hard to 
believe that no sensible set of axioms could in any case admit any sub-additivity violations21. 
The second property says that the risk measure is: 
1. Proportional to the scale of the portfolio 
2. Independent of scale changes (e. g. currency) in the unit in which the risk is measured. For 
example, halving the portfolio halves the risk measure. 
The first two properties together imply that the risk of a diversified portfolio must be less than or 
equal to the appropriate weighted average of the risk of the instruments or sub-portfolios that 
make up the diversified portfolio. Risk measures that do not satisfy these conditions fail to 
capture the benefits of diversification22. 
Property (iii) says that if the portfolio with payoff y has greater losses than (i. e. dominates 
stochastically) another risk with payoff x, then x is riskier because of the higher loss potential. 
20 In a banking context, this would imply that it is possible to reduce the capital requirement by splitting a bank into 
parts. This condition also permits decentralized calculation of risk, since the sum of the risk measures of sub-portfolios 
provides a conservative estimate of the risk of the aggregate portfolio 
21 Sub-additivity is an essential property also in portfolio-optimisation problems. This property in fact is related to the 
convexity of the risk surface to be minimized in the space of portfolios and the risk minimization process will always 
pick-up a unique, well-diversified optimal solution. Only if the surfaces are convex they will always be endowed with 
a unique absolute minimum and no fake local minima 
22 For example, if the pay-off of a diversified portfolio is z= wx + (1- w)y, were w and 1-w are the weights of two 
sub-portfolios with payoffs x and y, then properties (i) and (ii) require that p(z) S wp(x) + (1- w)p(y) 
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This also means that if x<_ y, then each element of y is at least as large as the corresponding 
element of x. 
Property (iv) says that adding a risk-free instrument to a portfolio decreases the risk by the size 
of the investment in the risk-free instrument. For example, if adopting a regulatory perspective, 
this means that there is no additional capital requirement for an additional risk for which there is 
no uncertainty. This property expresses the fact that a portfolio made of sub-portfolios will risk 
an amount that is at most the sum of the separate amounts risked by its sub-portfolios. This 
axiom captures the essence of how a risk measure should behave under the composition/addition 
of portfolios. It is the key test for checking whether a measurement of a portfolio's risk is 
consistent with those of its parts. 
So far, two frameworks for consistently measure the risk of a portfolio, namely the SD and 
Coherence have been discussed. Aim of the next sections is to analyse possible (and desirable) 
interdependencies between these frameworks thus providing superior information: 
0 to regulators, rating agencies and bondholders when evaluating the risk of default and the 
size of the shortfall 
to shareholders, investors risk and portfolio mnagers when evaluating the risk-return-value 
profile of the portfolio. 
4 Taxonomy of risk measures: an end user's perspective 
The global idea about investors is that they can be characterized by their non-satiability, (i. e., 
investors always prefer more money to less) and their risk behavior (investors can be risk-averse, 
risk-neutral or even risk-seekers). Unfortunately, in reality, risk is not universally defined, and 
each investor may approach decision-making under uncertainty with different risk definitions, 
risk measures and risk risk-reward criteria23. In this paragraph the most widespread used risk 
measures in the banking, insurance and asset management industry will be reviewed. 
Throughout this section four definitions of risks will be considered: 
1. risk as maximum potential loss (given a set of possible states of nature) 
2. risk defined as the magnitude of deviation from a target 
23 Risk adjusted performance measurement (RAPM) are examples of risk-reward criteria 
47 
Chapter 2 
3. risk defined as the magnitude of deviation from the expected utility24 
4. risk as maximum potential loss defined as the difference between the wealth today and the 
end-of period wealth 
In this section I will show that a correct interpretation of the end user's perspective, on one hand, 
and the identification of the possible consequences of axioms violations with respect of both the 
SD and coherent paradigm, on the other hand, can produce more valuable investment decisions 
and simplify the decision-making process. 
Moreover, some interesting technical remarks, namely the problem of ranking investment 
alternatives and of capital requirements decided by regulators when the underlying probability 
distribution is non-normal and shows fat and long tail, will be discussed. 
4.1 Risk as maximum potential loss 
Aim of this section is to define a typology of risk measures which are based on the idea of 
maximum potential losses (the most popular being the Value at Risk, VaR) that can occur under 
specific circumstances. The VaR for a portfolio both in the financial and actuarial literature is 
defined as the p-quantile of the loss distribution. Therefore, for any p in (0,1), the p-quantile risk 
measure for a random variable X, which will be denoted by QP(X), is defined by 
Qp(X) = inf {x ER I Fx(x) ? p}, PE (0,1)25 (4.1.1) 
The calculation of VaR can be performed in different ways26. Independent of the used calculation 
method, VaR gives an answer to the following question: given time horizon T and confidence 
level k, what is the maximum loss L in market value (over the pre-specified time horizon T) that 
is exceeded only with probability k? To answer this question the end user has to specify first the 
time horizon and the confidence level. Basically, this choice is arbitrary. The confidence level 
depends on the risk aversion of the institution and on the VaR-model performance. The time 
horizon is determined from the portfolio structure and the possibility to liquidate (or hedge) the 
risky positions. Under the multivariate normal distribution assumption, it correctly aggregates 
. 
risk and reflects the benefit of diversification' 
24 The distinction between two-sided and one-sided measurement of risk will be described in the next section. 
25 The quantile function Qp(X) is a non-decreasing and left-continuous function of p. 
26 There are two main methods that can be used to estimate the value at Risk: the parametric (variance-covariance 
approach) and non-parametric approach (historical and Monte Carlo simulation). The advantages and disadvantages of 
the various methods must be carefully considered 
27 A risk measure is pseudo-coherent (denoted by p) if it has the homogeneity and the risk-free condition properties, 
but not the sub-additivity property; the VaR is one example of a pseudo-coherent risk measure. Value-at-risk is a 
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Apart from all the glory reserved to this risk measure in the last ten years it is worthwhile to 
highlight that Value-at-Risk satisfies (ii), (iii), and (iv) coherence properties, but is not a coherent 
risk measure because it fails to satisfy the axiom of sub-additivity28. Moreover it fails to satisfy 
also the SDSD principle because this type of risk measure is calculated by using only tail loss 
distribution information thus disregarding all other information incorporated in the remaining 
part of the loss distribution29. 
P 
ßi%) 
Figure 2 Quantile Risk Measure 
A closer inspection of the property of this risk measure may help in understanding why VaR can 
be used for capital requirements purposes. 
Regulators, bondholders and rating agencies care is to calculate the capital requirement with 
respect to a random loss with the aim of avoiding insolvency30, like the VaR measure''. Strictly 
speaking, for this class of market participants, therefore, the only worry is downside risk and not 
active portfolio risk management32. 
Unfortunately VaR is a risk measure that only concerns about the frequency of default and not 
the size of default. If X denotes the aggregate claims of a generic portfolio of a financial 
institution over a given reference period and P denotes the aggregate premium (or the provision) 
for this portfolio, then K= Qp(X) -P is the smallest "additional capital" required such that the 
insurer, broadly speaking, becomes technically insolvent, i. e. X >P + K, with a (small) 
coherent risk measures if the possible change in portfolio value is described by the normal distribution, but not 
generally 
2e For a detailed analysis of the sub-additivity broken axiom violation consequences ee Dowd K. (2002) pp. 27-28. 
29 See section 4.2.5.4 for an illustration of this result. 
30 This quantile reserving principle is used in practice in the insurance industry and it is a well known concept for 
actuaries 
31 For a risk which may result in a gain or a loss, it is appropriate when pricing the risk to take in consideration the 
potential gains. In capital adequacy, this can lead to unacceptable results 
- 
for example, a negative capital requirement. 
The portfolio management perspective will be analysed in more detail in section 7. 
32 Strictly speaking, for them risk is associated only to adverse event 
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probability of at most 1-p. Using the p-quantile risk measure for determining a solvency capital 
is meaningful in situations where the default event should be avoided, but the size of the shortfall 
is not important. Loosely speaking, the size of shortfall is more important for the bondholders 
than for the rating agencies. 
From a shareholders and bondholders perspective one might think that quantile VaR at the 
company level is a meaningful risk measure since the default event is of primary concern, and 
the size of shortfall is only of secondary importance. But from a proactive risk and portfolio 
management perspective these types of "truncated" risk measure do not provide any sensible 
insights simply because they are built in a manner that will not allow different risk profile of 
scenarios and states of the nature that can be faced behind the considered quantile or, stated 
alternatively, behind the truncation value. After this value all states of the world are assumed to 
be equally likely and worth nothing! 
The same argument can be considered for all risk adjusted performance measurement (RAPM) 
built on top of this quantile risk measure. The same criticism therefore applies also to the asset 
management industry when the portfolio manager uses VaR as a discriminating tool (or 
technique) to select among different alternative investment strategy. In theory, if the asset 
manager can avoid to care about the tail risk behind the quantile value and the shape of the 
underlying portfolio distribution is normal, VaR can still provide interesting insights. In practice, 
as it will be described in section 6, portfolio manager typically use RAPM based on the idea that 
the risk should be measured as "deviation from a target". This topic is introduced in the next 
section. 
Summarising, a single quantile risk measure of a predetermined level p does not give any 
information about the thickness of the upper tail of the distribution function. For example, a 
regulator is not only concerned about the frequency of default, but also about the severity of 
default. Furthermore, shareholders and management should be concerned about the question 
"how bad is bad? " when they want to evaluate the risks at hand in a consistent way. Best 
practices in both the banking and insurance industry often uses another risk measure the so called 
the Tail Value-at-Risk (TVaR,, ) at level p. This risk measure will be discussed in section 4.2.5. 
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4.2 Risk as the magnitude of deviation from a target: two sided and one sided risk 
measures 3 
Two sided risk measures calculate the magnitude of the distance (in both directions) from the 
realizations of a random outcome x to its expected value E(x)34. Looking for example at 
quadratic deviations (volatility) this leads to the risk measure variance (or standard deviation 
respectively by taking the root). Both risk measures have been the traditional risk measures in 
economics and finance since the pioneering work of Markowitz. These risk measures exhibit a 
number of nice technical properties. For instance, the variance of a portfolio return is the sum of 
the variances and covariances of the individual returns. Furthermore, the variance is used as 
standard optimisation function35 aimed at nicely solving the portfolio management problem. 
These properties are particular helpful in solving the normative selection problem, since the 
optimal portfolio is not yet known. 
Two sided risk measure contradicts the notion of risk that only negative deviations are 
dangerous, it is downside risk that in this framework matters. In addition, variance does not 
account for fat tails of the underlying distribution and for the corresponding tail risk. This leads 
to the proposition to include higher (normalised) central moments (as e. g. the third and the fourth 
moment, respectively, skewness and kurtosis) into the analysis to assess the risk more properly. 
As the devil's advocate, Markowitz (1959) has recognized and stressed the limitations of mean- 
variance analysis. 
33 This section is based on the following research papers: Huang Linzebrgh (1988); Ingersoll (1987); A. Plantinga and 
S. de Groot (2001); Benninga, S. Z., 1997, `Financial modeling', MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.; Elton, Edwin J. and 
Martin J. Gruber, 1995, Modem portfolio theory and investment analysis, John Wiley & Sons; Pratt, John W., 1964, 
"Risk aversion in the small and the large", Econometrica, Vol. 32, pp. 122-136; Sharpe, William F., 1966, "Mutual 
fund performance", Journal of Business, No. 1, Vol. 2, pp. 119-138.; Sharpe, William F., 1994, "The Sharpe ratio", 
Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 49-58; Sortino, Frank A. and Robert van der Meer, 1991, 
"Downside risk", Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 18, summer, pp. 27-31; Sortino, Frank A., Robert van der 
Meer, and Auke Plantinga, 1999, "The Dutch triangle", Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 50-59; 
Sortino, Frank A., and Lee N. Price, 1994, "Performance measurement in a downside risk framework", 
Journal of Investing, Vol. 3, No. 3; Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman, 1992, `Advances in prospect theory: cumulative 
representation of uncertainty', Journal of risk and uncertainty, pp. 297-323; Optimal Algorithms And Lower Partial 
Moment: Ex-Post Results by David N. Nawrocki 
, 
College of Commerce and Finance, Villanova University; Two 
paradigms and nobel prizes in economics: A contradiction or coexistence?, By Haim levy, Enrico De Giorgi and 
Thorsten Hens, working paper, June 2003; Sharpe, W. F. (1964), "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market 
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, " Journal of Finance, l9,425-442, Sharpe W. F. (1991), "Capital Asset Prices 
With and Without Negative Holdings, "The Journal of Finance, 46,2,489-509; Decomposing Portfolio Value-at-Risk: 
A General Analysis Winfried G. Hallerbach 
, 
The Journal of Risk 5/2, Febr. 2003; Jorion, Ph., 2001, "Value at Risk: 
The Benchmark for Controlling Market Risk", McGraw-Hill, Chicago Ill., 2nd ed. (1st ed. 1997); Litterman, R., 
1997a, "Hot Spots and Hedges (I)", RISK 10/3, March, pp. 42-45; Litterman, R., 1997b, "Hot Spots and Hedges (II)", 
RISK 10/5, May, pp. 38-42. 
1 In the following, without loosing generality, the expected value will be considered as the relevant target for the end- 
user. 35 Such as, for example, the quadratic optimisation functions. 
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From a general perspective, the variance as a risk measure may miss its link with an investor's 
preference structure or with the distributions of security returns and portfolio returns. 
Information concerning mean and variance then is not sufficient to adequately discriminate 
between return distributions. For example, typically a risk manager or an asset manger is 
interested in characteristics of distributions over the whole range of the returns (full domain)36. 
These characteristics can be captured by full domain distribution measures surpassing the second 
statistical moment. In the resulting general setting of multi-moment portfolio analysis, the 
investor, in theory, should be able to specify preferences for the first four moments. In practice, 
this is a not easy exercise. 
Full domain (risk) measures can be contrasted with partial domain measures, which provide 
information for some distribution over some part of its domain. Of special relevance is 
"downside risk", focusing on returns falling below some critical level. If the end user only care 
about downside risk, then this risk measure can provide very useful and reliable information. The 
global idea about downside risk is that the left-hand side of a return distribution involves risk 
while the right-hand side contains the better investment opportunities. 
A measure of shortfall risk is one-sided risk measure and measures the shortfall risk relative to a 
target variable. This may be the expected value, as assumed so far but, in general it can be an 
arbitrary (fixed or variable) deterministic target i" or even a stochastic benchmark i. A more 
general (and more sophisticated) approach to downside risk specifies risk in terms of probability- 
weighted functions of deviations below some target return. One example is the semi-variance, 
introduced in Markowitz (1959)'$ and which measures the variability of returns below the mean. 
The semi-variance is a special case of the more general lower partial moments (LPM) risk 
measure, which form the partial domain analogous of variance and higher moments39. Seminal 
references are Bawa (1975) and Fishburn (1977). These authors introduced a general definition 
of downside risk in the form of LPM and developed the model", respectively. The LPM 
of order a around t40 with respect to the investment return X, can be interpreted, in a statistical 
36 Return distributions may exhibit asymmetry or other form characteristics different from normal distributions 
37 Target gain, target return, minimal accepted return to give some appropriate examples. 
38 Markowitz pointed out: "Since an investor worries about underperformance rather than over-performance, semi- 
deviation is a more appropriate measure of investor's risk than variance". Sharpe (1963): "Under certain conditions the 
mean-variance approach leads to unsatisfactory predictions of investor behavior" 
39 See Harlow and Rao (1989) for recent references in this area. 
40 In practice, a benchmark return, a short term interest rate or a required return given some liabilities ('minimal 
acceptable return) can serve as the target return. The parameter a reflects the investor's feeling about the relative 
consequences of falling short of t by various amounts. Fishburn (1977) has shown that a=I (which suits a risk-neutral 
investor) separates risk-seeking (0 <a< 1) from risk-averse behaviour (a > 1) with regard to returns below the target 
rr. In practice, values of a ranging from less than 1 to greater than 4 were observed by Fishburn. By changing the 
parameters a and t most downside measures used in practice can be formed. For example, as shown later in the 
paragraph, a=2 yields the target semi-variance, while adding the restrictions that r= E(X) produces the semi- 
variance (or lower partial variance). 
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sense, as non-central moments of an underlying distribution, where the interest is focused only 
on the lower part of the whole distribution. How much of the distribution is relevant fur the 
computation of the LPM depends on an ex ante delined target return T. Formally, this relation 
can be specified, for a continuous random variable X, as follows: 
LPM, {(r, x)= f, (r-Xrf(x)ax=Ir, (r-X), KdF(x), (4.2.1) 
or in normalised form 
a>_2 R(X)=LPM(r, X),. (4.2.2) 
where: 
F(X) is the cdf of the investment return X. 
f(x) is the pdf to quantify the probability of X taking on a certain value x. 
It is remarkable that the relevant area to compute any LPM is limited by the target return t, 
which defines the upper bound of the integral. An important characteristic lies in the choice of 
the variable a, which defines the order of the LPM. Basic probabilistic measures, within the 
previous described set-up, playing an important role in applications, are obtained for 
a=0,1 and 2 and corresponding return density functions3'. 
ll 
Figure 3 Shortfall-probabilities under a target return t Cur two portfolios A and 13 with their 
variations as illustrated in the following sections. 
4.2.1 1 PM when a=0 and the expected value is the target value ti 
For the case ofa =0 the extent of a shortfall relative to z remains irrelevant 
LPA4O(r, x)=1, (= x)()f. (x)dx=1`, 
_t(x)dX =[l'(x)]r = P(r)-F(---)=F(r) (4.2.3) 
Any LPM,, (z, x) is simply the part of the whole distribution hclonr the pre-specified target 
return i and is therefore commonly cited as shortfall probability. Figure 3 illustrates the 
This graph is quoted from A. Peter, Risk Measures, Working paper, University of Mannheim 
, 
Jan 2003 
53 
Chapter 2 
shortfall-probabilities under a target return ' for two portfolios A and B with their corresponding 
return density functions. The two distributions are calibrated in order to receive identical means 
and variances respectively42. 
Portfolio selection techniques based on the ideas of Markowitz will consider A and B equally 
desirable. But a LPM0 (r, x) 
-based investor will undoubtedly prefer the right-skewed portfolio 
B, which has a much better protection against low returns without capping the probability of high 
gains. The return behaviour of portfolio B is represented by the log-normally distributed curve B, 
whereas portfolio A is described by the density curve A, which is just a reflection of curve B at 
its mean t. Both A and B possess the same mean and variance. Therefore a µ-cr-portfolio 
selection in the sense of Markowitz is of no further help. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that an 
investor will prefer portfolio B with the smaller shortfall probability relative to ti43 
4.2.2 LPM when a =1 and the expected value is the is the target value ti 
The first-order LPM computes the shortfall distance relative to the target return by integrating 
the probability-weighted differences between ti and every X with X +oo, zl. 
LPMt(r, X)=f. (r-X)tf(X)dX=E[Max(z-X, O)] (4.2.2.1) 
LPM, (r, X) is called target shortfall. In order to compute the truncated mean 
, 
u1 : 9'r it is 
necessary to standardize a LPM, (r, X) by dividing it with the shortfall-probability 
LPM0 (r, X). Subtraction of this standardized target shortfall from the pre-specified target return 
I results in the truncated mean. Figure 4 below shows for two distributions F and G44 the 
relation between the target shortfall LPM(1; t) and the shortfall-conditioned mean j. t 
, 
for 
returns xS T45. From inspection of figure 4 it is straightforward to see that, for a constant target 
return i, an increase of the standardized target shortfall automatically implies a reduction of the 
shortfall conditioned mean. 
42 The shortfall-probabilities in figure 3 are illustrated by the two differently shaded areas under the corresponding 
density functions. 
43 In section 7 other portfolio strategies based on downside risk measure will be analysed. 
as Figure assumes the target return is the same for both distribution. 
45 It is important to note that LPM(l; r) has to be divided by LPM(O; z) in order to get a measure which is subtractable 
from r and therefore calculate the truncated mean g,,, 
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G lLF uxig 
xsc 
Figure 4 Relation between the target shortfall LPM(1; t) and the shortfall-conditioned mean 
µ 
,. 5T for returns x <_ ti two distributions F and Gab 
To see this, by construction, it is possible to show that the standardised target shortfalls are 
related through the following relationships: 
r, ur5r 
X )'f (X)dX 
f (X)dX 
F- LPM1, F(r, X) LPMI c(z, X) 
_G zfýxsr 
- LPMO. F (r, X) 
< LPMO, G (r, X) - 
T' : Sr 
Consequently, the relationship between downside LPM0 (x, r) and maximum potential loss VaR 
based risk measure becomes: 
VaRK =L= W(1 - et 
)-W (I 
-e 
F-1(k) )-W1-e F-1(LPMp (X, r))1 ) (4.2.2.2) 
This means that a maximum potential loss risk measure such as the VaR can be calculated on the 
basis of a downside risk measure, such LPM0 (X, r) and vice versa47. 
4.2.3 LPM when a=2 and the expected value is the target value's 
LPM2 (r, X) Can be calculated by integrating the probability-weighted and squared downside 
deviations between ti and every X with XE [-co, T ]: 
LPM2(r, X)= f. (1. 
-X)2f(X)dX=E[Max(r-X, 0)2 (4.2.3.1) 
This measure is therefore called target variance or 
- 
by taking its quadratic root 
- 
target standard 
deviation. As in the case of the classical variance, LPM2(r, X) overweighs realizations of X 
46 This graph is quoted from A. Peter, Risk Measures, Working paper, University of Mannheim Jan 2003 
47 The proof is in appendix 3 
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which are far below the target return4S. The asymmetrical LPM for a>2 can be derived 
analogous to the terms of the higher statistical moments49. It is straightforward to show that the 
degree of risk aversion corresponds directly with the chosen order a of the LPM-measure. 
4.2.4 LPM when a =1,2 and the target value is the expected value r= E(X) 
LPM1(E(X), X), also called Lower semi-absolute deviation is a generalisation of eq. (4.2.2.1) 
and can be calculated as follows: 
LPM1(E(X), x)=1L,, (E(X)-X)' f(X)dX =E[Max(E(X)-X, 0)] (4.2.4.1) 
LPM2(E(X), X), also called Semivariance deviation, is a generalisation of eq. (4.2.3.1) and 
can be calculated as follows: 
LPM2(E(X), X)= jT, O(E(X)-X)2 j(X)dX = E[Max 
(E(X)-X, 0)21 (4.2.4.2) 
A particular case of the Semivariance is the Semistandard deviation, or alternatively called 
target semi-deviation. Semivariance can be calculated by taking the square root of eq. (4.2.4.2): 
{LPMZ(E(X), X)}°'5 
= 
jL (E(X)-X)2f(X)dX}n'5 
=E[Max(E(X)-X, 0)21,5 (4.2.4.3) 
{LPMZ(E(X), X)}°'S measures the standard deviation of below-target returns and therefore it only 
penalizes those events that are below the target. As all others previously described downside risk 
measure, it is an asymmetric risk measure. 
The example in table 1 illustrates the behaviour of the LPM measure for different moment 
degrees (a). The target return is set to 15% for the two investments A and B50. Note that: 
" when a<1, the Investment A is considered to be less risky than Investment B, although the 
skewness number and the distribution information indicates that Investment B has less 
downside risk. Note that this is consistent with a risk-loving utility function. 
. 
When a=1 the two LPM values are equal. 
" 
When a>l, then Investment B is considered to be less risky than Investment A. Note that 
this is consistent with a risk-averse utility function. Also, as a increases, Investment A takes 
on a heavier risk penalty. In particular: 
o When a=1.5 Investment A is twice as risky as Investment B. 
o When a=2 Investment A is four times as risky as Investment B. 
48 It has to be emphasized that the deviations of X are neither computed relative to the first central moment µ of the 
underlying distribution (like the variance) nor to any truncated mean µr5s, but to the target returns 
49 These risk measures are termed as target skewness and target kurtosis 
50 Which for this example is the same as the mean return. Not necessarily the target return must be equal to the mean 
return 
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o When a=3 Investment A is sixteen times as risky as Investment B. 
If i is set to some other return, then the LPM values will depend on the degree of skewness in the 
return distribution. This demonstrates the importance of setting the correct values of a and 'r 
when using the LPM downside risk measures. 
Company A Company B 
Return Prob. Return Prob. 
-5.00 0.20 10.00 0.80 
20.00 0.80 35.00 0.20 
Mean Return 15.00 15.00 
Variance 100.00 100.00 
Skewness 
-1.50 1.50 
LPM a=0.0 r=15 0.20 0.80 
LPM a=0.5 t=15 0.89 1.79 
LPM a=1.0 T--15 4.00 4.00 
LPM a=1.5 c=15 17.89 8.94 
LPM a=2.0 i=15 80.00 20.00 
LPM a=3.0 T=15 1600.00 100.00 
Table 1- Example of Degrees of the Lower Partial Moment. 
Summarising, in order to provide investment advice, the use of an appropriate risk measure is 
imperative. Following the downside risk measure framework, the most important investor 
behaviour/dynamics affecting the choice of the risk measure are: 
" Investors perceive risk in terms of below target returns. 
" Investor risk aversion increases with the magnitude of the probability of ruinous losses. 
" Investors are not static. 
As the investor's expectations, total wealth, and investment horizon changes, the investor's 
below target return risk aversion changes. Consequently, in theory, investors need to be 
constantly monitored for changes in their level of risk aversion. This is a not easy and expensive 
exercise. 
4.2.5 Conditional measures of shortfall risk 
In this section the main measures of shortfall risk are described, namely. the Conditional Tail 
Expectation (CTE), Tail VaR (TVaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES). Moreover their main 
strengths and weaknesses are analysed. 
4.2.5.1 Conditional Tail Expectation (CTE) 
One of the most widespread measures of risk used in the insurance industry (and in banking 
industry as well, in the area of credit risk portfolio management) is the so called Conditional Tail 
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Expectation (CTE). CTEP is defined for smooth distribution functions, given the parameter p, 
with 0<p<1, as follows: 
CTEE (X) 
= 
E[XI X> FX' (p)] (4.2.5.1.1) 
where F-1(p)is the inverse distribution function of the loss random variable, X. That is, 
F, 1(p) is the 100a percentile of the loss distributions '. 
4.2.5.2 Tail Value at Risk (TVaRP(Aq), 
TVaR. is the arithmetic average of the quantiles of X from p on and is defined as 
i 
TVaRP (X) =11 
pf 
Q9 (X)d9. PE (0,1) (4.2.5.2.1) 
Note that the TVaR1, is always larger than the corresponding quantile QP(X). From (4.2.5.2.1) it 
follows immediately that the TVaRp is a non-decreasing function of p. Let X again denote the 
aggregate claims of a financial institution portfolio over a given reference period and P the 
aggregate premium (or the provision) for this portfolio. Setting the amount of "additional 
capital" equal to TVaRP(X)-P, it is possible to define "bad times" as those where X takes a value 
in the interval [Qp(X), TVaR1, (X)]. Hence, "bad times" are those where the aggregate claims 
exceed the threshold QP(X), but not using up all available capital. The width of the interval is a 
"cushion" that is used in case of "bad times". 
4.2.5.3 Mean Excess Loss (MEL) or Expected Shortfall (ES) 
Another widespread used measure of risk in the banking industry when measuring credit risk is 
the so called Mean Excess Loss (MEL) or the Expected Shortfall (ES). ES measures the average 
shortfall under the condition a shortfall occurs. In practice ES can be considered as a kind of 
(average) worst case scenario. ES at level p will be denoted by ESP(X) (or MELP(X)) and is 
defined, for a loss random variable X, as 
MEL (X)=ESP(X) =E [(X 
- 
QP(X))+], pE (0,1) 
Example 
(4.2.5.3.1) 
For example, let assume X is standard normally randomly distributed. Following example 3.9.1 
in Kaas, Goovaerts, Dhaene and Denuit (2001), where it is shown how to calculate the Quantile 
VaR, CTE, TVaR and ES when X is standard normally distributed, 
if 
c1 denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function 
D' denotes the density function of the standard normal distribution" 
51 Loosely speaking, CTEQ(X) is equal to the mean of the top (1-a)% losses. 
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-' denotes the inverse of the standard normal distribution function 
(D"' (p)=z if the mean is 0 and the standard deviation is 1 
The Quantile VaR Qp (X), the CTEP TVaRp ESP at 95% (p=5%) confidence interval results 
QP(X)= p+Q(c''(p»=1.644 
ESFP (X) = a0'(D'' (p))- a' (p))1- p) = 0.02 
(4.2.5.3.2) 
(4.2.5.3.3) 
CTEE(X)=p+a(DI (ý(') = 2.062 (4.2.5.3.4) A 
TVaRP =p+ a((D-' (p))+ °gD/((D_' 
(P))- a('-' (p)ýl 
- 
p) 
= 
2.062 (4.2.5.3.5) 
1-p 
From inspection of eq. (4.2.5.3.4) and (4.2.5.3.5) it is easy to show that if the mean is 0 and the 
variance is 1 results that GTE is equal to TVaR 
Fcr. 
_ 
IV) 
I 
P 
Figure 5 Expected Shortfall, Quantile and Tail VaR 
4.2.5.4 Remarks 
In this section some interesting relationships and risk measure properties are analysed: 
1. Dhaenex, Valdezz and Hoedemakers (2004) 53 showed that the relations between Quantiles, 
TVaR, CTE and ESF can be summarised as follows: 
1y 
sz (D' ý(.. 1 
_e2 see also footnote 13 V1 27IQ 
53 See footnote 11 
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TVaRP(X)=Q, (X)+11pESFP(X) PE(011) (4.2.5.4. j 
CTEP(X)=QP(X)+1_FXQp(X)ESFP(X) pE(0,1) (4.2.5.4.2) 
CTEP(X) 
= 
TVaRFX[QP(X)I(X) PE(011) (4.2.5.4. ) 
2. CTE and ESF are not sub-additive. 
3. TVaR is sub-additive: in fact results TVaRP(X+Y)<TVaRP(X)+TVaRP(Y), pE (0,1). 
4. Despite the advantage of corresponding closer to an intuitive notion of risk, shortfall 
measures have the disadvantage that they lead to greater technical problems with respect to 
the disaggregation of portfolio risk, optimisation procedure and parameter statistical 
identification and estimation as will be discussed in detail in the next sections. 
5. These type of measures ignore losses below the quantile being considered. As a result their 
use in portfolio management may lead to sub-optimal decisions, the main reason being that it 
doesn't comply with the SDST principle as the following example it will help to clarifyT'. 
Consider the following two loss distribution X and Y: 
0 with probablity 0.95 
X= 50 with probablity 0.025 
100 with probablity 0.025 
Y= 
50 with probablity 0.975 
100 with probablity 0.025 
Clearly Y has the riskier distribution, and clearly X <2nd Y. The CTE with parameter 
97.5% is the expected value of the loss, given the loss lies in the upper 2.5% of the 
distribution. In both these cases, the CTE (97.5%) risk measure is 75. In fact, for any 
parameter aZ0.975 the CTE of these two risks will be equal. The CTE risk measure 
cannot distinguish between these risks in general. 
It is therefore argued that to use a risk measure for portfolio management purposes it is crucial 
that it should go beyond coherence. In fact, as previously described, although being coherent, 
CTE ignores useful information in a large part of the loss distribution, and consequently lack 
incentive for mitigating losses below the quantile VaR. The problem is that CTE doesn't 
properly adjust for extreme low-frequency and high severity losses, since it only accounts for the 
mean shortfall and not higher moments, as illustrated in the previous example. Same remark 
applies for all others downside risk measure 
A measure aimed at providing useful information for asset allocation and risk management 
should go beyond coherence and accomplish with the stochastic dominance principle one and 
sa The example is draw from Wirch and Hardy (2001), working paper, "Ordering of Risk Measures for Capital 
Adequacy". 
60 
Chapter 2 
two. Section 5 will introduce another class of risk measure, namely the distortion risk measure, 
that are able to comply with both the coherence and the SD framework and, consequently, they 
are more appropriate when active risk management is the main purpose of the analysis. 
4.3 Utility theory based risk measures" 
As expected utility theory is one of the standard theory for decisions under risk it will be 
interesting to investigate the relationship between investor preference functions and measures of 
risk built by using specific classes of utility functions. Formally, the corresponding preference 
function is of the form risk (x)=-E[U(X)] where U(X) denotes the utility functions specific to 
every investor. Risk therefore corresponds to the negative expected utility of the transformed 
random variable X-E(X). Specific risk measures are then obtained for specific utility functions. 
By using the same framework illustrated in the previous paragraphs, it is possible to define the 
following utility-based risk measures: 
" magnitude of deviation from the expected utility 
" risk as maximum potential loss defined as the difference between the wealth today and the 
end-of period wealth 
These classes of utility-based risk measures will be used when building risk adjusted 
performance measurement based on some arbitrary utility function which relates the reward 
value and the risk measure utility function such as the Generalised Sharpe Ratio (GSR) 
introduced by S. Hodges (1997). 
Even if in theory it is possible to build utility-based risk measure that are coherent and 
complying with stochastic dominance principle in the practice of the banking, asset management 
and insurance industry, in the more than half-century (since modern utility theory was first 
developed and despite its theoretical appeal and long-standing academic calls for its use) it has 
been used only very rarely, for the following main reasons: 
1. Utility estimation is by no means an easy or exact exercise and therefore it is almost 
impossible to build reliable utility function because: 
" This section is based on the following research papers and books: A. Plantinga and S. de Groot, (2001), Risk 
Adjusted Performance Measures and Implied Risk Attitudes, working paper, University of Groningen. Z. Ber6nyi 
(2001), Accounting for illiquidity and non-normality of returns in the performance assessment, working paper, 
University of Munich. Pedersen, C. S. and Satchell, S. E. (1999), 'Choosing the Right Measure of Risk: A Survey', in: 
S. B. Dahiya, ed., The Current State of Economic Science, Vol. 2 (46) of Micro Economics, Macro Economics, 
Monetary Economics, Spellbound Publ. Rossi, G. A. and Tibiletti, L. (1996), Higher Order Polynomial Utility 
Functions: Advantages in Their Use, Technical report, Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of 
Torino. J. E. Ingersoll. Theory of financial decision making. Rowman & Littlefield studies in financial economics. 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1987; C. F. Huang and R. H. Litzenberger. Foundations for Financial Economics. Prentice-Hall, 
1988. 
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a) utility responses might vary between individuals and even vary for the same 
individual on different days. 
b) many planning problems evolve over decade-long periods, during which utility 
functions are likely to change considerably. 
c) People's valuations are likely to change as they learn more about a problem. 
d) It is often difficult to decide who in a large organization or group should be 
interviewed for estimating a utility function. 
i. For a private company, should the president, middle 
-manager, board 
members, or stockholders be interviewed? 
ii. For public company, should the utility function be that of the agency head, 
private citizens, or elected officials? 
e) High-level decision-makers are busy people; it is often hard to get their time for 
interviews. 
f) Decision-makers are often unsure what their preference structure/utility function is 
g) For newly controversial issues, these preferences may be highly unstable as new 
information develops. 
h) Decision-makers, such as politicians, have political reasons to avoid revealing their 
true preference or utility functions. 
i) Utility theory and processes for estimating utility are somewhat abstract and 
subjective. The process of estimating utility functions is somewhat artificial. 
2. the maximisation of the expected utility is based on the rationality assumptions which also 
can lead to paradoxical results56; in fact: experience and empirical evidence tell us investor 
are "not-rational"57 
sb See Huang and Linzbergh (1998) for a closer examination of the rationality assumption 
" If an investor is asked to choose between two possibilities: one wins 1000 dollar "for sure" (100% probability) 
another "lottery" being 100 dollar with 5% probability and 2100 dollar 95% probability, even if the two lotteries have 
the same expected value all investors will prefer the first lottery. Also the well known Allias paradox supports the 
intuition that investor do not behave "rationally", which means that maximising the expected utility within the risk 
neutral framework is not consistent with the typical human behaviour. See also the second paragraph for a description 
of the difference between portfolio theory and post-modem portfolio theory 
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5 Distortion risk measures: definition, examples and properties58 
In this section I will consider the class of distortion risk measures, introduced by Wang (1995). A 
number of properties of these risk measures can be generalized to the class of distortion risk 
measures. Recalling the definition of the expectation of X, if it exists59 
E[X ]_-f [1- Fx (x)I1x +J FX (x)dx with Tx = Pr(X > x) (5.1) 
-0 0 
Wang (1996) defines a family of risk measures by using the concept of distortion function. A 
distortion function is defined as a non-decreasing function g: [0,1]-+ [0,1] such that g(0)=0 and 
g(1)=1. The distortion risk measure associated with distortion function g is denoted by pg ["] and 
is defined by 
pg [X [l 
- 
g(FX (x))}ix +f g(FX (x))dx for any random variable X (5.2) 
o 
With 
58 This section is based on the following research paper: Hiirlimann, W. (2002), An economic capital allocation for 
lookback financial losses, Working paper. Hürlimann, W. (2002), Distortion Risk Measures And Economic Capital, 
Switzerland. Kaas R., Heerwaarden, van A. E. and M. J. Goovaerts (1994), Ordering of Actuarial Risks, CAIRE 
Education Series 1, Brussels. Goovaerts, M. J., Kaas, R. and J. Dhaene (2002), Economic capital allocation derived 
from risk measures. Working paper. Goovaerts, M. J., de Vijlder, f. and Haczendonck, J. (1984) Insurance Premiums. 
North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam. Goovaerts, M. J., Kaas, R. and Dhacne, J. (2003) Economic capital 
allocation derived from risk measures, North American Actuarial Journal. Goovaerts M. J., R. Kaas, J. Dhaene, Qihe 
Tang A unified approach to generate risk measures. Goovaerts, M. J., R. Kaas, J. Dhaenea, Qihe Tang (2004), Some 
New Classes of Consistent Risk Measures a Center for Risk and Insurance Studies (CRIS) Katholicke Universiteit 
Leuven. J. Dhaene, R. J. A. Laeven, S. Vanduffel, G. Darkiewicz, M. J. Goovaerts (2004) Can a coherent risk measure 
be too subadditive? Catholic University of Leuven, Center for Risk and Insurance Studies, Leuven, Belgium and 
University of Amsterdam. Dhaene, j., Denuit, m., Goovaerts, m. j., Kaas, r. and Vyncke, d. (2002a) The concept of 
comonotonicity in actuarial science and finance: theory. Insurance Math. Econom. 31(1), 3-33. Dhaene, j., Denuit, M., 
Goovaerts, M. J., Kaas, R. and Vyncke, D. (2002b) The concept of comonotonicity in actuarial science and finance: 
application. Insurance Math. Econom. 31(2), 133-161. Wang, S. (1995), Insurance pricing and increased limits 
ratemaking by proportional hazard trasforms. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 17; pp. 43-54. Wang, S. 
(2000), A class of distortion operators for pricing financial and insurance risks. Journal of Risk and Insurance 67(1), 
15-36. Wang, S. (2001), Equilibrium pricing transforms: new results using Bühlmann's 1980 model, Working paper. 
Wang, S. (2002). A risk measure that goes beyond coherence, Working paper 
http: //www. gloriamundi. org/picsresources/sw. pdf. Wang, S., Young, V. R. and H. H. Panjer (1997), Axiomatic 
characterization of insurance prices, Insurance Mathematics and Economics 21,173-183. Wang, s. and Young, V. R. 
(1998) Ordering risks: expected utility theory versus Yaari's dual theory of risk, Insurance Math. Econom. 22(2), 145- 
161. Wirch, J. L. and M. R. Hardy (1999). A synthesis of risk measures for capital adequacy, Insurance Mathematics 
and Economics 25,337-47. Wirch J. L., and M. R., Hardy (1999), Proper Ordering for Risk Measures, working paper. 
Wirch J. L., and M. R., Hardy (2000), Distortion Risk Measures: Coherence and Stochastic Dominance, working paper. 
Wirch J. L., and M. R., Hardy (2000), Ordering of Risk Measures for Capital Adequacy, working paper. Yoshiba, T. 
and Y. Yamai (2001). Comparative analyses of expected shortfall and value-at-risk: expected utility maximization and 
tail risk. Working paper; http: //www. gloriamundi. org/picsresources/tyyy. pdf. J. Antoon Pelsser (2004), On the 
Applicability of the Wang Transform for Pricing Financial Risks, working paper, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
www few. eur. nl/few/people/pelsser. Artzner, Ph. (1999) Application of coherent risk measures to capital requirements 
in insurance, North American Actuarial Journal 3(2), 11-25. Embrechts, P., Mcneil, A. J. and Straumann, D. (2002) 
Correlation and dependence in risk management: properties and pitfalls. Risk management: value at risk and beyond, 
176-223, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge. Gerber, H. U. (1974) On additive premium calculation principles. 
ASTIN Bulletin 7,215-222. Yaari, M. E. (1987) The dual theory of choice under risk. Econometrica 55(1), 95-115. 
59 A detailed proof of the integral representation of the Distorted risk measure can be found in "Empirical Estimation 
of Risk Measures and Related Quantities", Bruce L. Jones and Ricardas Zitikis, Department of Statistical and 
Actuarial Sciences, working paper University of Western Ontario, 2004. The geometric interpretation is quoted from 
"Risk Measures and Optimal Portfolio Selection (with applications to elliptical distributions); Jan Dhaenex, Emiliano 
A. Valdezz and Tom Hoedemakers; Samos 2004 Workshop, Risk Measures and Optimal Portfolio Selection, pag 26 
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p, [X] the distorted expectation of X 
g(x)>_ X. 
Figure 6 below helps clarify the relationship between the expected and the distorted expectation 
value of a random variable. 
In figure 6 the dotted line represents F, (x) and the solid line resembles g(F,. (x)). By 
construction results/),, [X I> E[X ], i. e. the distorted expected value of x is greater than the 
expected oneo'. For a general distortion function g, the risk measure p, [X] can be interpreted as a 
"distorted expectation" of X, evaluated with a "distorted probability measure"". 
Also note that gi (y) <_ g, (y) for all q e[0,11 implies that /), [X]<p,, [X]. One immediately 
finds that r('' (4) is a non-increasing function of x with values in the interval [0,1]. However 
pg [X] cannot always be considered as the expectation of X under a new probability measure, 
becauseg(F, (. v)) will not necessarily be right-continuous. 
Let now consider two examples of distorted risk measure: the Quantile and the TVaR distorted 
risk measure. 
60 Note that the distortion function g is assumed to be independent of the distribution function of tlic random ýariahlc 
x 
61 See Deuncbcrc (1994 ). 
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5.1 The quartile distorted risk measure 
From equation (5.2), it is possible to see that the quantile QP(X), pe (0,1) corresponds to the 
distortion function 
g(x)=I(x>1-p)0<_x<-1 
Where I represents the "distorted" VaR 
Figure 7 The Quantile Distorted Risk Measure 
5.2 The TVaRp(X) distorted risk measure 
(5.1.2) 
TVaRp(X), pE (0,1) as illustrated in section 4.2.5.2 corresponds to the distortion function 
g(x) = min 1-xp ,1I, 0<- x <_ 1 (5.2.1) 
I 
0 
Figure 8 The Tail VaR Distorted Risk Measure 
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Summarising, by using TVaR1, there is no incentive for taking actions that increase the 
distribution function for outcomes smaller than Q,. Moreover, if one uses the ESF, there is the 
possibility of not adjusting for extreme low-frequency, high severity losses. Also both ESF and 
CTE are not a distortion risk measure62. The Wang transform risk measure offers a possible 
solution to this problem 
5.3 The Wang transform risk measure 
From eq. (4.2.5.2.1) it is possible to see that the TVaRp risk measure uses only the upper tail of 
the distribution. Hence, this risk measure does not create incentive for taking actions that 
increase the distribution function for outcomes smaller than Q,. Also, from (4.2.5.3.4) TVaRP 
only accounts for the expected shortfall and hence, does not properly adjust for extreme low- 
frequency and high severity losses. The Wang Transform risk measure was introduced by Wang 
(2000) as an example of a risk measure that could give a solution to these problems. 
For any 01, define the distortion function 
gp(x)=cp[cp-'(x)+ -l(xP)J, 0 <_ x <_ 1,0 <p<1 
which is called the `Wang Transform at level p'. 
(5.3.1) 
The corresponding distortion risk measure is called the Wang Transform risk measure and is 
denoted by WTP(X). For a normally distributed random variable X, results 
1-gp(x(x)) =(D x-QP(x) Q 
(5.3.2) 
which implies that the Wang Transform risk measure is identical to the quantile risk measure at 
the same probability level in case of a normal random variable: 
WT (X) = QP(X) (5.3.3) 
or, stated differently, 
Pg 
p 
(X) 
=Q 
(X) 63 (5.3.4) 
Let illustrate an example to clarify how this calculation is performed 
As previously described Wang introduces a new transform that can be written in the following 
form: gp (x) _ (D[(D-1 (x) - (D-' (p)] with 0S xS1 
Where 
d-1(x) is the standard normal percentile with respect of x 
62 In fact the function g depends on the distribution function of X; hence it is not possible to infer that CTE, (. ) is a 
distortion risk measure. For a complete analysis of the relationships between distorted and shortfall measure of risk 
and for a proof of this result see Risk measures and optimal portfolio selection, J. Dhaene, S. Vanduffel, Q. Tang, M. 
J. Goovaerts, R. Kaas, D. Vyncke, working paper, 2003 
63 Examples illustrating the fact that the WT risk measure uses the whole distribution and that it accounts for extreme 
low-frequence and high severity losses can be found in Wang (2001). 
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(D '1 (p) is the inverse of the standard normal distribution at the required level of probability a. 
It is possible to generalize for arbitrary F(x). In this case, Wang suggests the following 
adjustment for parameter uncertainty gp(x) = Q((D-1(x)) (5.3.5) 
5.4 Concave distortion risk measures 
A subclass of distortion functions that is often considered in the literature is the class of concave 
distortion functions. A distortion function g is said to be concave if for each q in (0,1), there exist 
real numbers ay and by and a line 1(x) = ayx + by, such that 1(q) = g(q) and 1(q) >_ g(q) for all q in 
(0,1)64. A risk measure with a concave distortion function is then called a `concave distortion risk 
measure'. For any concave distortion function g, g[Fx(x)] is right-continuous, so that in this case 
the risk measure pb[X] can be interpreted as the expectation of X under a `distorted probability 
measure' 
Concave distortion risk measures are coherentbs. For example, because results 
pg[X+ Y] ; 
-> pb[X]+p6[Y], concave distortion risk measures are sub-additive. This means that Qp 
is not sub-additive whereas TVaRP is sub-additive. 
5.5 The Beta distortion risk measure 
Wirch & Hardy (2000) suggested to use for pro-active portfolio management concave distorted 
risk measure such as the Beta distribution function g(x) = Fp(x), with 0: 5 x 51. This risk measure 
is defined as follows: 
Fß(x)=T(, xt°-I(1_t)b-1dt OSx51 (5.5.1) 
where ß(a, b) is the Beta function with parameters a>0, b>0, i. e. 
Q(a. b) = 
r(a)r(b) 
b) (5.5.2) 
The Beta distortion function is strictly concave for any parameters 0<a <_ 1 and b >_ 1, with 
ail and b#166 
'A A concave distortion function is necessarily continuous in (0,1). For convenience, in the remainder I will always 
tacitly assume that a concave distortion function is also continuous at 0. 
65 In Artzner (1999) and Artzner, Delbaen, Eber & Heath (1999), as reported in section 3.2, a risk measure satisfying 
the four axioms of subadditivity, monotonicity, positive homogeneity and translation invariance is called "coherent". 
Any concave distortion risk measure is coherent. Note that the quantile risk measure is not a concave distortion risk 
measure whereas TVaR is a concave distortion risk measure. Therefore, the class of concave distortion risk measures 
is only a subset of the class of "coherent" risk measures. For proof see Wang & Dhaene (1998). 
66 For a detailed analysis of the technicalities related to the beta function see also chapter 1, section 4.2.1. 
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Note that the Beta distortion risk measure with the parameters a=0.1 and b=1 reduces to the 
PH-transform risk measure, which is considered in Wang (1995). 
5.6 The relationship between stochastic dominance and ordered distortion risk 
measures 
All distortion functions preserve first order stochastic dominance. This is because distortion 
function is defined as an increasing function. Unfortunately, as illustrated in section 3.1, not all 
risks can be ordered using second order stochastic dominance. In fact, any pair of risks with 
survival distributions that cross an even number of times cannot be compared, as the sign of the 
difference in integrals before the first crossing and after the last crossing are opposite. In order to 
rank random variables with second order stochastic dominance, an additional property is needed. 
Wirch and Hardy (2001) showed, based on a previous work of Wang (1996), that to preserve the 
SDSD a distortion function need also to be strictly concave. It is worthwhile to note that a risk 
measure derived from a distortion function that is concave, but not strictly concave, does not 
strongly preserve SDSD. A Proof of this result can be found in Wirch and Hardy (2001)6. 7 
Summarising, the class of strictly concave distortion risk measures are coherent and comply 
with FDSD and SDSD. As such, in theory, these are the most effective in proactive risk 
management as, for example, in setting up optimal credit risk portfolio management and 
economic capital allocation strategies. Portfolio strategies based upon risk adjusted performance 
that are built on top of distorted risk measure are discussed in section 7.3 and they constitute one 
of the most important research contribution of this chapter. 
6 Risk adjusted performance measure 
The risk-reward criteria can be represented through a two dimensional vector 
h(6V)= [reward((V-), 
"-risk(6V)]68 
, 
called performance vectors and composed of reward and risk 
measures of the random return W. Markowitz first proposed the use of a performance vector of 
67 Stochastic dominance can be also characterized in terms of ordered distortion risk measures. For any random pair (X, Y), X is smaller than Y in stochastic dominance sense if and only if their respective distortion risk measures are 
ordered, i. e. X <_,, Yq pg [XIS pg [Y] for all distortion functions g. The proof follows immediately from 
Theorem 4.2 in Dhaene, Vanduffel, Tang, Goovaerts, Kaas, and Vyncke (2003). bs The negative sign assigned to the risk value is due to the fact that most investors want to minimize risk. 
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size two, in which each component is specifically designed to measure the risk-reward 
performance of a portfolio. 
As usual, the most difficult task is to select the adequate risk and reward measures of a portfolio, 
to approximate the investors' behaviour accurately. In the next paragraphs the most widespread 
used RAPM are analysed. As for the risk measure, the end-user perspective will be the main 
element to consider when choosing to use a specific RAPM. This issue is of particular relevance 
for risk managers, asset managers and also for rating agencies. Of course this topic is of crucial 
importance for institutional and private investor as well. Unfortunately the answers provided in 
the literature are still confusing. It will be shown that both paradigms (coherence and stochastic 
dominance) jointly considered can provide more fine tuned guidelines for both portfolio 
managers and investors. 
6.1 Sharpe Ratio 
The Sharpe ratio is one of the most common measures of portfolio performance. William Sharpe 
developed it in 1966 as a tool for evaluating and predicting the performance of mutual fund 
managers. Since then the Sharpe ratio, and its close analogues the Information ratio, the squared 
Sharpe ratio and M-squared, have become widely used in practice to rank investment managers 
and to evaluate the attractiveness of investment strategies in general. The appeal of the Sharpe 
measure is clear69. It is an affine transformation of a simple t-test for equality in means of two 
variables, the first variable being the manager's time series of returns and the second being a 
benchmark70. The literature on performance evaluation is a large one (c. f. Brown, 2000 reference 
website), and much of it has focused on the limitations of standard measures. However, despite 
twenty years of academic understanding of the problems of benchmarking and performance 
measurement, the Sharpe ratio and its relatives remain fundamental tools in research and 
practice. In 1965 (revised 1994) W. Sharpe proposed the following simple measure of relative 
performance, namely the Sharpe Ratio: 
(R` 
. 
-Rb) SRI = (6.1) 6Rr Rb 
where 
Rl = investment return of asset i over some time horizon T 
69 Unfortunately, the Sharpe ratio is prone to manipulation 
- 
particularly by strategies that can change the shape of 
probability distribution of returns. For example, Henriksson and Merton (1981) and Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) show 
that non-linear payoffs limit the applicability of the Sharpe ratio to the problem of performance evaluation. More 
recently, Bernardo and Ledoit (2000) show that Sharpe ratios are particularly misleading when the shape of the return 
distribution is far from normal. 
70 For a review of its history and use, see Sharpe (1994). For a current textbook discussion and applications of the 
Sharpe ratio, see for example, Bodie, Kane and Marcus (1999) p. 754-758. For applications in the mutual fund 
industry, see Morningstar (1993) p. 24 
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Rb = benchmark expected return over same T 
R. 
- 
Rb = excess return over same time T 
CTR,. Rb= standard deviation of excess return over T 
The SR of any investment is defined as its return in excess of a benchmark return divided by the 
standard deviation of excess return71. If A an B are two mutually exclusive investments, an 
investor should invest in a mixture of A (and therefore not in B) and the risk free asset if and 
only if SRAM 0 and SRA) SRB. The justification is based on 2 assumptions: 
" Return an A and B are similarly distributed 
" Investors prefer higher returns of the same risk level or lower risk levels for the same return 
(they are risk averse). 
The optimality of the Sharpe rule can be seen from a simple heuristic argument. Suppose to 
consider a benchmark, b, and to face a choice between two mutually exclusive investments, A 
and B, where A has the higher expected SR. The investment choices are depicted in table 4.1. 
The idea behind the Sharpe rule is following: take the benchmark as a hypothetical initial 
investment, and then try to select an alternative that improves on the benchmark in risk-expected 
return terms72. However, applying the Sharpe rule to the choice of alternative investments can 
give misleading answer if: 
" Returns on those investments are correlated with the existing portfolio return 
" Returns are not normally distributed. 
For example, through inspection of table 2 it is possible to observe that SRA=0.50 and 
SRB =0.33. The Sharpe rule would therefore recommend choosing A over B. Since A is 
positively correlated and B is negatively correlated with the existing position, the "naive" Sharpe 
rule fails to take account that A increases the overall risk while B tends to reduce it. 
To take account of this effect, the Sharpe rule applies to the alternative portfolios resembling the 
investment (A or B) plus the existing position rather than the single alternative investments. From 
inspection of table 6.1 it is possible to note that: 
The portfolio of investment A plus the existing position produces a SR of 0.15 
" 
The portfolio of investment B plus the existing position produces a SR of 0.20. 
" The benchmark very often is represented by a riskfree investment alternative, typical, a treasury bond maturing at T. 
72 A high expected SR therefore represents a good departure from the benchmark because it implies a considerably 
higher expected return than the benchmark for relatively little extra risk, and a low expected SR is a bad departure 
because it offers little extra expected return relative to the greater risk entailed 
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The correct choice is therrlore investment 13". 
In the next section a comparison with the analogous utility based risk measure, namely the 
Generalised Shape Ratio, and a practical example (reported in the appendix 4) to better clarify 
how one can go wrong when founding its decision making process on this popular RAPM is 
presented. For example, paradoxical results may arise if an asset manager uses SR to do stock 
picking or if a credit risk managers selects the optimal bank portfolio, with respect to a pre- 
determined risk-return profile, as it will be shown in section 7. 
Investment Investment k B h Initial Position + Investment 
A B mar en Position P+A P+B 
size 1 1 1 2 2 
Ex p. Return 11% 10% 7% 8% 9,50% 9,00% 
St. Dev. Ret. 8% 9% 7% 13,4% 7,4% 
Exp Exces Ret 4% 3% 0% 2,00% 11,50%1 
Std Dev Exces Ret 8% 9% 13,4% 7,4% 
Corr. Port 0,6 
-0,6 0 
SR 0,50 0,33 1 1 0,15 0,20 
Table 2 Sharpe Ratio comparison: single investment vs portfolio 
6.1.1 Information Ratio 
The way the SR has beeis presented in the previous section is not the traditional one in which the 
benchmark is assumed to be the risk free-rate. In fact, by just considering instead of the asset ia 
generic portfolio (or fund) p the SR becomes the widely used risk adjusted performance measure 
(RAPM) Intünnation Ratio /R,,. In this case, from the perspective of the asset management 
industry, the standard en-or represents the Tracking Error Volatility (7EG;, ý, ) of the fund. 
'Therefore: 
SR1, =IR, = 
l- I`b 
ITT 
where 
R1, = investment return of asset i over some time horizon T 
R, = benchmark expected return over sane T 
R1, 
- 
R,, = excess return over same time T 
6a,.. R,, = standard 
deviation of excess return over l' 
(6.1.1.1) 
Although the Sharpe ratio has bccuni part of the canon of modern financial analysis. its applications typically do not 
account für the tart that it is an estimated quantity, subject to estimation errors that can be substantial in some cases. 
This important aspect u ill not be analysed in this chapter. For a detailed analysis of this topic refer to I he Statistics of 
Sharpe Ratios Andrew W. Lo AIMR. 2002. 
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6.2 Treynor Ratio 
The second RAPM, the Treynor Ratio, is also derived from the CAPM. In fact the CAPM poses 
a linear relationship between the excess return of an asset and excess return of the market to 
which the asset belongs 
R, 
-rf =ar+A(Rm-rf) (6.2.1) 
Where 
R1= investment return of asset i over some time horizon T 
rf= risk free return over same T 
R. 
= 
investment return on the market portfolio over some time horizon T 
cri = investment's excess return over the market over same time T 
/1. 
= 
6''m CAPM measure of risk 
6m 
Treynor's Ratio (Treynor, 1966) TR is defined as the ratio 
TR 
= 
a` (6.2.2) 
The investor that want to follow this rule has to choose investment A over B if: 
aA aB RA - ri RB - rf Moreover, substituting (6.1) in (6.2.1) and using A 
P''m6i 
PA P, 
A PB 6m 
results TR = 
SR, 
Pr. 
m 
Some obvious conclusions now follow: the Treynor rule is not reliable if we are working with 
any benchmark other than the risk-free asset. Even if we are working with a risk-free benchmark, 
the Treynor rule will only be reliable if the alternative investments have returns that are equally 
correlated with the market return (that is, if PA. M = Pa, M ). Because there is no particular reason 
to expect this correlation condition to hold, there is no reason to believe the Treynor rule to be 
reliable even if the risk-free asset is choosed to be the benchmark. Furthermore, the same 
criticism described for the SR rule applies to TR. 
The TR can be also presented in another form Tp = 
rP 
/-ý 
rf 
, 
which can be considered one of the 
Yp 
many variants this RAP can be founded in the literature. 
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6.3 Jensen alfa Ja 
Jensen (see Jensen, 1968) proposed to consider only the asset excess return over the market, that 
is a. An investor chooses investment A over B if aA > ae The basic idea is to analyse the 
performance of an investment manager one must look not only at the overall return of a portfolio, 
but also at the riskyness of that portfolio. For example, if there are two mutual funds that both 
have a 12% return, a rational investor will want the fund that is less risky. Jensen's measure is 
one of the ways to help determine if a portfolio is earning the proper return for its level of risk If 
the value is positive, then the portfolio is earning excess returns. In other words, a positive value 
for Jensen's alpha means a fund manager has "beat the market" with his stock picking skills. 
Moreover, substituting (6.1) in (6.2.1) and usingA, 
p''m6r 
m 
Results that 
RA-rf (RB 
-rf RM-rf QA 
RA 
)- 
QB 
aB 
ý (0 APA, M - QBPB, M UM C 
consequently 
6A(SRA)-PA. M(SRM)> 6a(SRB)-PB, M(SRM 
Jensen's alpha therefore provides the same preferences as the Sharpe Ratio only for assets with 
the same Q and the same p. In particular, for the Alpha rule to give the same decisions as the 
Sharpe rule, three conditions to hold are required: the same two conditions needed for the 
Treynor rule to be reliable, and the additional condition that the returns on the two investments 
have the same standard deviation. The alpha rule is therefore reliable only under conditions even 
more restrictive than those required for the Treynor rule. 
Summarising the alpha rule is inferior to the Treynor rule, and it was already proved that the 
Treynor rule is inferior to the Sharpe rule. 
Consider the following example to see how to consistently select the best investment alternative. 
Let A and B be two investment alternatives showing the returns, volatilities and correlations 
reported in table 3. From inspection of table 3 it is possible to see that: 
" 
SR rule rank investment A superior than B 
" TR and Alpha rank B superior than A 
Because it has been shown that SR is a superior RAP it is better to avoid using TR and Jensen 
Alpha to avoid sub-optimal decision74. 
74 As for the SR and the TR also the a can be founded in the literature under other forms like for example the 
following one: a = I'P - 
[r1 
+ lip (rM 
- 
ry 
)J. In any case the same criticism applies. 
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Investment A Investment B Benhmark kt t 
Position + Investmen 
m por P+A P+B 
size 1 1 1 2 2 
Exp. Return 12,0% 8,0% 5,0% 9,0% 10,5% 8,5% 
St. Dev. Ret. 12,0% 8,0% 0,0% 9,0% 21,0% 13,7% 
Exp Exces Ret 7,0% 3,0% 4,0% 5,5% 3,5% 
Std Dev Exces Re 12,0% 8,0% 9,0% 21,0% 13,7% 
Corr. Port 1,00 0,30 0,00 1,00 
Beta 1,33 0,27 1,00 
Alfa Jensen 0,017 0,019 
Treynor 0,013 0,073 
SR 0,583 0,375 0,444 0,262 0,255 
Table 3 Sharpe Ratio, Jensen Alfa and "I ruynor Ratio comparison 
6.4 The Return on "alue at Risk (RO VaR) 
The ROVAR is the relevant expected return divided by the VAR: 
RO6aa 
R 
R= 
Vu R; 
(6.4.1) 
where R; is the (expected) return on asset i and 6'aR, is the Value-at-Risk (at the chosen 
confidence level). 
The ROVaR rule tells us to choose the investment or portfolio with the highest (expected) return 
over VaR. One can assess the reliability of the ROVaR rule by comparing it to the Sharpe rule. 
To do so, first replace the VaR in the previous equation with 
-(R, +aak 
). Ilere, a. is the 
standard normal variate reflecting the confidence level on which the VAR is estimated. It follows 
that: 
R; 
R0VizR; 
R; + (X(TR 
(6.4.2) 
by making the additional assumption of a risk-free benchmark it is possible to show how ROVaR 
relate to SR: 
RuVuR; =-R, 
+ SR; aR 
arrk + R, + SR, cs,, 
(6.4.3) 
Equation (6.4.3) indicates there is no reason to expect that the ROVaR rule and the Sharpe rule 
will give the same rankings of alternative investments. Indeed, this becomes obvious if one 
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makes the further simplifying assumption that the risk-free return is zero. In this case, (6.4.3) 
reduces to: 
ROVaR, 
_- 
SR; aRr 
aaR + SRj 6R, 
(6.4.4) 
Since q can take any finite positive or negative value, the two rules will not give the same 
rankings. 
Summarising, preference rankings set by this measure can be very different from those obtained 
from the Sharpe rule and highly dependent on the choice of a. In a static context (one time 
period) and for assets with similary distributed returns, among the proposed performance 
measures, the Sharpe rule is the only measure that is coherent with the mildest form of on 
investor risk aversion. However, in practice, one has to compare the performance of wildly 
different investment strategies leading to very different return distributions. The Sharpe rule is 
therefore severely limited in its applicability. Obviously most of the criticism previously 
considered when discussing the VaR risk measure properties also applies to RoVaR. 
6.5 Generalised Sharpe Ratio (GSR) 
In an influential preprint, S Hodges (1997) proposes a generalisation of SR for investors with 
constant absolute risk aversion, which is investors who maximise E[U(W)] with 
U(W) =- exp( 2W) for some A) 0 reflecting absolute risk aversion. W Denotes the total 
wealth of the investor For simplicity, assume w0 =0 so that U(W) _ -1 
. 
Favourable 
investment opportunities taken in optimal quantities will lead to optimal expected utilities U* in 
the range (-1,0) Consider an investment opportunity over a time horizon T leading to (forward 
annualised) mean returns pT and standard deviation a, i. e. returns N(uT, a2 T) and 
maximise the expected utility of an investment of X units of capital in this opportunity as 
compared to the risk free investment yielding r. Mathematically, 
MAX E[U(x)] =- exp - 
((P 
- 
r> 
-0.52 62 T x2) (6.5.1) 
We find 
U' = MaxE[U] =- exp 0.5 * i_2)2T (6.5.2) 6 
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which is independent of A. 
SR can be expressed in terms of the maximum expected utility as follows; 
T 
SR=ýýr)_ -2In(U (6.5.3) 
Hodges (1997) defines the GSR =- 
21 (U (6.5.4) 
It is a measure of performance for investors with constant absolute risk aversion, that is, with 
utility U(i )=- exp(- 17V2), whatever their coefficient of risk tolerance A (A =1 can be 
chosen without loss of generality) R. In the next section it will be shown that: GSR can be applied 
to compare any type of return distributions, GSR is always compatible with stochastic dominance 
and GSR could have many other applications than performance ranking. 
Summarising, choices among various investment opportunities are bound to depend on some 
expression of risk attitude. In the simple case of similarly distribute opportunities, a mild 
expression of risk aversion suffices to justify the Sharpe ratio rule. For arbitrary distributions, a 
more precise expression of risk aversion is necessary. Choosing constant absolute risk aversion 
(of whatever degree) suffices to define a GSR with pleasant and intuitive properties It would be 
particularly useful to use the GSR to compare performances of highly skewed returns such as 
with hedge funds. However caution must always be exercised when knowledge of the return 
distribution is based on ex-post data. 
It is also worth to mention that utility theory based RAP have not been widespread used in 
practice, in the asset management industry in particular, as it will be discussed in section 7.1. 
An example of how SR and GSR perform when the underlying return distribution is not 
symmetrical is illustrated in the appendix 4. 
6.6 RAP measures based on downside risk 
In addition to the SR this study also examines several risk-adjusted performance measures that 
use the so-called downside deviation with respect to a reference point. The reference point, 
which may also be called the minimal acceptable rate of return, is used to distinguish "risk" from 
"volatility". According to Sortino and Van der Meer [1991], realizations above the reference 
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point imply that goals are accomplished and, therefore, are considered "good volatility". 
Realizations below the reference point imply failure to accomplish the goals and should be 
considered "bad volatility" or risk. Based on this premise, this study investigates the Sortino ratio 
and the Upside-Potential Ratio. 
6.6.1 Sortino Ratio 
The Sortino ratio is probably the most well known downside risk adjusted performance measure, 
and it is calculated as follows: 
SOR= E(R)- 
LPMZ (r, X (6.6.1.1) 
where i is the minimal acceptable rate of return andLPM2(r, X) is the downside risk with 
respect to the minimal acceptable rate of return. In the variance calculation no distinction is made 
between upside and downside deviation. For this reason, an investment with monthly returns of 
-5% and +5% will have the same variance as another investment that is flat one month and +10% 
the next. In accordance with the description above, the Sharpe Ratio is therefore using a non 
directionally biased measurement of volatility to adjust for risk. This concept has been criticized, 
as it may actually punish a fund for a month of exceptionally high performance. For many 
individuals, this type of deviation is not only acceptable, but also desirable. It is for this reason 
that the Sortino Ratio was developed. Instead of using standard deviation in the denominator, the 
Sortino Ratio uses downside semi-variance. This is a measurement of return deviation below a 
minimal acceptable rate. By utilizing this value, the Sortino Ratio is only penalizing for 
"harmful" volatility. It is a measurement of return per unit of risk on the downside. 
Although there are arguments in favor of both ratios, the use of the Sharpe has been more 
widespread. In some cases, this may reflect a certain comfort level associated with its use of 
standard deviation, which is a more traditional measurement of volatility. Funds that cite their 
Sortino Ratio have traditionally been those with the least tolerance for risk. In these cases, the 
Sortino may be presented as a compliment to an investment thesis that stresses the containment 
of losses to a minimum. 
Although both the ratios are measurements of return-to-risk, understanding the distinctions of 
each may provide insight into their unique drawbacks. It is important to note that thorough 
interpretation of their values requires attention to each of these considerations 
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6.6.2 Upside-Potential Ratio 
An alternative for using the expected return is the so-called Upside Potential Ratio, which is the 
probability-weighted average of returns above the reference rate: 
UPR = 
Upside Potential 
Downside Risk 
(6.6.2.1) 
The upside potential ratio was developed by Sortino, Van der Meer, and Plantinga [1999] and is 
defined as: 
T 
Ei`-(R, 
-r) 
UPR 
=QT with i+ =1 if R, >r; i+ =0 if R< <- r; F =1 if R, 5 r; i- =0 if Rý >r (6.6.2.2) T E- 
-(R, - r)2 
t-1 T 
where t is the number of periods in the sample, R, is the return of an investment in period t. An 
important advantage of using the upside potential ratio rather than the Sortino ratio is the 
consistency in the use of the reference rate for evaluating both profits and losses. 
An important difference between downside risk and standard deviation is the use of an 
exogenous reference rate versus the mean return. The investor's objective function motivates the 
choice of the reference rate. As a result, a part of the investor's preference function is introduced 
into the risk calculation. Therefore, the resulting calculation is only valid for individuals sharing 
the same reference rate. Investors with different minimal acceptable rates of return will have 
different rankings. 
6.6.3 The Generalised Sortino Ratio: the Kappa and Omega RAP 
The Sortino Ratio and the more recently-specified Omega statistic, as defined by Shadwick and 
Keating [2002], can be used as alternatives to the Sharpe ratio in measuring risk-adjusted return. 
Unlike Sharpe, neither assumes a normal return distribution, and each focuses on the likelihood 
of not meeting some target return. In contrast Sharpe measures only the sign and magnitude of 
the average risk premium relative to the risk incurred in achieving it. As specified, the Sortino 
Ratio and Omega appear distinct. Omega is defined as: 
Q(z) 
LPMR (r, X) +1 (6.6.3.1) 
Despite their (Omega and Sortino Ratio) apparent distinctiveness, each represents a single case 
of a more generalized risk-return measure, defined below, called Kappa (K). Kq generates 
Omega when a=1, the Sortino Ratio when a =2, or any of an infinite number of related risk- 
return measures when n takes on any positive value. Kappa is undefined where a: 5 0 
Definition of Kappa 
E(R)-r 
LPMa. (z, X (6.6.3.2) 
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Substituting equation (6.6.3.2) into equation (6.6.3.1) provides an alternative, fully equivalent 
definition of the Sortino ratio as 
S2(r) 
= 
Ka (r) +1 (6.6.3.3) 
Hence the Omega statistic and the Sortino ratio have identical structures, being equal to K1+1 
and K2 respectively. Despite the addition of a constant to K, in the Shadwick and Keating 
definition of Omega, Omega and K, are for all practical purposes identical. I will refer to them 
interchangeably below. K« is defined for any value of n exceeding zero. Thus, in addition to K, 
and K2, any number of K. statistics may be applied in evaluating competing investment 
alternatives or in portfolio construction. All Kappa curves represent an inverse relationship 
between the threshold return chosen and the value of Kappa. The steepness of the K« curve at 
any given threshold return is inversely related to the chosen value of the n parameter. 
By construction, every Kappa variant has a value of zero when the threshold return equals the 
average figure. Note that although K2 
- 
the Sortino ratio 
- 
is usually expressed as a single-point 
statistic relative to a single threshold return, it is more informative to plot this Kappa variant, as 
well as others, against a range of threshold values. All Kappa curves are monotonic. 
Interpretation of differences in Ka values at different return thresholds is complex: it can be seen 
that the rate of change in Kappa as a function of T is inversely proportional to a. Kappa is 
insensitive to skewness for values of i which lie close to or above the mean return; but sensitive 
to skewness when r is substantially below the mean return. Kappa sensitivity to skewness, at low 
values of T, is a negative function of a, and the a parameter can be interpreted as a measure of 
skewness risk "appetite" for threshold returns below the mean. As is the case with skewness, 
Kappa is insensitive to kurtosis for values of r that lie close to or above the mean return; but 
sensitive to kurtosis when t is substantially below the mean return. the a parameter of Kappa can 
be interpreted as a measure of kurtosis risk aversion for return thresholds below the mean. This is 
in contrast to skewness, for which the a parameter appears to represent a measure of risk 
appetite. 
Detailed derivations, descriptions and suggested applications of K, (Omega) and K2 (Sortino 
ratio) already exist. There remains the question of what Kappa "means" in these cases or, as well, 
when a is set to some other value such as 0.5 or 375. 
75 While interesting, the relationship between Kappa variants and particular moments of a return distribution is not 
meaningful. For instance, while K2 depends in part on semi-variance, and K, depends in part on a semi-mean, there is 
no corresponding distribution moment for Kappa variants with non-integer parameter values, nor is the relationship 
between K3 and a notional "semi-skewness" statistic, or K4 and a "semi-kurtosis" statistic, easily interpreted. All 
Kappa variants are sensitive, to some degree, to the first four as well as other moments of the return distribution. 
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6.6.4 Remarks 
Omega and the Sortino ratio are two among many potential variants of Kappa. In certain 
circumstances, other Kappa variants may be more appropriate or provide insights that are more 
powerful. The ranking of a given investment alternative can change according to the Kappa 
variant chosen, due in part to differences among the variants in their sensitivity to skewness and 
kurtosis. The choice of one Kappa variant over another will therefore materially affect the user's 
evaluation of competing investment alternatives, as well as the composition of any portfolio 
optimized to maximize the value of Kappa at some return threshold. 
It does not exist, unfortunately, a generally applicable rule for choosing the "correct" Kappa 
variant for a given purpose. For the purposes of simple comparisons among competing 
investment alternatives at "ordinary" minimum return thresholds, Kappa may be estimated 
efficiently using a parameter-based calculation that eliminates the need to gather and manage 
discrete return data. However, this estimation method may lead to material discrepancies in 
Kappa estimates at low return thresholds, and so should be used with caution for the purposes of 
stress testing or portfolio construction. 
7 Portfolio management and risk adjusted performance 
In this paragraph four portfolio management frameworks will be illustrated: 
1. Portfolio management when investor preferences can be resembled through quadratic 
utility function (see section 7.1) 
2. Portfolio management in the traditional mean-variance framework (see section 7.1) 
3. Portfolio management with risk adjusted performance built on top of downside risk 
measure (see section 7.2) 
4. Portfolio management with risk adjusted performance measure built on top of distorted 
risk measure (see section 7.3) 
In section 7.3 a RAP built on top of a distorted risk measure, used only in the insurance industry, 
is for the first time analysed within a banking and finance industry set up. This section 
represents on of the most important contribution of the paper. 
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7.1 Portfolio management when using quadratic utility theory and mean/variance 
principle 
Von Neumann/Morgenstern (1953) assumed that rational investors behave according to some 
axioms of rationality76. They showed that this assumption is consistent with maximizing 
expected utility function U( W,, +, ), where W, +, denotes the end-of-period wealth of a 
representative investor, if U(W, +, ) shows the following properties: 
1. twice differentiable 
2. increasing 
3. strictly concave77 
Then the investors' optimization problem can be stated as follows78: 
Max E(U(W 
+j 
)) (7.1.1) 
In this section, a single period case is considered and therefore the time sub-index is dropped 
from now on. To investigate the possible outcomes of the future end of wealth value Taylor's 
expansion of the expected utility around the expected wealth need to be evaluated. 
u(W)=u(w)+u(`)(wXT-V-Fv)+[u2(W)](w 
I-jvr 
+ 
jj[ 
uW(w)](W 
-wI 
79 (7.1.2) 
2! 
-3 V 
where 
U(W)=U(E v) 
E(6V 
- 
o'w denotes the variance of wealth. 
Substituting the above expression into equation (4.19), the indirect utility (preference) function 
takes the form 
E[U(W)]=EU(W)+[ u"(W)J6w1W)+j[4u') (W)]mi(y3)80 (7.1.3) 
iZ t 
mi represents the i-th moment of the probability distribution of U(W). Equation (7.1.3) 
highlights the fact that the expected utility of wealth depends on: 
0 the expected end-of-period wealth 
" the variance of end-of-period wealth, QW 
" the higher moments of the probability distribution of end-of-period wealth 
76 See Huang and Litzenberger (988) 
n See Ingersoll (1987), pp. 21-22 
78 See Huang and Litzenberger (1988), pp. 60-61 
79 It is easy to show that E[U'(W XW 
-w 
)]= U'(W )E(W 
-W FV0 
so If I calculate the third and fourth derivative of the utility function U with respect to the term in brackets I get: 
E[U(W)]=EU(W)+[jU(W)]c2(w)+[u"(W)]s3 ( W)++81 
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If the end-of-period wealth U((V-) is normally distributed, then the moments of order greater than 
two can be stated as functions of the expected end-of-period wealth and its variance. This allows 
reformulating (7.1.3) as: 
E[U(W)]=EU(W)+[2ýU"(W)]6V(ii ý (7.1.4) 
Therefore, (7.1.4) indicates that investors have to concern themselves merely with the mean and 
the variance of the end-of-period wealth W when FV is normally distributed. 
Some interesting remarks can be drawn: 
" equation (7.1.3) holds for any probability distribution 
" equation (7.1.4) holds for normal probability distribution 
" the mean/variance principle can be deduced out of (7.1.4) 
" the higher the expected utility of wealth given a constant level of QW , the higher the 
expected level of end-of-period wealth will be 
If ETV is held constant, aw has to be minimized to maximize the expected utility. 
Thus: 
a) if tiV is assumed to be normally distributed: 
" the "performance" of any portfolio according to von Neumann/Morgenstern's utility theory is 
measured as the expected end-of-period wealth assessed by a portfolio of assets 
" the portfolio's risk is measured by the variance of the end-of-period wealth. This is called a 
mean/variance principle of portfolio diversification. 
b) if a normal distribution for the end-of-period wealth cannot be assumed 
" the mean/variance principle can be rescued for arbitrary wealth probability distributions, if 
quadratic utility functions of the form U(W)= yV 
- 
bW1 
are imputed. 
In the last case all moments of order greater than two are zero and can thus be dropped. 
Substituting the above utility function into equation (7.1.3) the new objective function that 
maximize the investor's utility may be expressed as: 
EU(6W)= EW 
-b EW 2= E63 -2 E((EWV)2 + Q2 (7.1.5) 
Just as in equation (7.1.4) equation (7.1.5) shows that investors endeavor to minimize the 
variance of wealth for a given level of expected end-of-period wealth. 
Summarising two alternative assumptions can be made to deduce the mean-variance principle 
out of utility theory: 
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1. The end-of-period wealth is distributed normally' 
2. Investors are faced with quadratic utility functions82. 
From a portfolio management perspective the quadratic utility function says that, after a certain 
point, when the investor becomes wealthy enough, he starts enjoying the incremental returns 
even less. Consequently, the more he earns the less satisfaction he has! This means that he would 
now try to give back some of the wealth he is earning. It is because the shape of the curve is 
actually the shape of a quadratic function. The first part goes up reasonably well within a range 
of behaviors that says, as the investor gets more and more wealth, he values the next unit at 
slightly less value than the previous unit. When he gets to the point of having enough, it is like 
giving it all back. Mathematically the wonderful simplifying assumption of quadratic utility tied 
in with mean-variance. However, this means also carry on the baggage of negative utility beyond 
a certain point along with the benefits of the simplicity calculating at the front-end of the utility 
function. 
7.2 Portfolio management when using RAP downside risk measure 
Another important issue for portfolio asset and risk mangers concern the optimal portfolio 
selection problem which is solved by making use of downside risk measure in the denominator 
of the RAPM. As one might expect, the resulting efficient frontier contains all portfolios that 
own the highest level of expected return at a given level of risk and the lowest risk for a given 
expected return. In order to find the efficient portfolio with expected return t from the 
opportunity set P of N securities, the following non-linear optimization problem must be solved: 
min LPMa (r, X 
E(x)= u71X =, u 
1=1 
N 
1=1 
(7.2.1) 
With the expectation (or mean) µ being defined as the average of T historical portfolio returns. 
After having separated the MLPM-efficient portfolios from the dominated portfolios, the stage of 
portfolio choice entails the selection of an optimal portfolio depending on the specific 
preferences of the investor. Though intuitively very appealing, the lower partial moment risk 
$ý The normal distribution assumption with risk equal to standard deviation is the basis of all the Markowitz work, the 
Sharpe work and the Capital Assets Pricing Model Theory. Virtually all of modem finance builds itself on this 
underlying concept that the world is normally distributed and risk is measured symmetrically. When start breaking 
those restrictions, the ability to measure many more things is created. 
82 It is worth to point out that the concept of uncertainty incorporated in the mean-variance framework is that both 
upside and downside volatility are penalized the same. It measures risk only relative to the mean. It does not measure 
the risk relative to a target level. 
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measures are computationally much more complex than their full domain equivalents and can be 
rather problematic to use in a portfolio context. Full domain moments display nice symmetry and 
decomposition properties. The portfolio's return variance can be decomposed into covariances 
between the component returns, and the covariance of security i with security j equals the 
covariance of j with i. Likewise the portfolio's higher order return moments can be decomposed 
into co-moments between the incorporated securities and, for example, the co-skewness between 
securities i, j and k equals the co-skewness between securities k, i and j. 
Of course, the ability to decompose a portfolio's full domain return moment into individual co- 
moments translates into the ability to aggregate individual co-moments to the portfolio's full 
domain return moment. Lower partial moments, in contrast, are constructed to be asymmetrical 
risk measures, so it is not surprising that co-lower partial moments possess a similar asymmetry. 
Consequently, the co-lower partial moments between the individual security returns cannot be 
aggregated to the portfolio's return lower partial moment. This aggregation to the portfolio level 
cannot be done, not even when one takes into account that the co-lower partial moment of 
security i with security j is different from the co-lower partial moment of j with i. 
LPM2(r, Rp)=E{(max[O, r-Rp Y}=týu7; E{(r-R. )maxý0, z-RPý (7.2.2) 
where Rp is the return of the portfolio. 
But, unfortunately 
Y_trjEJ(r-R); 
max[0, r-RPJ 
EYuw; 
v71E{(r-Rt)max[0, r-RJJ (7.2.3) 
W 1=1 J=/ 
Hence, copying the security analysis from the Markowitz framework is of no use: it is simply not 
possible to construct the portfolio's target semi-variance from the N securities' (co-) semi- 
variances. Since, in general, the set (co)lower partial moments does not provide a shortcut to 
circumvent the computational complexity of the portfolio selection problem, we must use the 
entire empirical joint distribution of the security returns in the opportunity set. 
One clever way to circumvent this problem and construct the RAPM Efficient Frontier based on 
downside risk measure might be the one that makes use of Montercarlo Simulation. In fact, due 
to the existence of multiple local minima in the case of downside risk measure when no 
assumption is made about the distribution of returns, the efficient frontier must be constructed by 
a complete enumeration of the feasible portfolios83. This methodology although is 
understandably subject to higher estimation risk is a lot more efficient when dealing whit highly 
83 This is a computationally demanding task even for a small number of assets 
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asymmetric and fat tailed return distributions. Other authors (Zagst and al. )84 have solved the 
portfolio optimization problem under the shortfall risk by making use of stochastic optimization 
procedures, namely mixed integer programming. In this case, stochastic optimisation problems 
have to be approximated. 
7.3 A new RAPM based on distorted risk measures: definition and portfolio 
management perspectives 
In this section a RAPM built on top of a distorted risk measure is analysed within a banking and 
asset management end user perspective. 
To explore how RAP based on downside risk measure like the TVaR and ESF, can lead to 
paradoxical results and, at the same time, the Wang measure can help identifying the investment 
alternative with the better risk return profile, let consider the following example and the input 
data in table 4. Consider two portfolios A and B with assigned losses (X), reported in the first 
column of table 4, and correspondent probability (Prob f(x)), reported in the second column. The 
third column represents the product of the first two (losses time probability). Moreover let 
assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the expected return of both portfolios are the same and 
equal to 1. 
Portfolio A Portfolio B 
Loss x Prob f(x) *f(x) Loss x Prob f(x) x*f(x) 
0 60.0% 0 0 60.0% 0 
1 37.5% 0.37 1 39.0% 0.39 
5 2.50% 0.12 11 1.00% 0.11 
Table 4 Portfolio A and B loss distribution 
In this case, how is reported in table 5, results TVaR(A)=TVaR(B). Also the ESF(A)=ESF(B). 
Therefore any RAP that shows in the numerator a measure of the reward of the investment or 
business opportunity and at the denominator a measure of downside risk as the ones reported in 
the example like the TVar or ES will produce the same synthetic number, disregarding all the 
information in the remaining part of the distribution. As already shown in section 5, distorted risk 
measure will capture information also contained in the remaining part of the pdf because are 
compliant with the stochastic dominance principle. Only by using a distorted risk measure, like 
the Wang distorted risk measure, it is possible to correctly discriminate between the two 
84 Portfolio Optimization Under Credit Risk, R. Zagst, J. Kehrbaum, B. Schmid, Risk Lab Germany, working paper, 
2002. 
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investment alternatives, because it is clear that portfolio B is dominated by portfolio A. Below 
follows the table summarizing all risk measures previously analysed. 
Portfolio A Portfolio B 
ESF(a) 1.250 IESF(a) 1.250 
TVaR((x) 3.000 TVaR 3.000 
WT(a) 2.420 tWT 3.400 
Table 5 Comparison between downside and distorted risk measure 
From a theoretical portfolio management perspective it is clear the advantage of adopting a RAP 
that take in consideration all information of the portfolio value distribution. In this case, one is 
able to measure: 
1. the likelihood of having a positive returns, information disclosed in the "central" part of the 
portfolio value distribution (i. e., the expected value or other similar statistics) 
2. the riskyness of the considered portfolio value distribution, information disclosed by the 
shape of the tail of the distribution at the hand. 
To better clarify the pro-active portfolio management interesting features of distorted risk 
measure let consider also the following example. 
Let recall from section 5 that a continuous increasing function g: [0,1] 
-+ 
[0,1] such that 
g(0) =0 and g(1) =1 is called distortion function. For XEx with probability distribution 
Fx (x) 
, 
the transform g(FX (x)) defines a distribution function, which is called distorted 
distribution function pg [X] as reported in eq. 5.2. Wang et al. (1997), theorem 3, implies that the 
risk measure pg [XI is a coherent risk measure provided that g(x) is a concave function85. 
Now consider eq. 5.2. Let pg[X] defining a coherent distortion measure through the increasing 
concave distortion function g, (x) = min{E, 1}, where c is a small probability of loss, say 
E=0.05. To see86 how distorted RAP measures can provide superior information, let now 
consider Y be a loss consisting of two scenarios with loss amounts 20$, 2100$ such that 
P(Y = 20) =1- P(Y = 2100) = 25 
. 
Through active risk management, assume that the lower 
amount can be eliminated and that the higher loss amount can be reduced to 1700$. By equal 
mean and variance, this results in a loss X such that P(X = 0) =1- P(X = 1700) = ;; 
Suppose a risk manager is weighing the cost of risk management against the benefit of capital 
85 This implies that (7.3.1) and (7.3.2) are coherent provided that g(x) is a convex (7(x) is a concave) function. 
86 This example is adapted from Distortion Risk Measures And Economic Capital, working paper Hurlimann (2003) 
pag. 
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relief. Then ETL does not promote risk management because 
ETLa [XI 
=1700 > ETLa [Y] = 20 + 2080. (22-06 ) =1620, which shows that there is a capital penalty 
instead of a capital relief for either removing or reducing the initial loss amounts. However, the 
Wang measure offers a capital relief because 
pg [XI =1700 " i7 = 412.3 < pg [Y] = 20 + 2080.26 = 427.9. Since Y is evidently a higher loss 
than X, the ETL measure fails to recognize this feature. 
Summarising, downside risk measure ignores useful information in a large part of the loss 
distribution. Therefore, if a risk manager uses a coherent RAP distortion measure, he can adjust 
more properly extreme low frequency and high severity losses. The intuition is that a RAP built 
on top of this risk measure should provide more useful and congruent information. 
8 Conclusions 
In this chapter different measures of risk used in portfolio management have been analysed and 
compared, distinguishing traditional mean-variance, other two-sided measures based on the 
entire distribution, probability of shortfall and downside measures of risk based on a part of the 
distribution. 
None of these provides an ideal risk measure, appropriate in all circumstances. 
Quantile risk measures are unsatisfactory because they do not satisify the sub-additivity axiom of 
coherence. In section 4 it has been shown that, using the p-quantile risk adjusted performance 
measure (like the RoVaR) for determining a solvency capital is meaningful in situations where 
the default event should be avoided, but the size of the shortfall is not important. When 
addressing the solvency capital puzzle bondholders, regulators and, to a certain degree, rating 
agencies are interested not only in the estimation of the frequency of default, but also of the 
severity of default. Interestingly, as it will be shown in much more detail in the next chapter, 
shareholders and top management design their strategies with the main aim of maximising the 
value of financial institutions. In doing so, they can take a conservative view and therefore will 
care about designing those risk management (contingent) strategies that will allow the institution 
to "survive". However, if the management is experiencing a difficult moment they will try to get 
the most out of their (risky) investment strategy without caring about the size of the loss in the 
event of default because of the limited liability assumption. Thus, not only there are different 
perspectives between bondholders, regulators, rating agency and shareholders and management; 
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but, ultimately, the behavior of the investors is contingent to the life cycle of the financial 
institution and the market opportunities. 
It is therefore hard to think that a RAPM based only an a p-quantile riske measure can provide 
answers that can reconcile all these peculiar different point of view. It appears obvious that do 
exist a need for a more flexible and comprehensive RAPM when moving from a "provision 
principle" perspective towards the "premium principle" set up, where all the values of the loss 
(and gain) distribution play a role. 
One possible way to attempt to solve this problem is to use RAPMs that show in the denominator 
downside risk measure. It is argued that RAPMs of this type are shown to be useful when 
focusing on the provision principle because they show the advantage to be, by construction, 
more conservative then quantile risk measure. Moreover, in section 4 it was shown that they 
comply with the sub-additivity axiom, thus showing the interesting feature of coherence. In this 
case it is possible to use these measures to avoid the problems that the quantile based RAPM is 
not capable to cope with as illustrated in section 3.2. Unfortunately, from a proactive portfolio 
risk management perspective these types of RAPM, do not allow to undertake strategies that 
make it possible to mitigate riskier scenarios by leveraging other possibilities of gains that can 
be evaluated by considering the whole distribution. RAPM built on top of downside risk 
measure such as the one based on measure of shortfall risk, conditional tail expectation, expected 
shortfall and tail VaR, because do not satisfy the second-order stochastic dominance principle 
cannot be safely used for pro-active portfolio management as shown in section 4.2.5.4 and 7.3 
To this aim, I propose the use of distortion concave risk measures developed in the actuarial 
literature as the basis to build on top of this measure RAPM that can help identify and rank 
investment alternatives when their distribution is non-normal and fat tail are possible. In section 
7.3 it has shown that, if portfolio A and B have the same return, and portfolio A dominates 
portfolio B in according with the SOSD principle, RAPM based on measure of shortfall risk such 
as the Tail VaR are not able to correctly rank the two portfolios. The distorted concave RAPM, 
such as the Wang Transform, on the other hand, ranks correctly. 
These type of distorted RAPM offer portfolio managers a family of different full distribution 
measures of risk, which can be adjusted to reflect a range of different attitudes to outcomes in 
different parts of the distribution by choosing an appropriate distortion function. Examples where 
the distortion risk measure provides summaries of portfolio performance that are more helpful 
than any of the other commonly used metrics are provided in section 7.3. 
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Summarising, in this chapter it has been shown that, when using RAPM for portfolio 
management it is crucial to check that the RAPM at the hand it is at the same time coherent and 
SD compliant. The concave distorted risk measures are a good example to help solve 
successfully this puzzle. Actuaries have started to use this risk measure also for capital allocation 
purposes and I think that the finance researchers and professionals will start to consider even 
more carefully than the past the need for more tailored and consistent RAPM because risk and 
portfolio management represent the next challenge for risk and asset managers in the near future. 
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Appendix 1 First Degree Stochastic Dominance Principle 
Proposition 1 The FDSD rule 
Given two probability distributions f(x) and g(x), distribution f dominates distribution g by 
FDSD if. 
1. the decision maker has positive marginal utility of wealth for all x (u'(x) > 0) 
2. cdf of f(x) is less than or equal to cdf under the g(x) distribution, for all x with strict 
inequality for some x87. 
If f is preferred tog then f u(x) f (x) - g(x)]dx >0. 
Conversely, 
if g is preferred to f results f u(xl f (x)- g(x)]dx <0. 
Let define a=u(x) and b the difference between two cdf, namely b=[F(x)-G(x)], where 
F(x) = If (x)dx and G(x) =f g(x)dx 
Moreover let also define 
da 
= u'(x)dx and db = [f (x) - g(x)] 
By integrating by parts results 
00 0 f u(xX f (x) - g(x» =f adb = abl -f bda 
- 
-0 -00 
(A. 1.1) 
Assume both f(x) and g(x) is the probability associated to each level of wealth for alternatives f 
and g. It is therefore possible to write the difference in the expected utility between the prospects 
(see eq. A. 1.1) as follows: 
fu(x)[f(x)-g(x)]dx=[u(x)[F(x)-G(x)] 
- 
ju'(x)[F(x)-G(x)}fr (A. 1.2) 
It is possible to observe a couple of things about this result. 
Let look at the first addendum of the right hand part, i. e. [u(x)[F(x)-G(x)j 
. 
1. First notice that when x 
-> -oo , 
F(x)=G(x)=0 because at the far left hand tail of the 
probability distribution the cumulative probabilities equal zero. 
Thus, for x 
-a -co results [u(x)[F(x) - G(x)]] .O=0. 
2. Second, when x 
-* +oo since these are cumulative probability distributions both will equal 
one and therefore the utility of plus infinity times a term that equals one minus one which is 
zero. Thus, for x 
-* +ao results [u(x)[F(x) - G(x)1,, =0 
57 Note, the strict inequality requirement means the distribution cannot be the same. 
90 
Chapter 2 
Now let look at the second addendum, namely 
- 
Ju'(x)[F(x) 
- 
G(x)]dx 
If the overall sign of 
[u(x)[F(x)- G(x)fl 0-f u'(x)[F(x) 
- 
G(x)Jdx 
is positive then f dominates g. 
I will restrict the sign by adding assumptions. 
1. First, assume non-satiation i. e., that more is preferred to less and therefore results u'(x) >0 
for all x88. This means this term takes its sign from the F(x) 
- 
G(x) term. That term gives the 
difference between the two cdfs. 
2. Second, suppose [F(x) 
- 
G(x)] 50 dx 89. Because by assumption cdf of f is less than or 
equal to cdf under the g distribution, for all x with strict inequality for some x, it will result 
[F(x)- G(x)] <0 
Having shown that the term at the left hand side of eq. A. 1.2 is zero and the second term is 
positive because [F(x) - G(x)] <0 and the marginal utility is positive (with a negative sign in 
front of it) results 
[u(xXF(x) 
- 
G(x)1. 
-f u'(x)[F(x) - G(x)]dx z0 for some x 
20 
88 Thus u(x) it will always be a positive multiplier 
89 This means that the cdf off must always lie on to the right of the cdf of g 
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Appendix 2 Second Degree Stochastic Dominance 
Proposition 2 The Second Order Stochastic Dominance rule 
If 
1) An individual has positive marginal utility (non-satiation), u'(x) >0 
2) An individual has diminishing marginal utility of income u"(x) <0 
3) [F2 (x) 
- 
G2 (x)] S0 for all x, with strict inequality for some x 
Then 
f dominates g by a SDSD. 
Proof 
If risk aversion matters the FOSD decision rule ju(x)[f (x)-g(x)}dx is replaced by the SOSD 
f u'(x)[F(x)-G(x)]dx=adb=-[u'(x)[FZ(x)-G2(x)J1 . 0+ f u"(x)[F2(x)-G2(x)]dx (A. 2.1) 
-00 .0 
By applying the integration by parts formula and defining for convenience 
a=u'(x) 
and 
db=[F(x)-G(x)]dx 
so that 
da 
= u'(x)dx 
and 
b=[F2(x)-G2(x)]dx, 
where F2(x) and G2(x) are the second integral of F and G with respect to x, i. e.: 
F2 (x) =ff 
.f 
(x)dx 
= 
F(x)dx (A. 2.2) 
Integrating by parts results 
f u'(x)[F(x) - G(x)]dx =- [u'(x)[F2 (x) - G2 (x)] ,*+ft, "(x)[FZ (x) - G2 (x)]dx 
OD -. 0 
Therefore, f dominates g under the SOSD rule if eq. (A. 2.1) is always positive. To see this, 
consider the right hand part of (A. 2.1). SDSD makes two assumptions that render this term 
positive: 
1. First, assume that the second derivative of the utility function with respect to x is negative 
everywhere, i. e. u "(x) <0 Vx E 91 
2. Second, assume that [F2 (x) 
- 
G2 (X)1: 5 0 FZ(x) for all x with strict inequality for some x. 
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Under these circumstance results a negative number times a negative leading to a positive9', 
therefore 
I u"(x)[F2 (x)-G2 (x)]dx >- 0 
_ 
Consider now the left hand part of (A. 2.1). If 
3. the assumption on non-satiation is now added, i. e. u'(x > 0), Vx E 9l 
, 
because 
[F2 (x) 
- 
G2 (x)] <- 0, results, for 
 x 
-a +co results 
[F2 (x)- G2 (x)] S0 
 x 
-ý -oo results [F2 (x) - G2 (x)] -0, since there is no area at that stage. 
Therefore, also the left hand side term is positive 
- 
[u'(x)[F2 (x) 
- 
G2 W1000 ?0 
Consequently 
- 
[u'(x)[F2 (x) 
- 
G2 (x)]I 00a, +ju "(x)[F2 (x) 
- 
G2 (x)]dx >0 
Remarks 
a. If u(x) <0 and u'(x) >0 then the Pratt risk aversion coefficient is positive 
b. The assumption that the integral under the cdf of f must be smaller than the integral under 
the cdf of g allows the cumulative distributions to cross as long as the difference in the areas 
before they cross is greater than the difference in their areas after they cross. 
90 For second degree dominance to apply therefore the utility function must be non-decreasing and concave. 
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Appendix 3 The relationship between downside and maximum potential loss based 
risk measure 
VaR calculates under a certain confidence level k the maximum loss (or the maximum loss return 
T) over a given time horizon T. Conversely, LPM(O; t) represents the probability of failing an ex 
ante definded target return r. Due to their similarity, it is easy to derive a formal relationship 
between these two risk measures 
- 
despite the fact that they follow different goals. Given that 
LPM(0; r) corresponds exactly to the confidence probability a of the considered VaR equation, 
with a=0 is taken as a starting point. Assuming the existence of a corresponding density function 
for the distribution function F(x), results 
LPM0(r, X)= f. (r-X)°. f(X)dX =[F(X)]t,. =F(r)-F(-oo)=F(r)=k 
The transition to the loss return can be executed by using the inverse function of F(x): 
F"1 (k) = F"1 [LPMO (X, r)] =r 
The VaR can be equivalently expressed as a continuously compounded loss return T. In fact, The 
maximum loss L can be transformed into the continuously compounded loss return 
r =1n1 lnW J by using the relation L=W 
(1- 
e'), with W the initial wealth. 
Therefore: 
VaRK =L=W(1-e=) 
and consequently, the relationship between VaR and LPM0 (X, r) is: 
VaRK =L =W(1-er)=W(1-eF-'(A) 
)=W(1-eF-º(LPMO(X. t» 
Therefore, a VaR can be calculated on the basis of LPM0 (X, r) and vice versa. It is easy to 
verify that the VaR decreases with increasing shortfall-probability. 
This relationship can be exemplified with a standard-normally distributed random variable x. The 
negative argument of the distribution, z=t-0, approaches to zero with increasing shortfall 
a 
probability91. Therefore in the limit, z -* 0, implies e' =1. The implication is that both the term 
in brackets and the VaR disappear. 
An extension of the classical VaR-framework can be illustrated by considering the target 
shortfall for a target return T. Recalling that 
91 The possibility of a negative VaR is excluded 
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LPM1(r, X)= f. (r-X)lf(X)dX=E[Max(r-X, O)] 
It can be shown that LPM, (r, x) permits a quantitative judgement about the expected loss, if the 
effective portfolio loss exceeds the calculated VaR Based on the target return T, which 
corresponds to the pre-specified confidence probability k, the shortfall-conditioned mean 
J. t" 
, 
can be calculated using the standardized target shortfall previously introduced 
r r. (r 
- 
x)' f(x)ax PXsr =Z- !. f(X)dX 
Through this equation it is possible to quantify the expected loss of a portfolio, if the classical 
VaR-forecast underestimates the effective loss realization and insufficiently captures the existing 
risk. This loss expectation is therefore called Shortfall-Value at Risk (SVaR), since it estimates 
the average wealth reduction, if the effective loss exceeds the forecasted loss by VaR: 
fJ. (T_x)'f(x)dxl 
= 
W(1- epxsr )= W 1- e Jr°`f(X)d = SVaR(k x: 5 z) VaRK, x - LxSr = <_r = 
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Appendix 4 Example SR vs GSR 
92 
Let consider two investments A and U. Suppose that returns and related probabililies are those 
reported in table 7 Clearly investment A dominates investment 13. By comparing SR vs OSR (see 
also table 8 and 9 and figure 9 and 10) it is possible to note how, when returns are non-normally 
distributed the (SR correctly ranks the considered alternative investments. SR instead flawed. 
Investors, fund and asset managers, risk managers, regulators must carefully consider the 
problems which arise when coherence assumptions, on one hand, and the statistical properties of 
estimated parameters considered in the used RAPM, on the other hand, are not carefully taken in 
consideration when evaluating or structuring both financial and strategic investments or financial 
products (especially the most illiiluid ones). 
Probability RA Probability RB E[RA] E[RAA2] E[RB] E[RB^2] 
0.01 
-13.00 0.01 -10.00 -0.10 1.00 -0.13 1.69 
0.04 
-7.00 0.04 -5.00 -0.20 1.00 -0.28 1.96 
0.25 
-1.00 0.25 -1.00 -0.25 0.25 -0.25 0.25 
0.40 5.00 0.40 5.00 2.00 10.00 2.00 10.00 
0.25 11.00 0.25 15.00 3.75 56.25 2.75 30.25 
0.04 17.00 0.04 28.00 1.12 31.36 0.68 11.56 
0.01 23.00 0.01 32.00 0.32 10.24 0.23 5.29 
Mean RA 6.64 Mean RB 5.00 6.64 110.10 5.00 61.00 
Std dev RA 8.12 Std dev RB 6.00 
SR RA 0.83 SR RB 0.82 
GSR RA 0.82 GSR RB 0.95 
Table 7 Sharpe Ratio and (icnertliscd Sharpe RZalio tu l imestm ent :A and 13 
Return Probablity Distributions 
- 
Distribution A 
Distribution B 
a 0 
CL 
30 35 
Figure 9 SR vs GSR: Retuni Probability Distribution Function oi' Investment A and 13 
The author wishes to thank S. Hodges fur pro% iding the %%orksheets illustrated in table 7,5 and 9 
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Cumulative Distribution Functions 
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Figure 9 SR vs GSR: Cumulative Distribution Function eßt' Investment A and 13 
Worksheet for cal culating General ized Sharpe Rat io RA 
Pr: RA\ X: 0,00 0,08 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,13 
0,01 
-13 ;,, t -1 ý, 'I 
0,04 
-7 
0,25 
-1 
0,4 5 2,00 1,33 1,04 1,03 1,03 1,03 1,03 1,03 1,03 
0,25 11 2,75 1,12 0,66 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 
0,04 17 0,68 0,17 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 
0,01 23 0,23 0,03 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 
Sum: 5,00 1,50 0,10 UJ 
-6 00 -0,00 0,00 -0.00 0,00 
Pr: RA\ X: 
0,01 
-13 1,69 4,91 9,16 9,60 9,60 9,60 9,60 9,60 9,60 
0,04 
-7 1,96 3,48 4,87 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 
0,25 
-1 0,25 0,27 0,28 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 
0,4 5 10,00 6,64 5,22 5,13 5,13 5,13 5,13 5,13 5,13 
0,25 11 30,25 12,28 7,24 6,95 6,95 6,95 6,95 6,95 6,95 
0,04 17 11,56 2,87 1,27 1,19 1,19 1,19 1,19 1,19 1,19 
0,01 23 5,29 0,80 0,27 0,24 0,24 0,24 0,24 0,24 0,24 
Sum: 61,00 31,24 28,31 28,40 28,40 28,40 28,40 28,40 28,40 
Pr: RA\ X: 
0,01 
-13 0,01 0,03 0,05 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 
0,04 
-7 0,04 0,07 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 
0,25 
-1 0,25 0,27 0,28 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 
014 5 0,40 0,27 0,21 0,21 0,21 0,21 0,21 0,21 0,21 
0,25 11 0,25 0,10 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 
0,04 17 0,04 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
0,01 23 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Sum: 1,00 0,75 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,71 
SR 0,83 0,83 0,83 0,83 0,83 0,83 0,83 0,83 0,83 
GSR 0,00 0,76 0,82 0,82 0,82 0,82 0,82 0,82 0,82 
Table 8 SR and GSR of Investment A 
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Worksheet for calculati ng Generalized Sharpe Ratio RB 
Pr: RB1 X: 0,00 0,06 0,12 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 
0,01 
-10 
0,04 
-5 
0,25 
-1 
0,4 5 2,00 1,48 1,09 0,91 0,89 0,89 0,89 0,89 0,89 
0,25 15 3,75 1,52 0,60 0,36 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 
0,04 28 1,12 0,21 0,04 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 
0,01 32 0,32 0,05 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
sum: 6,64 2,53 0,74 0,07 0,00 0,00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Pr: RBI X: 
0,01 
-10 1,00 1,83 3,39 4,81 5,01 5,01 5,01 5,01 5,01 
0,04 
-5 1,00 1,35 1,84 2,19 2,24 2,24 2,24 2,24 2,24 
0,25 
-1 0,25 0,27 0,28 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 
0,4 5 10,00 7,40 5,43 4,56 4,47 4,47 4,47 4,47 4,47 
0,25 15 56,25 22,76 8,99 5,33 5,02 5,02 5,02 5,02 5,02 
0,04 28 31,36 5,79 1,02 0,39 0,34 0,34 0,34 0,34 0,34 
0,01 32 10,24 1,49 0,20 0,07 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 
Sum: 110,10 40,89 21,17 17,64 17,43 17,43 17,43 17,43 17,43 
Pr: RB1 X: 
0,01 
-10 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 
0,04 
-5 0,04 0,05 0,07 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,09 
0,25 
-1 0,25 0,27 0,28 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 
0,4 5 0,40 0,30 0,22 0,18 0,18 0,18 0,18 0,18 0,18 
0,25 15 0,25 0,10 0,04 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 
0,04 28 0,04 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
0,01 32 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0.00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Sum: 1,00 0,74 0,65 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 
SR 0,82 0,82 0,82 0,82 0,82 0,82 0,82 0,82 0,82 
GSR 0,00 0,77 0,93 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,95 
Table 9 SR and GSR of Investment B 
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Default probability, capital 
structure and the cost of 
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1- Introduction 
One of the most important developments in risk management over the past few years has been 
the widespread implementation of risk-adjusted performance measurement (RAPM)2 systems, 
designed to put the returns of very different risk business on a comparable, risk-adjusted basis. 
The main benefit of such systems is that they help financial institutions to identify businesses 
where they have a competitive advantage. The immediate purpose of such risk measurement 
system is to provide bank managements with a more reliable way to determine the amount of 
capital necessary to support each of their major activities, and thus, to determine the overall 
leverage for the bank as a whole. The ultimate goal of these risk based capital allocation 
systems is to provide a uniform measure of performance. Management can in turn use this 
measure to evaluate performance for capital budgeting, risk management, optimal capital 
structure and as an input to the compensation system used for senior managers. 
Allocating equity capital on the basis of the risk of individual business units seems pointless in 
the classical theoretical paradigm of "frictionless" capital markets (one with perfect 
information and without taxes, bankruptcy cost or conflicts between managers and 
shareholders). If markets operated in this manner, the pricing of specific risks would be the 
same for all banks and would not depend on the characteristic of an individual bank's 
portfolio. Moreover, given market prices of risk, whether a bank varied leverage on the basis of 
risk or varied the cost of capital with the risk of the project would result in the same capital 
budgeting decisions and investment activity for the bank. Of course, in real world, banks and 
other financial intermediaries add value precisely through their ability to reduce market 
frictions. This role implies that a large portion of bank assets are likely to be difficult for 
outside investors to value, which in turn may create information and. agency problems for 
banks themselves when they have to raise capital externally. In this situation systems of RAPM 
can add value. 
This chapter provides the combined first analysis of the impact of default probability, capital 
structure, limited liability, deposit insurance, franchise value and taxes on Risk Adjusted 
Return on Capital (RAROC)3 type risk measures. Previous work of Crouhy and at (1999) has 
addressed part of this problem but does not provide a complete analysis. The suggested model 
2A generic RAPM takes the following form, RAP M 
Expected Revenues- Costs 
- 
Expected Losses 
, 
where: Expected 
Economic Capital 
Revenues is the expected revenues assuming no losses, Expected Losses is the expected losses from default, and 
Economic Capital is usually defined as the capital necessary to cushion against unexpected losses, operating risks 
and market risks, and is often referred to as Value at Risk (VaR). For a more detailed description of this measure see 
Ong 1999, pag 218. The magnitude of the Economic Capital is usually determined so that the probability of 
unexpected losses is below some specified level. Matten (2000, pp 146-166) describes several different RAPM. 
3 In this framework only the ex-ante perspective will be considered. The cost of economic capital is therefore based 
on expectations and risk assessment 
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also adopts a rigorous equilibrium perspective by enforcing the pricing of banking assets using 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This alters significantly some of the results reported 
by Crouhy and al. (1999). Finally, this framework clearly establishes the relationship amongst 
different measures of capital, namely the market value of the equity, the risk capital and the 
economic capital. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section Section 2 reviews the most relevant 
literature. The third Section 3 discusses the different concepts of `capital' and how these relate 
to both performance measurement and value creation, illustrates the theoretical framework by 
considering their relationship from the perspective of both bond holders and shareholders. 
The core analysis of this chapter is presented in Section 4, linking the economic capital to the 
performance measurement, i. e how to enhance (maximise) the shareholder value of the 
financial institution through the analysis of the cost of economic capital. Section 4.1 introduces 
the core assumptions of the suggested model. Because, in this framework, assets are measured 
on a mark-to-market basis market and book capital are the same by construction. In Section 
4.2 the distinction between actual and target default probability is then used to show how a 
bank can change the capital structure to reach the pre-defined credit rating that allows the bank 
itself to ultimately reach the cost of capital target. It will be shown that the most important risk 
driver is the market correlation and not the volatility as previously reported by Crouhy an al 
(1999). Sections 4.3 and 4.4 introduce shareholder limited liability and the possibility that 
deposits are insured. When considered the put option associated with the insurance then the 
asset return volatility plays a role. The impact of volatility on the cost of capital is higher the 
riskier is the bank or, stated alternatively, the higher the existing bank leverage. The resultant 
cost of capital is calculated also in the case that the target credit rating is considered. Section 
4.5 summarises and compares the results obtained in the various sub-sections 4.2-4.4. Section 
5 generalises the analysis by adding the franchise value and the taxes. When all adjustments 
are made the risk capital becomes the economic capital and can be immediately compared 
against the market hurdle rate. Section 6 provides a further analysis of the situation when 
actual capital exceeds the risk capital associated with the target level of probability. Section 7 
concludes. 
2-, Literature Review 
- 
.. 
7a. 
,f 
According to Schroeck (2002) since early 1990s the financial institutions have been very 
focused on designing systems to measure the risk that is involved in their different lines of 
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business. The purpose of such measurement systems is to determine the amount of capital that 
is necessary for each business unit and thus determine the equity capital required by the bank 
as a whole. In this framework the bank can define the profitability of businesses with different 
capital requirements and different sources of risk. These capital-based capital allocation 
systems are known as Risk Adjusted Return On Capital or RAROC. Development of the 
RAROC methodology was started in the late 1970s by a group at Bankers Trust. Before the 
development of risk-adjusted profitability measurements, the banks used Return On Assets 
(ROA) or Return On Equity (ROE) to measure their performance and assigned capital to 
different businesses according to the regulatory requirements-Basel guidelines. But neither of 
these approaches took into account the different kind of risk that are embodied in the bank's 
various activities. 
James (1996) argued that the capital budgeting process resembles the operation of an internal 
capital market in which firms allocate capital with the objective of mitigating the costs of 
external financing. RAROC systems allocate capital for two reasons: a) risk management and 
b) performance evaluation. 
For risk management purposes, RAROC assigns capital to individual business units in order to 
determine the bank's optimal capital structure i. e. the proportion of equity to assets that 
minimizes the bank's cost of funding. This process involves estimating how much the 
volatility of each business unit contributes to the total risk of the bank. There are two factors in 
determining a business's risk contribution: a) the total volatility of its returns4, b) the extent of 
the correlation of its returns with the returns of the overall bank5. Therefore financial 
institutions try to increase value by reducing market frictions and choosing the optimal capital 
structure. Most of the banks intend to have high leverage because of the benefits they can have. 
One of the most important benefits is the tax shield provided by tax-deductible interest 
payments. Another motive to use debt financing and reduce equity is the potential of high 
leverage, especially in industries with excess capital, to motivate managers to operate as 
efficiently as possible by accepting projects that add value and rejecting projects that they will 
not give a desirable return. Also, the financial institutions should take into account the costs 
that the high leverage involves. Analytically, banks are imposed to heavy costs and liquidity 
constraints if they violate the minimum capital standards, which will cause major disruptions 
in the operating activities6. Another important issue is that the customers, that they are also the 
largest liability holders, are very concerned about the bank's credit rating. If a financial 
institution fails to meet the credit quality standards, it will probably loose important customers 
and face problems in its operational activities. To maintain a high credit rating the financial 
The more volatile the unit's performance, the more capital is assigned to it. 
If its returns are less than perfectly correlated with the bank's returns its economic capital is reduced. 
6 In extreme cases, extensive use of debt financing can lead to default and a costly reorganization 
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institution evaluates the capital adequacy by measuring the volatility of the assets' market 
value and not the book value. The credit ratings are influenced by the volatility of the variables 
that affect bank stock prices rather than the changes in earnings and book capital'. 
For performance evaluation purposes, the goal of allocating capital to individual business units 
is to determine the economic profit of each unit and its contribution to shareholder value. This 
process provides a basis for effective capital budgeting and incentive compensation. RAROC 
systems are used to measure the performance of each business unit. If RAROC of a particular 
business is higher than the cost of equity-shareholders' minimum required rate of return-the 
unit creates value for the shareholders. On the contrary, if RAROC is less than the cost of 
equity, the unit reduces the shareholders' value. But RAROC does not provide information 
about the amount of value that is being created or destroyed by an operation and thus the use of 
RAROC can lead to underinvestment. If managers are rewarded solely on the basis of 
RAROC, they might reject projects with positive Net Present Value that will lower their 
average returns. To avoid this problem and create the right incentives for the managers, 
performance should also take into account the sign of the economic profit (i. e. earnings less a 
charge for the cost of capital). 
As Froot and Stein (1995) pointed out, faced with an increasing cost of raising external funds 
banks will behave in a risk-averse fashion. Specifically, a business unit's contribution to the 
overall cash flow volatility of the bank will be an important factor in the capital budgeting 
decision. Moreover, in this environment capital structure, risk management and capital 
budgeting are inextricably linked together. Finance theory suggests that, in designing a capital 
allocation system, the first step is to identify the cost and benefits of holding equity capital in 
the context of these market frictions. In banking, as in most industries, the tax shield provided 
by tax-deductible interest payments (as opposed to non-deductible dividends) creates an 
incentive to make extensive use of debt financing. Banks' access to fixed-rate deposit 
insurance also makes debt in the form of deposits a low-cost source of funding!. The 
advantages of debt financing for commercial banks suggest, that holding a large capital buffer 
will be costly. The most serious deterrent to high leverage in banking is the possibility for 
liquidity constraints to cause major disruptions on a bank's operating activities. 
7 Although, many of the bank's businesses do not mark their portfolios to market on a regular basis and as a result 
the volatility of market values cannot be defined. For these businesses, the volatility in economic earnings is used 
instead. 
8 When combined with this federal insurance subsidy, depositors' further reduction of their required interest rates for 
the liquidity and convenience of demand and time deposits is an added incentive for banks to use this form of 
leverage 
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Froot and Stein (1998) stressed the relation between risk management, capital budgeting, and 
capital structure policies for banks9. In their model all three of these policies are shaped by two 
related primitive frictions. First, it is costly for banks to hold a buffer stock of equity capital on 
the balance sheet, even if this equity is accumulated over time through retained earnings. Given 
these frictions, bank value-maximisation implies the following conclusions. Banks should: 
hedge any risks that can be offloaded on fair-market terms; hold some capital as a device for 
absorbing those illiquid risks which cannot be hedged, but the optimal amount of capital is 
limited; value, given limited capital, illiquid risks much as an individual investor would 
- 
according to their impact on overall portfolio risk and return- with the degree of risk aversion 
being a decreasing function of the amount of capital held. 
Merton and Perold (1993) argued that, banks and other financial firms can be distinguished 
from industrial companies by the fact that their customers are often also their largest liability 
holders. And because these customers place a premium value on assurances of performance on 
their contracts, they show a strong preference for banks with a high credit quality. As a 
consequence, a high credit rating is generally held to be essential for bank to be major swaps 
dealer, to underwrite securities or to compete effectively in the corporate banking market. 
In sum, the benefits of debts financing for banks suggests that there are cost associated with 
holding a lot of capital. This implies that risk-management concerns will enter into capital 
budgeting decisions1°. This has two important implication for the design of a capital allocation 
system. First, when evaluating the risk of a new project or business unit the project's 
contribution on the overall variability will affect the project's hurdle rate or cost of capital. A 
second implication of these market frictions is that the bank should hedge all tradable risk- 
risk that can be hedged at little cost in the capital market. This implication follows directly 
from the fact that the bank's required price for bearing tradable risk will exceed the market 
price for the risk by the contribution of a hedgeable risk to the overall variability of the bank's 
portfolio. The only risk the bank should assume are illiquid or non-tradable risk in which it has 
a comparative advantage in bearing. 
But what would happen if the RAPM systems did not correctly adjust for risks? What if its 
results were fundamentally biased relative to the way that the market actually compensated 
risks through higher returns? Then the RAPM evaluations would also be biased, leading to 
9 Because capital budgeting in the Froot and Stein model is driven by an exposure's impact on portfolio risk and 
return, decentralised implementation becomes a problem if the pre-existing portfolio cannot be treated as fixed for all 
time. Thus, for example, if several new investment opportunities arrive at once, the optimal allocation to each must 
be jointly determined. This requires a well informed central planner operating out of the headquarters. The whole 
issue of centralisation versus decentralisation should also be investigated with respect of full versus asymmetric 
information and in presence of capital adequacy restriction 
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undercapitalise business in which it truly had a competitive advantage and overcapitalise those 
units with mediocre or even negative performance. 
Crouhy, Turnbull and Wakeman (1999) shown that the market's standard RAPM system, 
namely RAROC, is fundamentally biased. In the following a biased RAPM system is the one 
that does not make returns comparable even in efficient market. Wilson (1992) showed that for 
most risk portfolios there is a trading strategy which will generate an infinite RAROC. If both 
the Capital at Risk (CAR) and the portfolio return are correctly calculated, Wilson (1992) 
showed that the bias comes from the RAROC calculation itself. In fact, RAROC calculation 
rule implicitly assumes that only the portfolio risk capital is compensated, rather than the 
economic capital invested in a portfolio". Froot and Stein (1998) showed that, in the common 
RAROC framework, at each investment under consideration is allocated a certain amount of 
capital. Multiplying the allocated capital by the cost of capital yield a capital charge. The hurdle 
rate for the investment is then a risk-less rate plus the capital charge. As also shown by Wilson 
(1992) and James (1996), traditional RAROC can be thought of as a one factor pricing model12, 
the factor being the market' 3. Froot and Stein argued that the hurdle rate for small investments 
in new project14 can be more efficiently decomposed in a two factor hurdle rate, namely: the 
covariance of the return on the tradable component with the market R. and the correlation on 
the non tradable component of the new risk 
G N) with the non-tradable risks of the existing 
portfolio'5. In their work Froot and Stein highlighted the ways in which one can go wrong, at 
least relative to their model's implications for value maximising behaviour, in applying a 
10 Stoughton and Zechner (1999) argued that discussions with practitioners support the view that corporates CFOs as 
well as their counterparts at financial institutions view capital budgeting, risk management and capital structure as 
being inextricably linked 
Il Consider a generic portfolio that has a non-zero, strictly positive, mark-to-market value, and the risk manager has 
access to a risk-free asset investment opportunity. It is easy to show that, under these weak conditions, an infinite 
positive RAROC can be achieved by liquidating the entire portfolio immediately and investing the proceeds in the 
risk-free asset. This strategy would generate positive realised returns with no capital at risk, implying an infinite 
RAROC 
12 In this model the risk driver factor is the market: /4 =y Covýj, Rj+ 2 COV (uj, R p) , where 
y= market unit price of risk for the (market) priced factor 
Rm = return of (market) price factor 
A= unit cost for volatility of the bank's cash flows 
RP = return on the bank's existing portfolio 
pi = hurdle rate or required return for project i 
13 The market is by definition a tradable component and this is the reason of the absence of the super-script T 
14 The two factor model can be represented as: p, =r cov(i , Rm 
)+ G cový, RA FP p, = (1) + (2), where: 
component (1) represents the first factor and, like the standard CAPM, describes the covariance of the return on the 
tradable component 
(T) 
with the market Rm; component (2) represents the second factor and, like in the 
modified version of CAPM which considers the non marketable asset, is based on the correlation on the non tradable 
component of the new risk 
(i4r) 
with the non-tradable risks of the existing portfolio 
(R p), 
multiplied by G (the 
bank's risk aversion factor that depends on the Economic Capital); 
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"single factor" RAROC to capital budgeting. In particular they argued that there are three main 
possible source of errors: one factor model are inadequate to separate priced and non-priced 
risks'b, capital allocation is based on measures of variance rather than covariance'7 and it is 
likely that an incorrect cost of capital is estimated and used". 
Crouhy, Turnbull and Wakeman (1999) argued that the definition of risk inside the financial 
institutions has moved away from a market-driven definition of risk to a measure of risk that is 
purely firm specific. In particular, one of the most appealing features of the traditional RAROC 
methodology is that of avoiding to calculate the beta for the business because it is able to 
measure the inherent risk by using only the current probability of default of the bank. 
Consequently, if the RAROC number is greater than the firm's cost of equity capital the 
business will add value to the firm. Zaik et al. (1996) state the Bank of America's policy is to 
capitalise each of the business units in a manner consistent with bank's desired credit rating on 
the unit's stand alone risk'9. This assumes that the risk of economic capital of the stand-alone 
business is the same as that of the bank's equity. Consequently, the implicit assumption is that 
the RAROC measure adjusts the risk of a business to that of a firm's equity20. Crouhy, 
Turnbull and Wakeman (1999) showed that maintaining the probability of default constant is 
inconsistent with a constant expected return on equity and vice versa thus showing that 
RAROC cannot be directly compared with the firm's cost of equity capital. According to Zaik 
and al. and James (1996), state that Bank of America's policy is to use a common hurdle rate 
(cost of equity capital) for all the business units. The main reason is that the portion of the 
overall risk of the single business units is diversified away by the structure of the bank as a 
whole, which means that the risk contribution of each unit is based on an internal beta. As a 
13 Extending to many new products means we have to incorporate the covariance of each new non-tradable exposure 
whit other exposure, the optimal mix of new and old investments will thus depend on this variance covariance matrix 
16 One of the key implications of the Froot and Stein two factor model is that a bank should evaluate investments 
according to both their correlation with any priced market factors and their correlation with the bank existing 
portfolios. 
17 Under traditional RAROC the amount of capital allocated is related to a measure of the investment's risk such as 
its total volatility, but from prospect of a bank value maximization it makes more sense to be driven by the 
covariance with the rest of the bank's portfolio. Many financial institutions have now recognised the usefulness of 
this approach. For example James (1996), in discussing the implementation of RAROC at Bank of America writes 
"the amount of capital allocated varies with the contribution of the project to the overall volatility of earnings at 
Bank of America (the projects so called internal beta)" 
18Even if the RAROC capital allocation is based on the appropriate covariance measure, one need to came up, first, 
whit the right measure of bank tolerated default probability (For example according to Zaik and al. (1996) at Bank 
of America a default probability of 0,03% is tolerated), and, second, with the appropriate cost of capital. Following 
Zaik and al. (1996) the hurdle rate is typically set to equal the required return on equity of the bank's shareholders, 
which could be calculated from the standard CAPM. This latter calculation is inconsistent within the Froot and Stein 
framework. In fact, in the polar case where the bank hedges all risks, the bank's shareholders are left only holding 
non-priced risks, so their required return on equity is simply the risk-less rate. But, if this is true, the traditional one 
factor RAROC method says that the capital charge should be zero for any target default probability and cost of 
equity capital value. 
19 If a Business Unit's RAROC is higher than the cost of capital (or the cost of bank's equity) -the minimum rate of 
return required by shareholders- then the unit is deemed to be adding value to shareholders. 
20 If a firm is considering investing in a business, it can compute the RAROC for the business and compare it with 
the firm's cost of equity capital. 
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result the application of a single hurdle rate will produce results very similar to those generated 
by CAPM system with multiple discount rates21. Especially if the bank holds a well diversified 
portfolio of businesses, the risk of various activities on a levered basis will be the same and the 
internal betas will not be different from the market-based betas. Another reason is that as the 
cost of equity should reflect the systematic risk of every activity, which is measured by its 
CAPM beta, it is very difficult and costly to estimate betas for individual businesses. This 
process implies that investments in riskier projects will require less leverage than investments 
in less risky projects. They argued that this framework produces two types of errors: accepting 
"high-risk" projects that will decrease the value of the firm and rejecting "low-risk" projects 
that will increase the value of the firm. In order to overcome this distortion they suggested the 
RAROC 
-R 
use of the Adjusted RAROC which is defined as: Adj. RAROC =Pf, where ßE is the 
E 
systematic risk of equity and Rf is the risk-free interest rate22. They declare that if the Adjusted 
RAROC of a project is greater than the excess rate of return on the market (RM 
- 
Rf), it will 
increase the shareholder value. On the other hand if it is less than the excess rate of return on 
the market, it will decrease the shareholder value. They also observed that Adjusted RAROC is 
insensitive to changes in volatility and correlation. But in their analysis they didn't take into 
consideration the distinction between the tradable and non-tradable risk factor component 
introduced by Froot and Stein. This means that even the Adjusted RAROC is an inefficient 
Risk Adjusted Performance Measurement if the tradable component of the undertaken project 
is not diversified away. Zaik and al. (1996), while recognising the errors that may occur, argue 
that the costs of estimating individual betas for different businesses outweigh the benefits. This 
line of reasoning raise two fundamental questions. How is the expected rate of return to 
existing shareholders related to RAROC? Second, how sensitive is the RAROC methodology 
to changes in the risk of the underlying business? 
Crouhy, Turnbull and Wakeman (1999) showed that, assuming that the risky asset is totally 
financed by debt and that the market value of debt is less than the market value of the risk 
asset, results: for a positive NPV project the RAROC of existing shareholders is greater than 
the RAROC to equity shareholders and this last one is greater than the RAROC of new 
2! The primary objective of Bank of America system is to assign equity capital to business units (and ultimately to 
individual credits) so each BU has the same cost of equity capital. This process implies that investments in riskier 
projects or BUs (measured by the projects contribution to the overall volatility of the market value of the bank) will 
be required to use less leverage than investments in less risky BUs 
22 It is easy to show that the adjusted RAROC is just equal to the expected excess rate of return of the market 
portfolio. 
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shareholders; for a zero NPV these three RAROCs are the same23 and for a negative RAROC 
the opposite relationship of case 1 holds24. It is also interesting to note that this result is 
independent of used valuation model and is simply a consequence of the RAROC definition. 
Crouhy, Turnbull and Wakeman (1999) also founded that: the Adjusted RAROC is insensitive 
to changes in volatility and correlation and RAROC is sensitive to both25; RAROC is an 
increasing function of NPV26; RAROC is contingent on both the sign of NPV and the volatility 
of the underlying risky asset, in particular: a) if the project has positive NPV, the variation of 
RAROC with volatility is U-shaped; b) if the project has zero or negative NPV, RAROC 
increases as volatility increases; c) For low volatility, RAROC is relatively sensitive as to 
whether the project as positive or negative NPV; the level of sensitive decreases as the level of 
volatility increases27. 
A crucial result is that by following the traditional RAROC methodology, because the RAROC 
depends upon the level of the volatility, it could happen that, for large volatility project, 
RAROC may become sufficiently large that it would be result greater than the required hurdle 
rate. Hence a project with a negative NPV may will be accepted. Summarising, the Adjusted 
RAROC provides the correct investment decision, but this RAPM requires to measure the beta 
of the equity. Practitioners have developed RAROC mainly because it adjusts risk without 
requiring to measure the beta of the equity. However, Crouhy, Turnbull and Wakeman (1999) 
demonstrated that the traditional RAROC does not completely adjust for risk and 
consequently financial institution are still faced with the problem of estimating the equity beta. 
On the other hand, this last approach does not take in consideration the distinction between the 
tradable (hedgeable) and non-tradeble risk factor component introduced by Froot and Stein. 
This means that, even the Adjusted RAROC is an inefficient RAPM if the implicit tradable 
component of the generic project i is not diversified away. In the Froot and Stein framework, 
capital budgeting is driven by an exposure's impact on portfolio risk and return and 
consequently, the optimal allocation to new investment opportunities should be jointly 
23 When making a new investment project, only for zero net present value project the RAROC of the existing 
shareholders equals the RAROC of new shareholders and the RAROC of sum of the two classes of shareholders. In 
appendix 2a numerical example of this limiting case is shown. The zero NPV relationship provides some credence 
for comparing RAROC to the firm's cost of equity capital for stand-alone projects (see Zaik and al. 1996). Bank of 
America's policy is to capitalise each BU in a manner consistent with an AA credit rating, based on the unit's stand 
alone risk, but also including an adjustment for any internal diversification benefits provided by the unit. Each of 
these individual capital allocations are then aggregated to arrive at the optimal level of equity capital for the entire 
bank. 
24 Crouhy, Turnbull and Wakeman (1999) in the first appendix of their paper, pag 32, showed this result. 
25 If, as described by Zaik and at. (1996) a generic financial institution follows Bank of America's use of a fixed 
hurdle rate, than it would pick up high volatility and high correlation projects. 
26 Suppose the NPV decreases; this implies that the numerator in RAROC decreases and then denominator 
increases, and hence RAROC decreases. 
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determined. Stoughton and Zechner (1999) showed that optimal equity capital allocation is 
based on a business unit's contribution to the institution's total capital requirement and can be 
decomposed into two parts: the economic capital and the risk adjustment term. The economic 
capital term is measured by the divisional Incremental Value at Risk (NaR). The sum of the 
WaRs is equal to the institution's overall VaR. In the case of multiple business units, the 
Economic Capital is equal to a price of risk multiplied by the division's own standard 
deviation. The risk adjustment term is a constant related to the economic value added (EVA) at 
the optimal investment level. They also declared that the right definition of RAROC involves 
in the numerator the business unit's expected return minus an adjustment factor and in the 
denominator an economic capital amount equal to the unit's IVaR. This adjustment reflects 
both the economic valued added (EVA) at the optimal risk level and risk externalities imposed 
by one business unit to the WaR of other business units. According to Stewart (1994) 
Economic Value Added or EVA, which is an estimate of a business true economic profit, acts 
as an incentive compensation plan that can be used to motivate everyone in the organization 
from senior management to the ordinary employees. Stewart argued that EVA can be 
considered the best metric of wealth creation as it embodies in one measure capital budgeting, 
financial planning, goal setting, performance measurement and shareholders' wealth and also 
eliminates the accounting and financial distortions to the extent it is practical to do so. It is the 
only measure that takes into account the cost of capital and the amount of capital invested in 
the company and thus the most appropriate management tool of financial management and 
incentive compensation that creates value for shareholders and management. 
3- Economic capital and performance measurement28 
This section discusses the meaning of `economic capital' and contrasts it with other commonly 
used measures of banking capital. It also compares the different perspectives of bond holders 
and shareholders, considering how these can both be incorporated within the contingent claims 
analysis of Merton. 
27 Crouhy,, Turnbull and Wakeman (1999) showed also that the RAROC of a loan, when assuming the cost of 
borrowing for the bank is the risk-free of interest, varies as the volatility of the firm's risky assets change, even 
though the probability of default for the firm and the bank are held constant. It is also an increasing or decreasing 
function of the volatility of the firm's risky assets depending upon its credit rating; for low credits, RAROC 
increases as volatility increases. 
28 This section is based on the following papers: Wilson, T. C. (2002) Overcoming the Hurdle: Integrating the 
Shareholder/ Debtholder-Perspectives, Mercer Oliver Wyman, New York; Wilson, T. C. (2002) Cost of capital for 
financial institutions, Working paper, Mercer Oliver Wyman; Wilson, T. C. (2003) Valuation, earnings volatility and 
cost of capital, Working paper, Mercer Oliver Wyman 
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3.1 Alternative definitions of capital 
In a recent Survey it was found that there is no one consistent definition of Economic Capital in 
use in the marketplace29. Main themes of the various practical alternatives currently in use can 
be summarised in the following three definitions: 
1. Economic Capital is defined as sufficient surplus to meet potential negative cash flows and 
reductions in value of assets or increases in value of liabilities at a given level of risk 
tolerance, over a specified time horizon. 
2. Economic Capital is defined as the excess of the market value of the assets over the fair 
value of liabilities required to ensure that obligations can be satisfied at a given level of risk 
tolerance, over a specified time horizon. 
3. Economic Capital is defined as sufficient surplus to maintain solvency at a given level of 
risk tolerance, over a specified time horizon3o. 
While Definitions 1 and 3 refer to "sufficient surplus", Definition 2 instead focuses on the 
characteristics of the assets (market value) and the liabilities (fair value) that define this surplus. 
Each definition presents a different expression for the adverse outcome that the Economic 
Capital is intended to protect against. Definition 1 refers to "potential cash flows and reductions 
in value of assets or increases in value of liabilities. " Definition 2 is concerned only that 
"obligations can be satisfied. " The goal of Definition 3 is to "maintain solvency3. " These broad 
definitions seem to imply that all risks32 are to be taken into account. Moreover we are aware of 
29. Capital Market Risk Advisor, Economic Capital Survey Overview, 2002. Participants include some of the largest 
global banks and investment banks in the world as well as representative domestic financial institutions from US, 
UK, Japan, Italy, Canada, Norway, South Africa, Brazil, Mexico and Estonia. 
30 All definitions above refer to a "specified time horizon. " 
31 Several methods are commonly used to set the risk tolerance levels, including: A specified percentile (e. g., 98th 
percentile), often related to the financial strength rating of the company; Conditional Tail Expectation (CTE), 
CTE(n) represents the average of the (100-n) worst scenarios (for example, CTE(90) is the average of the worst 10% 
of scenarios). The first approach is the one commonly used by the rating agencies, while the latter is being used in 
Canada, and will likely be used for setting regulatory capital requirements for variable products with guarantees 
("RBC C-3 Phase tI"), starting in 2004, in the insurance industry. 
32 The following main risk categories were identified as relevant for calculating Economic Capital: interest rate risk, 
pricing risk, credit risk, equity market risk, liquidity, operational (business) risk. In determining the appropriate level 
of EC, the interaction among these risks should be considered. This could be accomplished by the use of either 
multivariate distributions or correlation factors. Some other financial institutions mentioned other liability risks that 
would need to be considered, including: separate account risk, i. e., the risk of adverse market performance, which 
can lead to lower negative profit margins on equity-based products, as well as payouts under the death and living 
guarantees typically offered with such products; transfer risk, i. e. the risk of policyholders exercising their transfer 
rights under equity-based products to the detriment of the insurance company; the minority think that all operational 
risks should be included, and others referred to subsets of this category. 
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some companies (particularly those which are owned by banks) using earnings33 oriented 
approaches for calculating Economic Capital. 
Summarising, risk is related to the amount of capital the firms requires to achieve a sufficient 
level of protection against adverse circumstance and, at the same time, risk is used to adjust the 
returns from business activities to determine whether activities are value adding or value 
destroying. The first part should reflect a debtholder's perspective on risk (i. e. is there sufficient 
capital to cover "worst case" risk? ). The second part should reflect a shareholder's perspective 
on risk (i. e. are we getting a sufficient return for the systematic risk begin taken? ). The 
debtholder and shareholder views of risk differ, but as it will be shown in the following 
sections, they are related. In classical corporate financial theory capital carries out two 
particular roles: transference of ownership34 and funding the business35 
There are at least six different definition of capital that a financial institution should consider 
and each of them depends on the views and the interest of the group that it represents: 
1. Book Capital. This is an accounting measure of the capital that the bank holds and can be 
observed on the balance sheet. The book capital measures mainly on-balance-sheet assets 
and liabilities on an historical cost basis, that may deviate substantially form the actual 
market values and does not include most off-balance-sheet items. Also, the book capital 
cannot be withdrawn in times of crisis 36 
2. Market Capital. The market value of capital is its current value. Although it is supposed to 
be better measure, there are difficulties in its application. First, most of the banks assets are 
non-tradable in the open market because of the bank has specific knowledge or 
informational advantages and many investors are not willing to buy those assets because of 
the asymmetric information. Consequently, it is very difficult to determine the market 
33 Risk is often modelled as volatility of accounting earnings. Hence, the distribution of asset value is approximated 
by a distribution of accounting earnings. This can seriously misstate the true economics risk to the firm. For 
example, the balance sheet interest rate risk many US thrifts during the 1980s, if measured by ANTI (net interest 
income), would have looked manageable, but if measured on ANPV basis, would have looked catastrophic. The 
latter view was correct, but was obscured by the one-year accounting earnings-based view of the ANII analysis. We 
believe strongly that capital markets investors, both debtholders and shareholders, rely on an economic view, not an 
accounting view, of risk-albeit an imperfect one as they only have financial statements on which to form their view. 
Hence, we believe that risk must be modelled as the value volatility to conform to an investor's view of risk. 
34 By shelling shares to third parties a company transfers ownership of assets, profits and risks to the holders of those 
shares 
35 Companies use capital as a source to raise funds for their investments. However, since interest payments to 
bondholders are tax deductible the companies prefer to increase their leverage (debt/equity), as it is less expensive 
for them to finance their projects, rather than use equity. But if leverage is too high, there is a risk of bankruptcy and 
other associated financial distress costs. On the other hand a very low leverage might lead to hostile takeover bids 
which will bring leverage close to the optimal level. 
36 Therefore, according to Cordell and King (1995) accounting-based measures of capital may overstate the actual 
value of capital that is available to absorb losses 
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value of those assets. Second, the market capitalization of the bank's traded shares is very 
volatile as markets are very sensitive to changing conditions 
3. Regulatory Capital. Regulators require banks to hold capital to ensure the safety and 
soundness of the banking system and protect the stakeholders from the consequences of a 
financial distress37. The required capital from a regulatory point of view is divided into 
Tier-1 and Tier-2. Both are book capital amounts. Tier-1 capital (Basic) is defined as: 
Equity capital plus Disclosed reserves. Tier-2 capital components are (Supplementary): 
Undisclosed reserves, Revaluation reserves General provisions/general loan-loss reserves, 
Hybrid debt capital instruments and Subordinated term debt. Tier-2 must amount to less 
than Tier-1 capital. In other words Tier-1 must at least amount to 50% of the total capital 
required. It should be noted that a sufficiently high capital ratio is necessary but it is not 
sufficient to ensure that a bank operates as a sound financial institution. Since Regulatory 
capital varies by political jurisdiction, if an institution works across many jurisdictions and 
have different strategies for each region decides to base its decisions on Regulatory capital 
requirements, it will not take any advantage on the economies of scale38 
4. Rating Agency Capital. This type of capital is defined by the rating agencies and it is very 
similar in spirit to the Regulatory capital. Rating agencies are concerned with the level of 
financial strength and general creditworthiness of a firm. Capital requirements are assigned 
by such organizations such as Moody's, Standard & Poor and Fitch 
5. Risk Capital. This specific feature of capital can be considered as the amount of capital 
required by the debtholders39 to cover a potential decrease of the assets' value over a given 
time period and at a given statistical confidence level40. There are two dimensions of risk: 
expected loss and unexpected loss. Expected loss is the average rate of loss expected from 
a portfolio. Unexpected loss is the volatility of returns or losses around their expected 
levels and it is the main reason that creates the need for economic capital. The unexpected 
37 In the early 1970s after the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement there was a significant increase in volatility 
of interest rates and exchange rates, which raised concerns about the financial institutions. In order to avoid 
unpleasant surprises a committee was set up to see what could be done in an international level. The committee 
consisted of representatives of the central banks of the G10 countries and is known as Basel Committee on Banking 
Regulation and Supervisory Practices (BIS). The Committee published its proposals in July 1988 and is known as the 
"Basel Accord". The Basel Accord succeeded in ensuring a security in the banking system by requiring all financial 
institutions to hold capital ratios of at least 8% of risk-weighted assets and encouraged the international competition 
by subjecting all the banks to the same rules. In January 2001 released the Basel II which represents a major change 
in the approach to capital regulation. Under the new Basel, capital will be assessed according to the risks that a bank 
undertakes: market risk, credit risk and operational risk. The new Accord consists of three pillars. Pillar I encourages 
banks to collect and analyze data. Pillar II will be the supervisory review of data and risk-management systems. 
Finally Pillar III will ensure that the banks that don't comply with the regulations will be penalized by the financial 
markets. 
38 Specialty Guide on Economic Capital, Version 1.4, June 2004. 
39 In other words, debtholders want to know if there is sufficient capital to cover "worst case' risks 
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losses are estimated by calculating the deviation of losses from their mean i. e. the volatility 
of losses. The unexpected loss contribution determines the level of capital that is assigned 
to each business unit as it takes into account the correlation of the credit with the overall 
portfolio41. 
6. Economic Capital. It seems reasonable to define Economic Capital as that capital required 
by the shareholders to optimize their returns and compensate them for the systematic risk 
that they bear. Apart from the compensation the shareholders seek dividend payments and 
share price appreciation. Therefore the only difference between risk and economic capital 
should be the goodwill: Economic Capital = Risk Capital + Goodwill. 42 As it will be 
illustrated in the next section, the shareholders are mainly concerned for the relationship 
between risk, return and value. Particularly, the shareholders are interested only in the 
systematic risk and not the total risk, because they can diversify away the unsystematic 
risk. Additionally, they are interested in the "fat part" of the net asset value distribution 
because they are exposed to the entity of the distribution. Hence, the best way to measure 
the risk that they bear is to use the standard deviation of the assets. 3 
3.2 A conceptual framework for attributing capital 
3.2.1 The Merton model of default. 
Many financial institutions can be analysed using a framework based on Merton (1974)'s 
model of default and its extension to the analysis of bank risk taking (Merton (1977). This 
model effectively says the following: 
0 Shareholders own the right to default on debtholders, and will do so if the value of the 
firm's equity (or "net asset") drops to zero; 
  
Debtholders charge shareholders for default risk by demanding a spread over the risk-free 
rate on the funds they provide; 
40 The choice for time horizon for measuring risk is arbitrary. One could use volatility measured over long periods, 
such as five or ten year intervals in order to capture "full cycles" in risk. On the other hand, it is hard to get reliable 
data for long periods and therefore some prefer to use volatility over much shorter periods of time 
41 For example, an investment can be characterized as very risky on a stand-alone basis but if the predicted losses are 
not perfectly correlated with the rest of the bank's projects its addition might reduce the overall risk. 
42 Chris Matten, Managing Bank Capital p. 34. 
43A survey that was conducted over a six-week period from July to September 2002 in Boston in which they 
participated 491 members of the financial, investment and international section in America provides useful results 
about Economic Capital. Particularly, most responders agreed that Economic Capital should cover various types of 
risks (market risk, credit risk, operational risk, liquidity risk). Almost half of them have used EC in their work to 
measure risk and performance and they consider that it will be excessively used in the future. Economic Capital 
Survey, July-September 2002, Boston. 
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The probability of default is a function of the firm's net asset value distribution and its 
current net asset value. 
A theoretically robust estimate for the level of capital required on an economic basis can be 
computed from the Merton model if the net asset value distribution can be estimated reliably 
and a solvency standard (probability of default) is selected carefully. 
This model can be used to bring the various measures of capital - economic capital, market 
capital, risk capital, etc - into a common analytical framework. The purpose of this sub-section 
is to provide an overview of how this is done, using the Merton model to analyse economic 
capital and value from both the shareholder and bondholder perspectives. Whereas bondholders 
are concerned only with the downward tail of risk, shareholders, protected by limited liability, 
may care only about the outcomes where the bank remains solvent. If the bank has a continuing 
franchise value, then shareholders and bond-holder interests are better aligned; shareholders 
will then seek to avoid insolvency but they will still not be concerned about the extent of losses 
in the event that insolvency occurs. This discussion provides a setting for the subsequent 
theoretical analysis of Section 4 in which a formal model is proposed for conducting this 
analysis of decision-making within financial institutions, combining the perspectives of both 
bondholders and shareholders outlined here. 
3.2.2 Economic capital and value measurement in financial institutions: the bondholders 
perspective 
In this framework, from the debtholder's perspective, risk can be defined as the possibility that 
the value of the equity of the firm drops to zero (or less than zero). The debtholder cares about: 
  
The total firms risk, not just the systematic component. 
The tail of the net asset value distribution. Creating this distribution requires that we define 
"net asset value", and define the time horizon over which we will measure its volatility 
" Value in the event of financial distress. What really matters for bondholders it is the value 
of the financial institution that would exist to protect debtholders in such event 
  
In practice, net asset value for our debtholder risk capital calculations can be the algebraic 
sum of the first three of the following four elements: 
  
Current book equity; 
  
Mark-to-market adjustments on tangible asset 
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Hard intangibles°4, i. e. those net assets that have no accounting book value, but which 
would still have marketable value in the event of distress; 
  
Soft intangibles (value of a customer franchise, value of a brand) are that net asset whose 
value would not be realizable in distress scenario. 
It is necessary that these judgments be made consistently. The definition used to generate the 
value distribution needed for economic capital calculations must be identical to that used to 
definite the current value of firm's equity (a quantity we will call "adjusted book equity")as 
This will enable an accurate comparison between required resources (economic capital) and 
available resources (adjusted book capital). 
The next step is aimed at generating value distribution. In generating value distributions, we 
group risks in a manner consistent with the identified bank risk measurement and management 
framework, based on the drivers of risk and nature of the risk distribution. In theory, the risk 
contribution from each of these risk sources should be measured by using the definition of 
value outlined above. In practice, measuring the volatility of a key asset value driver is 
sometimes sufficient to approximate full value volatility. 
Having constructed the aggregate value distribution, we must now determine the probability of 
default (solvency standard) that is acceptable to the institution. Capitalization standards should 
be expressed as a probability of insolvency over a specified time period, e. g., a 0.1% 
probability of insolvency over a one-year time period ie. economic capital corresponds to an 
aggregate value-at-risk. It is usual to relate this desired solvency standard to an intuitive 
external benchmark such as, for example, the bond ratings46. Firms should select a target 
solvency standard based on an evaluation of which rating level optimises their firm's value for 
firm's shareholders47. The time horizon (most often one year) for measuring the value 
distribution for economic capital calculation for banks is approximately the length of their 
capital planning cycles48. Ultimately, the selection of a specific time horizon is a judgment call. 
However, once a time horizon is selected, the confidence interval to be used in computing 
04 E. g. a separately-branded mutual fund business, mortgage servicing rights 
45 There is obviously a grey area between the "hard" and "soft" intangibles on with judgment calls need to be made. 
46 For example, firm rated AA by S&P has historically defaulted with a 0.03% frequency over a one-year horizon. If 
a firm has an "AA" target solvency standard, then economic capital can be determined as the level of cushion 
required to keep the firm solvent over a one-year period with 99.97% confidence if the solvency standard shifted to 
BBB, the confidence interval would shift to 99.80%. 
47 Note that a firm capitalizes to an "AA" solvency standard many not actually be rated "AA" by the agencies, as a 
rating agency's assessment of credit quality incorporates factors excluded from this analytical framework (eg 
management quality). 
48 Banks typically reassess their capital adequacy at least annually, changing dividend policy or undertaking capital 
markets transactions if necessary (share issuance or buyback). It is also roughly the average maturity of their illiquid 
credit portfolios, so it fits with the horizon over with a bank could materially shift its risk profile 
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economic capital should then be explicitly linked to this choice, and the earlier choice of a 
solvency standarda9 
3.2.3 Economic capital and value measurement in financial institutions: the shareholders 
perspective 
As described earlier, the debtholder and shareholder views of risk are different, so some 
adjustments need to be made. As described in the previous paragraph, while the debtholder's 
primary concern is the link between risk and capital, shareholders are most concerned with the 
link between risk, return and value. The relationship among these three measures requires both 
linking required return to risk (i. e. deriving an appropriate discount rate for uncertain returns), 
and deriving intrinsic (market) value. 
A further difference between the perspective of bondholders and shareholders is that while the 
former are concerned with total firm risk, shareholder value depends primarily upon the 
systematic component of risk. Relating required return to risk has been one of the most 
important problems in finance. The most broadly accepted theoretical approaches for 
addressing this issue such as is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), or its more 
generalized version, the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). The CAPM states that shareholders 
will require a return in excess of the risk-free rate to compensate them for un-diversifiable risk. 
CAPM formulates a simple linear relationship between required return and beta, where beta is 
a function of the volatility of the firm's equity value (a) and its correlation with the market (p). 
Once the required return (or discount rate) for a given activity is determined based on its risk 
profile, its intrinsic value can be calculated by discounting expected cash-flows using for 
example the dividend discount (or discounted cash flow) model. Summarising, risk 
calculations of this kind are central to value calculations for financial services businesses at all 
levels of measurement. 
To be effective, value measures must be fully integrated with the underlying foundation of risk 
analytics described in the previous sub-section, i. e. when dealing with the bondholders' view 
of risk capital. In fact, frequently, value is calculated by requiring a uniform return on 
economic capital across activities. This implicitly assumes that debtholder risk (measured by 
economic capital, or EC) and shareholder risk (measurement by CAPM's ß) are proportional 
across all activities. This assumption fails to recognize that the debtholder and shareholder 
views differ in two fundamental ways: 
49 It is generally understood that an "AN' / one year horizon leads to the selection of a 99.97% confidence interval 
for capitalization, while on "AA" /25-year horizon leads to a selection of a 95.5% confidence interval. 
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ý. Systematic versus total risk: shareholders can diversify away specific risk but not 
systematic risk. So from a shareholder's perspective only systematic risk matters. However, 
debtholders care about total risk (systematic plus specific) because all risk impacts the 
probablity of default. 
2. Standard deviation versus tail risk: shareholders are exposed to the entirety of the value 
distribution, so they are concerned more with the "fat part" of the distribution than with the 
tails. Hence standard deviation (a) is the more useful measure of value volatility, i. e. of 
risk5o 
For debtholder and shareholder risk to be proportional across activities, two conditions must 
hold: systematic risk and total risk must be proportional and a and EC must be proportional. 
These considerations suggest that the adoption of uniform hurdle rates should be considered 
carefully, as there is an inherent accuracy vs simplicity trade-off. As we will show later, for 
some firms the simplicity gained from a uniform hurdle rate will outweigh the potential 
increase in accuracy from a more involved analysis; in others, differentiated hurdle rates are 
clearly necessary to avoid misleading value measures 
4- Capital structure and cost of equity with constant default probability 
This Section and the following Section 5 and Section 6 provide the first combined analysis of 
the impact of default probability, capital structure, limited liability, deposit insurance, franchise 
value and taxes on Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC)51 type measures. Previous work 
of Crouhy and al (1999) has addressed part of this problem but this does not provide a 
complete analysis. The suggested model also adopts a rigorous equilibrium perspective by 
enforcing the pricing of banking assets using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This 
alters significantly some of the results reported by Crouhy and al. (1999). It will be shown that 
the crucial risk driver is the correlation of the bank asset return with the market and not the 
volatility of asset returns. 
The analysis will consider first the case of fixed default probability. This means that the target 
credit rating is equal to the actual one. In section six this assumption will be relaxed and the 
so Debtholders are exposed to the tail of the distribution - so an extremely high (eg 99.97%) confidence interval is 
the risk measure used to determine economic capital. Very simply; the tail event is not nearly as "special" for the 
shareholder as the debtholder 'i-_-- 
51 In this framework only the ex-ante perspective will be considered. The cost of economic capital is therefore based 
on expectations and risk assessment 
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analysis will be carried out allowing for the target credit rating being different from the actual 
one. By following this framework it is possible to clearly establish the relationship amongst 
different measures of capital, namely the market value of the equity, the actual and target risk 
capital, the actual and target economic capital. 
4.1 Modelling assumptions and notations 
In this section the main assumptions and model notations are introduced. In the following 
sections some of this assumptions will be relaxed 
Assumption 1A bank holds a single asset over a one period time 
Let consider a bank that holds a single asset A(t) over the period t=0 until t=T. We will always 
take the time period for analysis Tto be one year, i. e. T=1.. 
Assumption 2 Asset is partly financed by debt 
The bank finances this asset by issuing an amount of debt with a market value of D(t). 
Assumption 3 Balance Sheet condition evaluated on a mark to market basis 
The balance sheet condition, in market value term, can therefore be written as: 
A(t) = E(t)+D(t), witht E [0,11.52 (4.1.1) 
where 
E(t) is the market value of the equity at time t. Therefore, by assumption, the book value of the 
equity is equal to the market value of the equity53. 
Assumption 4 Asset prices are determined in an equilibrium framework in which all 
returns are normally distributed. 
Specifically it will be assumed that end period asset prices are given by: 
A(1) = A(O)[1 + RA +04 z] where RA is the expected return, 6A is-the standard deviation of 
returns, and z is a stochastic variable with a standard normal distribution. For pricing purposes, 
we will also utilise the correlation of z and hence A(1) with the market portfolio pA. 
One key implication of this assumption is that the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
provides a framework for determining the net present value of a business. Expected future cash 
flows are discounted using a risk-adjusted expected rate of return. In this set up the risk of a 
business can be measured through the covariance of changes of the return of the business with 
52 Without loosing generality and for the sake of simplicity we will consider through the analysis that at time T book 
and market value are equal. 
s; This assumption is increasingly becoming a mild one because of the new IFRS (International Financial Reporting 
Standard) that will be enforced at the beginning of 2005 for all the holdings quoted in the Stock Exchange. This new 
set of rules, especially the one related with the IAS 39, is introducing the fair value evaluation for all the book items. 
In 2006, when this set of rules will become in due force also for the other companies (the non-holdings one) this 
assumption will reflect best practice and therefore, empirically it will be the most correct way to model the bank 
balance sheet. 
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changes in the values of market portfolio returns. The following general equilibrium 
relationship applies 
RA (t) 
- 
rf (t) = ßR,, ß. 
(t)(RM (t) 
- 
rf (t)) (4.1.2) 
where, accordingly: 
RA (t) is the return on the bank asset at time t 
rf(t) is the (spot) risk-free rate at time t54 
ßR4 ýtý is the beta of the return on asset A with the market M 
RM (t) is the market return at time t. 
Simplifying the notation 
rf(t)=rf; RA(t)=RA; 8RA(t)=1384; RM(t)=RM; E(t)=E; A(t)=A; D(t)=D; T-t=1 
The equilibrium model can now be rewritten as 
RA 
- 
rf = ßRA, M(RM-rf) (4.1.3) 
4.1.1 Two key measures of risk: Sharpe Ratio and the option value of default 
In the subsequent analysis we will use two key measures of risk, the Sharpe ratio and the option 
value of default. We now derive both these measures, in our simple model. 
For a portfolio of assets one measure of the relative attractiveness of different portfolios is the 
Sharpe Ratio. It maps the expected return and the risk into a single measure. It is argued that the 
larger the Sharpe Ratio, the better the portfolio, and hence the objective of the portfolio 
manager's is to maximise the Sharpe Ratio. We can define the Sharpe Ratio (DA on the return 
on bank asset A as 
(D, 1 = 
RA 
- 
rf (4.1.1.1) 
6A 
where 
QA is the volatility on the asset return RA 
Moreover in equilibrium results 
RA-rf 
_ 
RM 
-rf 
= (DA = PA, M PA, M(DM (4.1.1.2) 
aA am 
where 
(DM is the Sharpe Ratio defined over the market return RM 
PA. M is the correlation between RM and RA 
am is the volatility of market return RM 
sa The risk free rate throughout the analysis is considered deterministic. 
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We now turn to the option value of default. By using the previous simplifying notations, the 
balance sheet condition at time 0 can now be rewritten as: 
E=A-D (4.1.1.3) 
Within the Merton framework, the market value of the equity can be considered a call option 
of the bondholders on the asset of the bank (or equivalently the equityholders put on the debt 
of the bank)55: 
E= AN(di,,. 
n)-DN(d2, rn) 56 
Where 
(4.1.1.4) 
N(. ) is the cdf for a variable that is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1. 
A [(In 
De 
J+(uj 
+ O, 56Ä 
f 
)l 
di,,,, 
07A 
d 
2. rn =dl. rn - 
07A (4.1.1.6) 
,uf is the 
instantaneous risk free rate. 
It should be acknowledged that in applying these equations we are assuming a correspondence 
between the instantaneous risk free rate and standard deviations, and their one-period 
equivalents 57 The equivalence of standard deviations is not exact because with geometric 
Brownian motion the period T returns are log-normally distributed (the assumption required for 
applying the Black-Scholes equation) rather than normally distributed (the assumption of the 
CAPM). However assuming that the two standard deviations are equivalent introduces only a 
minor approximation error. 
In equilibrium, the following relationship, which represents how the bank cost of (market) 
equity58 is expected to move with respect of the market return, also holds 
RE p 
E. M RM - rf + rf 
_M 
(4.1.1.7) 
ss The strike of the call option is equal to the book value of the firm's liabilities at time 0e rI D(T) =D 
56 Moreover, if A becomes very large the equity then becomes very similar to a forward contract with delivery price 
D(T). Consequently di and d2 becomes very large and N(d1) and N(d2) are both close to I and, ultimately, results 
E=A-D 
57 rf is the annualised discretely compounded rate of return on the risk free rate and is related to the continuously 
compounded rate of return via the relationship pI =ln(l+rf). Moreover, in the remainder we will make the 
simplifying assumption that the instantaneous volatility of the return on asset A is approximately equal at the annul 
volatility. 
58 In the following sections, when adding franchise value at the equilibrium relationship, the cost of equity will then 
become the cost of economic capital or RAROC 
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The no arbitrage balance sheet condition at time T=1 (4.1), by using discrete compounding, 
becomes59 
E(T) 
= 
A(T)-D(T)= A(1+RA)-D(l+rf) (4.1.1.8) 
Note that the actual default probability N( d2) can be different from both the target default 
probability N( dz) and will always be lower than the risk neutral default 
probability N(- d 2. r 
)60 
To avoid default and to maintain the actual credit rating6' the bank needs to generate a return 
RA > 1- d2 QA 
. 
If the target credit rating N(- d2) is different from the natural (actual) 
one N(- d2 ), the no default constraint in this case become RA > 1- d *cA. This case will be 
analysed in the last section when the assumption of fixed default probability will be relaxed. 
4.2 The determination of promised debt repayments 
Suppose the Bank is financed by an amount E and the rest by Debt. Assume now that the target 
capital structure at time 0 is chosen to keep the target probability of default at time t=T=1 to be 
equal to p* = N(- d2*). In general, because N(- d 2. r) # N(- d2 
)the bank has to identify the 
correspondent level of debt which allows the bank to safety maintain the desired level of risk, 
represented here by the target N(- d *)probability of default. This implies that the promised 
debt repayments at time T are at the appropriate point on the tail of the distribution of asset 
returns. In the standard economic capital modelling the bank risk appetite resembles the target 
bank credit rating. The lower the p the higher the bank competitive advantage in the 
interbank market due to credit comparative advantage. In this section, because of the fixed 
default probability assumption, by construction, the target default probability will be equal to 
the actual one, i. e. p= N(- d2) = p' = N(- dz 
Proposition 1. 
The promised debt repayments are given by 
Al+RA-d247A 
D-1+r (4.2.1) 
f 
Proof 
Knowing that 
A(T) = A(1 + RA) (4.2.2) 
59 When the risk neutral default probability is equal to the target one 
60 If dz increases then N(- d2 
)decreases 
61 Which corresponds to the bank risk neutral default probability observed at time 0 
121 
Chapter 3 
A bank is in default, if at time T A(T) < D(T) or, equivalently, E<O. To remain solvent, at time 
T, the bank must complies with the following no default constraint: 
A(T)-Ad2crA zD(T) 
Remarks 
(4.2.3) 
1. Ad2CA resembles the definition of the Capital at Risk, as introduced in section 2. 
Therefore the book value and market value of the equity are equal by assumption. 
Moreover through inspection of (4.2.3), they are also equal, by construction, to the risk 
capital. In this framework book value, market value and risk capital, from now on labelled 
E, are equal. 
2. Because, by construction, the bank wish to maintain unchanged the actual probability of 
default we observe that: 
" 
knowing that the return on asset A can be regarded as the sum of two components, 
namely the risk free rate and the spread SA associated at the bank rating, the following 
relationship applies 
RA = rf + SA (4.2.4) 
Therefore it is possible to restate the no default constraint also in spread terms 
DS 1+RA 
-d2Q" pDs(l+rf+SA -d2Q") <* D<1- A l+rf A l+rf) A l+rf 
3. The Debt to Asset ratio can take values between 0 and 1. The closest to 0 the safer the bank 
If both actual and credit rating are the same, this polar position is reached when 
d26A 
- 
SA 
=1 + rf (4.2.5) 
This means that if there is no debt outstanding, E=A. 
The closest to 1 the riskier the bank. This polar position is reached when 
d26A=S,, (4.2.6) 
Therefore, if there is no equity outstanding, D=A. 
4. The difference between the market value of the asset and debt at time T changes with the 
volatility of the asset returns. Therefore the ratio 
E 
will increase if QA increases and vice 
versa. This is because the bank wants to maintain the risk appetite fixed over time and 
consequently the riskier the business the higher the amount of equity the bank needs to 
have to compete in the market with both the same comparative advantage and level of 
protection. 
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5. Because in our framework the franchise value will be taken explicitly in consideration, the 
definition of economic capital will be Capital at Risk plus Franchise Value62 
6. The book value and market value of the equity are equal to the risk capital, from now on 
labelled E (which is associated with the risk neutral default probability), but are different 
from the economic capital Eec 
. 
7. Hence we have not yet determined the Risk Adjusted Return on Economic Capital 
(RAROC) but proposition 1 will play a key role in this calculation. 
Corollary 1 
The cost of equity RE is equal to both the cost of actual and target risk capital, namely 
RE but it is different from the cost of economic capital Rec 63 
RE=RE # Rec. (4.2.7) 
The main difference being that the franchise value is not included in the cost of capital. 
4.3 Capital structure and cost of equity under unlimited liability 
In this section we will show that, when unlimited shareholder liability is assumed, the capital 
structure is influenced by both the volatility on bank return on asset A and the correlation of 
the asset with market return while the cost of equity is independent from the volatility of the 
asset QA but does depend on the correlation between asset and market return. This result is in 
sharp contrast with what Crohuy and al claim (1999). In fact in their study they found that is the 
volatility the driving factor when evaluating the business unit/project performance. The reason 
being the fact that they didn't include in their work the impact of no default constraint in the 
RAROC formulation as it will be shown and proved in the next section. 
Proposition 2 
If shareholder unlimited liability and fixed default probability is assumed the bank capital 
structure depends on CA and PA. M 
Proof 
The proof is straightforward. Due to the balance sheet condition at time T will result 
E(T) = A(T) - D(T). If we assume constant pA, M, for a given level of CA, a unique 
D is 
found. For a given level of volatility vA, market correlation PA. M and level of default 
probability (or pre-specified target rating bank) a unique capital structure is defined. Moreover 
62 In practice, the term "economic capital" it is very often not clearly identified and, consequently, 
misunderstandings and misconceptions can induce top management towards wrong or biased decisions 
63 The cost of actual risk capital, for notation easy, is labelled also RE 
. 
Moreover, in the following, the term cost of 
economic capital and RAROC will be used as synonyms. 
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it can be shown also that to avoid default and to comply with the pre-specified target rating the 
following relationship 
D_ 1+RA-d2oA (4.3.1) 
Al+ rf 
should be always true over time. 
Given that by assumption RM, am 
, 
rf are constant, it will result 
RA = 
.f 
(QAPA, 
M) (4.3.2) 
Consequently, because d2 is chosen by the top management and the amount of asset A is fixed 
by construction, will result 
D 
=f 
((7A 
A PA. Ml / (4.3.3) 
Alternatively we can also write, due to assumption 3 and proposition 1 that the debt to equity 
ratio 
D is also determined by vA and PA, M . In particular: 
1+PA Q MA RM-rj +rf -d2QA (ý 
D= 1+RA-d2QA 
- 
_M 
=1+ 
6AWA, MýM -d2ý (4.3.4) 
A l+rf l+rf l+rf 
Corollary 2 
D is a decreasing function of the volatility of the Asset A 
Proof 
Let consider the first derivative of 
- 
with respect of QA 
a 
A= 
PAM M (RM-rf/-d2 
= 
S'A 
-d S0 d-15PA. M S1, (4.3.5) OaA l+rf 1+rf 
where SA is the value over the risk free rate with respect of asset A when QA =1. In 
equilibrium SA > 0. 
Moreover due to no default constraint we can rewrite equation 
D_ 1+RA-d2a4 
-(i+rj+SA-d2a4)_1+ 
S`'-d2aA (4.3.6) 
A l+rf l+rf l+rf 
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therefore the hank will not default iff D <A and, consequently, if S', 
- 
(l, <_ U. In fact, if 6I 
increases and and d, are held constant, also E increases but D decreases. The 
D 
ratio A 
decreases because the positive impact of 6, on F. is lower than the negative impact a,, on D 
due to the No Dciault" constraint. 
Corollary 3 
D is an increasing function of p t, 
Proof 
Let us take the first derivative of with respect of p 
D 
A (Rl-r, ) 
>0 V7 
aid 
l.. l l (TAI 
(4.3.7) 
D. IA f(corrA, r. -0,5) 
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If p, tý increases and rr I and d, are held constant, increases because the risk premium 
and the volatilities are always greater than zero 
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Figure 3 Debt, equity and leverage behaviour when changing both volatility and correlation 
Proposition 3 
If shareholder unlimited liability and fixed default probability is assumed, the cost of 
equity risk capital K,., depends only on i. e R1 
Proof 
In equilibrium, relationship (4.1.14) holds. Consider the balance sheet condition at time t 
(4.1.6) and 'I (4.1.16), rearranging 
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E 
=1-U 
(do-1_S, ) 
AA l+r, 
(4.3.8) 
Moreover due to proposition I and using equations (4.1.3) 
, 
(4.1.4), (4.1.5), (4.1.13), (4.1.16) 
and (4.3.6) it is easy to show that 
EDd, (R, 
- 
ý", ) ýl ,- (1) i 
(i. 
- 
ýý, i.. iý 
_ 
(4.3.9) 
A ýI 1+r, 1+ 
(T ý 
Recalling the equilibrium relationship (4.1.1.3) and by subtracting the risk-free rate we get: 
- 
1(1+R, )-D(1+rr) 
R1, rý !- l) - 
1-1-1 
=1-DF-P. i. ii(D. tf6.1 (4.3.10) 
This increase in the expected rate of return on equity (risk capital), relative to that on the bank 
assets, reflects the magnifying impact of leverage on the standard deviation of equity returns. 
Substituting in cq. (4.3.10) eq. (4.3.9), we obtain: 
il(R I- r-r) R, 
-1' __ (4.3.1 1) !; ((I, 
- 
P. i. 
. 
i! 11 i cl 
consequently 
(1 
+, ý 
)ýý. 
a.. tiý`u. tr 
ýl 
+ ý"ý )P. a.. trý. tr P. a.. týý. ýr +1 f(I, RF. RE + rý (4.3.12) 
The cost of equity is independent of' he volatility of returns on the bank portfolio. Note 
however that the cost ol'equity does depend upon the Cost oý Equity 
RE 
-1 
-10% 
Correlation 
Figure 4 Cost of equity (risk capital) and correlation relationship 
)i 
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4.4 Capital structure and cost of equity (risk capital) under limited liability 
Let consider the previous framework but when no loss of value in the event of default is 
possible because deposits are insured and, as such, shareholders have limited liability. In this 
case the equityholders are protected from downside risk because of the value of the deposit 
insurance put. The required rate of return is shown to be higher than the case illustrated in the 
previous paragraph. 
4.4.1 Limited shareholders liability and deposits are insured 
Let define: 
EP the value of the equity (risk capital) when the deposits are insured through the value of the 
put 
D the value of the deposits when they are insured through the value of the put 
VP the value of the put option on the deposits of the bank 
Proposition 4 
If shareholder unlimited liability, fixed default probability and insured deposits are 
assumed, the correspondent cost of equity risk capital RE, P depends on PAM and QA 
The following balance sheet relationship, in a risk neutral world, must hold 
Ep 
=A-D+VP (4.4.1.1) 
We are assuming that the deposits are insured at the beginning of the period of our analysis. 
Therefore the value of equity at time 0 is Ep. Rearranging 
Ep = E+Vp (4.4.1.2) 
the value of the put, at the beginning of the period, becomes 
Vp 
=DN( di. rn) -AN 
( dl. 
rn) (4.4.1.3) 
This relationship is based on 6, 
Recalling assumption 5 and proposition 1 it is worth to point out that the value of the equity 
(risk capital) depends on the risk neutral default probability. In fact, the default probability 
plays a role when considering proposition 1. Let consider RE, P the target cost of equity risk 
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capital when deposits are insured through the put. By proposition 1 and equation (4.1.16) we 
have 
EP (I+RE. P)=A(1+RA)-D(1+rf) (4.4.1.4) 
Summarising 
EP depends on QA and RE. P depends on QA 
Subtracting the risk free rate and rearranging we get 
A(1+RA)-D(1+r,. ) 
RE'P 
-rf A-D+V -1-rf 
(4.4.1.5) 
PA, McbM6A AP +rý. 
) 
REP =Ey+ rf (4.4.1.6) 
P 
AA 
From the previous equations it is possible to observe that QA has a "direct" positive impact on 
the RE, P and QA has a "direct" positive impact on Vp. But because VP has both a positive 
impact (numerator) and a negative impact (denominator) on RE,., the total effect is not trivial. In 
particular it is possible to observe that this trade-off is not linear and it is also dependent from 
the probability of default. In the next two graphs. two scenarios are considered: the first one 
when PD=0,01 % and the second one when PD=1 %. From a geometric inspection it is possible 
to observe that when the PD is low the volatility does not play a significant role. Moreover, the 
value of the put is almost linearly related with the level of PD. In fact by increasing the level of 
PD it is possible to observe the magnifying impact of volatility on the value of the put, the 
129 
Chapter 3 
value of the Icvcrage ratio and the cost of equity (risk capital)`'a. 
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64 The magnifying impact of leverage on R, 
,, 
is partially offset by the impact of the put option. 
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Corollary 4 
If deposits are insured will result E< EP and RE > RE, P 
Figure 6 illustrate the shape of the VP and how changes with 6A and PA, M 
Vp 
= 
DN( dz. 
rn) - AN( darn)=A 
(I+RA 
-d2QAl dz, rný-N(- (dz, 
rn +6A 
)) (4.4.1.7) 
l+rf 
Moreover by looking at (4.4.1.7) it now becomes clear the magnifying impact on the value of 
the put (and consequently on the inherent cost of equity risk capital) of both d2 and QA 
A(1+RA-d2CA)=D(1+rf)a D= 1+RA-d2QA (4.4.1.8) 
l+rf 
substituting we get 
V-A 
(1+RA 
-d20A)N dz. rn)-M- 
(d2, 
rn 
+6AX1+r1) 
4.4.1.9P 
1+rf 
() 
PA. MoMUA-iI+RA-d2QA)N( dz. m)-[N( 
(dz, 
rn+oAll11+rf)I RE 
,p=+ rf 
(4.4.1.10) (d2 
-PA, M(DM A 
_! 
1+RA 
-d2UA 
(d2. 
r)- N- d2, rn +4))1+r1) 
1 
1+rf +rf 
As it is possible to infer from a geometric inspection the function 
aRE'p 
presents a maximum ýTA 
value. Therefore the impact of the put option on the cost of equity (risk capital) is non trivial 
and depends on the interrelationships between the target and risk neutral default probability 
which in turns determine the bank capital structure. Therefore the no default constraint, as 
shown in the last equation, makes the relationship between the volatility and the cost of capital, 
when deposits are insured, not a positive one as one might expected. On the other hand, more 
importantly, because the bank wants to keep the PD the lowest possible, the impact of the put 
on R,, P can be considered very poor 
4.4.2 Limited shareholders liability and deposits are uninsured 
In order to protect deposit holders the bank has to increase the rate of interest on deposits. The 
new rate of interest will be the risk free rate plus a spread s. The bank in this case is less 
leveraged for any given level of probability of default. The level of the deposit is given by 
DS+VP =D (4.4.2.1) 
131 
Chapter 3 
where 
D' represents the level of deposit without the insurance premium given by the put. Remember 
that: 
Vpf (p) where p is associated to the risk neutral probability 
moreover, in our one period model, results 
D=D(T)(l+rfr' 
and 
D(T)_(l+rf+s) 
DS 
Proposition 5 
(4.4.2.1) 
The value of the equity (risk capital) Es and the cost of equity (risk capital) RE (Da) if 
deposit are uninsured are equal, respectively, at the value of the equity (risk capital) Ep 
and at the cost of equity (risk capital) RE, p when deposits are insured 
Proof 
Recalling that 
Es =A-D+Vp Ep (4.4.2.2) 
because 
E, =A- DS (4.4.2.3) 
and 
D' =D-Vp (4.4.2.4) 
we have 
Ep =ES >E (4.4.2.5) 
Moreover, we want show that 
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REDS)=RE, p (4.4.2.6) 
By applying the balance sheet condition at time T, we have 
ES(l+RE(DS))=A(l+RA)-DS(l+rf+s) (4.4.2.7) 
The cost of equity risk capital if deposits are uninsured is 
RE(DS)_ A(1+RA)-Ds(l+rf +s)-1 (4.4.2.8) 
A-D+Vp 
recalling that 
_A(I+RA)-D(l+ (4.4.2.9) RE'p 
-D+Vp A 
RE (DS )= RE. P (4.4.2.10) 
if 
A(1+RA)-Ds(1+rf +s) 
_ 
A(1+RA)-D(1+r1) 
A-D+ Vp A-D+ Vp 
(4.4.2.11) 
rearranging, we get (4.4.2.5) because 
Ds(1+rf+s)=D(1+rf)=D(T) (4.4.2.12) 
Recalling (4.4.2.1) we have also that 
RE > RE(Ds)= RE, P (4.4.2.13) 
4.5 A comparative analysis of leverage and cost of risk capital with fixed default 
probability, limited and unlimited liability. 
By comparing the leverage effect in these previously described three cases we have: 
(4.5.1) 
ED>-> 
EJ 
PJ 
because 
D> Ds and EP= ES >E (4.5.2) 
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The impact of QA and PA, M on RE 
(D) is the same when deposits are insured due to effect of 
increment of the risk free rate measured by the spread. 
Through the inspection of (4.4.2.13) it is possible to conclude that the impact of the limited and 
unlimited liability on the cost of risk capital is the same and it is negative (it lowers the value 
because RE > RE 
(D') 
= 
RE,,, ). 
5- From risk capital to economic capital: introducing franchise value and 
taxes 
If a bank will default the classical banking theory tell us that what is recovered is the franchise 
value of the bank. This case can be described as a variation of the previous three cases through 
the introduction of a digital call option. Suppose there is a loss to shareholders of y in legal 
and other fees, in the event of bankruptcy. This event can be measured through a digital call 
option which adds value to the equityholders if at time T no default will occur. 
5.1 Cost of Risk Capital with Franchise Value 
As discussed in section 4 when the franchise value is added to the equity risk capital the 
economic capital is obtained. This value of economic capital is net of the tax effect that will be 
introduced in the next section. 
Proposition 6 
If shareholder unlimited liability and fixed default probability is assumed the bank 
franchise value will add value to the equityholders if no bankruptcy occurs at time T 
Let now define with Eec the value of the market value of the equity plus the franchise value. 
Let us also define with Voc the value of the inherent digital callbs 
EeC =A-D+VDC 
65 Eec is the value of economic capital without the premium for insuring deposit and tax effect 
(5.1.1) 
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VDC 
_ 
aA A(T)>_ D(T) (5.1.2) 0 A(T)<D(T) 
which analytically is equal to 
VDC = a4e-n' N(dz rn) (5.1.3) 
V Dc represents the franchise value of the bank. This value will increase the value of the equity 
(risk capital) if no default will occur at T and a is the percentage of the assets that the bank 
will not lose if no default occur at time T. Clearly 
y= aA (5.1.4) 
Remark 
In this framework the risk capital does not reflect also the franchise value and consequently 
EeC > E. (5.1.5) 
Corollary 5 
If deposits are insured the value of the equity, E' p, increases due to the positive impact 
of the put and the inherent cost of economic capital (net of tax effect) decreases 
In fact, because 
Eec. P - 
EP + VDC 5.1.6) 
consequently 
p>Ep=Es>E (5.1.7) E' ec, 
The cost of economic capital net of tax effect becomes 
R, 
A(1+RA)-D(1+rf)-1 
(5.1.8) ` ec, P A-D+ VP + VDC ` 
Because (4.4.2.8), consequently 
RE. P Z R,, p (5.1.9) 
Corollary 6 
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If deposits are uninsured and limit liability applies the value of the equity EEC and the cost 
of capital (net of tax effect) are the same of the insured case and therefore 
E e, 
= 
Eec. P and Rec, v (Ds 
)= Rec. P (5.1.11) 
Prrof 
Given that 
E, ', '= A-Ds +VDc =A -D+Vp +VDC (5.1.12) 
therefore, as expected, 
Eec 
= 
Eec. 
p 
(5.1.13) 
Moreover, results 
R' p(DS'I_ 
A(1+RA)-DS(l+rf +s)-1 (5.1.14) 
A-D+VP +VDC 
because we have already shown in (4.4.2.11), results 
Rec, P 
(DS) 
= 
Rec, P (5.1.15) 
5.2 Tax and franchise value impact on cost of risk capital when deposits are 
uninsured 
Let us first consider the tax impact. Obviously tax impact r lower the equity value by an 
amount of capital Er but increases the correspondent cost of economic capital. 
Er=A-D-Er=E-Er=E(1-z) with0<z<1 (5.2.1) 
Er 
= t{AN(dl, rn)-DN(d2, rn)ý (5.2.2) 
Remark 
For the sake of simplicity, without loss of generality, we are considering that all equity is 
represented by "new" profit and consequently is taxed. 
Given that the franchise value has a positive impact on the equity of the bank, we can rewrite 
the balance sheet condition as follows 
136 
Chapter 3 
E'C, 
r = 
E(1- z)+ VDC (5.2.3) 
The cost of equity risk capital when tax effect and franchise value is include becomes 
R, 
- 
A(1+RA)-D(1+rf)-1 
5.2.4 
ec. s - E(I 
- 
r) + VDC 
() 
5.3 Tax and franchise value impact on cost of risk capital when deposits are insured 
If deposits are insured, knowing that, E; c, p=A-D+ VDC + Vp the new equity values 
becomes 
EeC, T, p = Eec p 
(1-r)= (A 
-D+ VDC + Vp 
kl 
- 
r)= Eec (5.2.5) 
and the cost of economic capital becomes 
Vp +VDC r 
fk A(1+RA)-D(l+rf) PA, M(DM6A - 11+r 1-z 
__ 
A ReC 
A-D+VDC +Vp 1-r) E Vp +VDC +rf 
5.2.6 
AA 
Corollary 7 
If deposits are uninsured the same equity and cost of economic capital of the insured case 
apply 
If deposits are uninsured, recalling (4.4.2.3) and (4.4.2.4) we have 
Es. T = Es 
(1- r) (5.2.8) 
by adding the franchise value, we get 
Eec, 
s, T = ES 
(1- t) + VDC (5.2.9) 
knowing that 
EEc. 
s, r =(A-D5X1-z)+VDC =(A-D+VpX1-z)+VDC =Ep(1-t')+VDC (5.2.10) 
then we get 
E; 
c, s, t =Ep(1-r)+VDc (5.2.11) 
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The same reasoning can be followed for the cost of equity and therefore the same results of the 
uninsured case apply 
6- Capital structure and cost of target risk capital under limited and unlimited 
liability, insured deposits, franchise value and taxes 
Let us now relax the assumption introduced in section 3 and consider the case when the target 
default probability (target credit rating) is not held constant: p# p'and N(- d2) # N(- d2*). As 
in the previous framework, rf, aM and RM are held constant and RM >rf. By following the 
same line of reasoning used to illustrate the fixed default probability case, in this section the 
cost of target economic capital will be analysed by considering the impact of the limited and 
unlimited liability, the deposit insurance, the franchise value and taxes on the cost of target risk 
capital. 
6.1 The determination of promised debt repayments under unlimited liability and 
target credit rating 
Recall (4.2.1), (4.2.2), (4.2.3) and (4.3.1), when the target credit rating N( d2) is different 
from the actual one N(- d2) 
Proposition 7 
The promised debt repayments are given by 
Al+Rq 
-d2 Ä Q D=- 
l+r l 
(6.1.1) 
Proof 
Knowing that 
A*(T) = A(1 + RÄ) (6.1.2) 
A bank is in default, if at time T A* (T) < D(T) o r, equivalently, E<O. To remain solvent and 
reach the target credit rating N(- dz) at time T, the bank must complies with the following 
constraint: 
A*(T)- Ad *a ? D(T) (6.1.3) 
Remarks 
1. Ada resembles the definition of the Capital at Risk, as introduced in section 2. 
Therefore the book value and market value of the equity are equal by assumption. 
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Moreover through inspection of both (4.2.3) and (6.1.3) result that the book and market 
value of the equity are also equal, by construction, to the actual risk capital but different to 
the target risk capital. In this more general framework book value, market value and actual 
risk capital, from now on labelled E, are equal. Moreover the target risk capital will be 
labelled E*(T) 
2. Because in our framework the franchise value will be taken explicitly in consideration, the 
definition of economic capital will be target Capital at Risk, E* (T) 
, 
plus Franchise 
Value VDc 66 
3. The target risk capital will be labelled E*(T) is different from the (target) economic 
capital E*, 
. 
4. Hence we have not yet determined the Risk Adjusted Return on Economic Capital 
(RAROC) but proposition 7 will play a key role in this calculation. 
Corollary 8 
The cost of equity RE is equal to the cost of actual risk capital but different from both the 
cost of target risk capital, namely RE and the cost of (target) economic capital ReC 
RE #RE #R; C. (6.1.4) 
The main difference being that the target default probability is different from the actual one and 
that the franchise value is not included in the cost of capital. 
Proposition 8 
If shareholder unlimited liability and target default probability is assumed, the cost of 
target risk capital RE depends only on pA. M, Le RE = g\°A. M) and is equal to 
+r 
_PA. 
MDM+rjd2 
R 
ýI+rf)PA. 
MM 
+r 'R' 
+rf)PA. M M 
=EJ (6.1.5) J-"" E (d2 
-pA. MýM d2 -PA. MýM d2 -PA. M'M 
Corollary 
RE is an increasing function of pÄ. M 
The proofs are reported in the appendix 
6.2 Capital Structure under unlimited liability and target credit rating 
Proposition 9 
66 in practice, the term "economic capita! " it is very often not clearly identified and, consequently, 
misunderstandings and misconceptions can induce top management towards wrong or biased decisions 
139 
Chapter 3 
Leverage, as represented by the 
R 
ratio, is an increasing function of target default 
probability for any value of volatility and independent from correlation values and signs 
Proof 
Recall (6.1.1); let us consider the impact on leverage by taking the first derivative with respect 
of d2 
0D A 
=- 
aA 
<0 
ade l+rf 
(6.2.2) 
Through inspection of the first derivative function of leverage with respect of d2 we can see 
that: 
8 is independent of correlation, 
  
it results always negative because volatility and risk free-rate are always positive by 
construction. 
Therefore, as expected, 
E 
ratio is an increasing function of default probability for any value of 
volatility and independently on correlation values and signs 
6.3 Cost of target risk capital under unlimited liability, limited liability and insured 
deposits 
Proposition 10 
The cost of target risk capital is positively (negatively) related with the target default 
probability N(- d2) if correlation p1. M is positive (negative) and it is independent from 
volatility o 
If the target default probability is not constant we have RE = h'(aA, d2+ PA. M 
) 
We know from section 3 that, if unlimited liability and default probability is constant, the cost 
of equity risk capital is an increasing function of correlation and is independent from volatility. 
By relaxing the default probability constraint, recalling (4.3.13) we can see that: 
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öRE 
-- 
(1+rf)OMPAM 
ý0 VPA, M <0 (6.3.1) 
ade (d2 
-PA, M(DMY 
eRE 
-- 
(I+rf»MPA. 
M 
<0 VPA, M >0 (6.3.2) 8d2 (d; 
-pM%j 
therefore we have 
aR 
*>0 
if PAM <0 and 
'RE 
S0 if pÄ_M z0 therefore the target default 
ade ade 
probability N(- d2) is positively related with the cost of equity if correlation is positive and 
vice-versa 
Corollary 9 The cost of equity target risk capital is an increasing function of 
PAM independently of default probability and aA 
Recalling that in section 3 we have shown that 
R* 
(DMPA. M +d2rj (6.3.3) E=r d2 
-PA*. M(1) M 
by taking the partial derivative with respect of P 
.M results 
ARE 
= 
d2 
>0 d-1SpÄMS1and d2 (-=93+ (6.3.4) 
aPA. M 
(d2 
-PA. M bM)2 
Therefore given that the numerator is always positive, the cost of equity is a decreasing 
function of correlation no matter the level of default probability. 
The relationship of cost of target risk capital when deposits are insured, R;,, 
, 
with the target 
default probability depends on the sign of the following relationship 
PA. M(DMaA -L 
(l+rf) 
In fact, recalling (4.4.1.6) and rearranging we have 
v A(1+rf P McMcA- Ä 
(1+rf) 
_f RE'P 
A 12QÄ- RA 
- 
rf 
-vp l+rf 
+r 
By calculating the first derivative with respect of d2 
(6.3.5) 
(6.3.6) 
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i' 
OR 
A2a*1 (l +I*/-I"tI 
: 1/ý 1- +fý F'p (6.3.6) 
cýd2 (1?. 
, 1ýý vp(l+rjýý, 
Therefore if (6.2.5) is positive, the derivative is negative and, consequently, the target default 
probability is an increasing function of the cost of equity risk capital. It, for example, the 
default probability is relatively high, say 5%, and the volatility of the asset is also high, about 
20%, the put value becomes approximately equal to 4.5 and its future value, one year from 
now, at an interest rate of'5%, becomes almost 4.8. 
Assuming, for example. that the value of the asset is fixed and equal to 1.000 this means that 
even in this "worst case" a minimum spread in one year time of 0,5% will be sufficient to 
generate a positive relationship between the target default probability and the cost of equity. 
This spread increases proportionally with the level of6 j. As expected the riskier the 
investment, the higher the expected cost of equity risk capital and the higher the PD. Moreover, 
in this framework, another crucial parameter is the sign of correlation. If the correlation is 
negative, the derivative is negative and the default probability is positively related with the cost 
of equity. if the correlation is positive the default probability is negatively related with the cost 
of equity (as was the case when default was constant). 
Corollary 10 Same relationship applies when deposits are uninsured 
Return on Equity Capital f Corr, ActDP) 
60% 
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38 
Q45,0%-52,5% 
23%--ý \ , \ý 
-- 
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022 5%-30 0% 15% = 
-_ 
, , 
' 
' 
ý----. ' Q15,0%-22,5% 
8% - 
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Figure 7 Cost of equity as a function of correlation and P1) 
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6.4 Cost of target economic capital tinder limited liability, insured deposits, 
franchise value and taxes 
In the general case, as illustrated in the last paragraph of section 4 we showed that 
R_ 
A(1+RA)-D(l+rf) 
-1 ec (A +VDC+Vp X1-T) 
and through 5.2.10 and (4.4.2.8) we have 
PA, M(DM(7A- 
Vp + VDC ýl+rfkl-t) 
R, 
c 
A 
= +rf E Vp+VDC (1-t) 
AA 
Moreover, knowing that, in equilibrium eq. 4.1.1.2 becomes 
(DA =R 6s 
rj 
= PA, M 
R 
-rf 
= PA, M(DM 
A 6M 
The following relationship must hold in equilibrium 
RA-rf 
= 
RA-rf 
=(D6APA, 
M Q'APA, M 
M 
(6.4.1) 
Therefore, analogously to eq. 4.3.9, in the case of target credit rating, we obtain the following 
relationship for the leverage 
E_(d2-PA, M'bA)r7 (6.4.2) 
A l+rf 
And the target economic capital is therefore 
E; C =A(1+R, *q)-D(1+rf)-Eec 
Where, again analogously to what described in section 4.2 eq. 4.2.3,4.34,4.39,4.310 and 
4.3.11 
The target cost of economic capital therefore becomes 
A(I+RÄ)-D(l+rf)-(A-D+Vp+VDC)I-r) A(I+RÄ)-D(l+rf)-Eec 
ReC 
A-D+Vp+ VDC 1- r) Eec 
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Consequently, we can rewrite (6.4.1) in the case that the actual default probability is different 
from the target one: 
Vp 
PA, M(DMaA -P ýC 
(1 
+ rfý(1- 
ReC 
=***A+rf (6.4.3) 
d2-PA, M(DA AVP+VDC (1-t) 
l+rf A 
Therefore the relationship of cost of target economic capital R,, with the target default 
probability depends on the sign of the following relationship 
PA, M'M°A-Vp 
ADC (l+rfkl-z) (6.4.4) 
If (6.4.4) is positive, the derivative is negative and therefore the target default probability is an 
increasing function of R,,. Interestingly when the default probability is low the put value has a 
very low impact on R,,,. If the franchise value is added the order of magnitudo of the put impact 
(slightly) changes because of the negative tax effect. 
7- Conclusions and further research 
In this chapter we have shown that the main risk drivers which allows the bank to enhance the 
cost of risk capital in the most simple world without frictions is the market correlation and 
(contrary to Crouhy et. al. (1999)) not the volatility (see eq. 4.3.12). 
By introducing adjustments due to the insurance put for the bank deposits (see eq. 4.4.1.6 and 
4.4.1.10, ), the franchise value and the taxes the volatility plays some role especially for the 
riskier banks, namely the ones with the lowest credit rating, as reported in eq. 5.1.8 and 5.1.14. 
In this chapter we have also shown how to estimate the capital structure by considering at the 
same time the target credit rating and the target cost of capital (see eq. 6.4.3) 
Moreover, as illustrated in section 6, this framework clearly establishes the relationship 
amongst different measures of capital, namely the market value of the equity, the risk capital 
and the economic capital. It is shown that: 
1. Ade°A resembles the definition of the Capital at Risk, as introduced in section 2 and 
AdzcA resembles the definition of the target Capital at Risk (here d2 is the actual 
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"distance to default" in terms of standard deviations of asset returns; while d2 is the 
target "distance to default" in order to achieve the required credit rating. ) 
2. under our equilibrium assumption, the book value and market value of the equity are 
equal. 
3. we show, (see (4.2.3) and (6.1.3)), that both the book and market value of the equity 
are a equal to the actual risk capital 
4. we show (again see (4.2.3) and (6.1.3)) that the book and market value of the equity 
are, in general, different from the target risk capital E' 
. 
5. this implies that the target risk capital E' is different from the target economic 
capital EeC 
. 
These last two results hold when, in this framework, the franchise value is taken explicitly in 
consideration, reflecting the assumed definition of economic capital as target Capital at Risk 
plus Franchise Value. Consequently, another important result of the analysis, illustrated in 
corollary 8, is that the cost of equity R. is equal to the cost of actual risk capital but different 
from both the cost of target risk capital, namely RE and the cost of (target) economic 
capital R* (see eq. 6.1.4). These differences in required return reflect the findings that the 
target default probability is different from the actual one and that the franchise value is not 
included' in the cost of capital. 
In a further research the problem of the optimal capital structure will need to be further 
addressed. The hurdle rate for the bank can be viewed as the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC) which will explicitly take in consideration the debt to equity ratio. At the same time 
the un-levered beta needs to be introduced in the capital asset pricing model. This extended 
framework will give the possibility to link the EVA analysis with the RAROC or cost of 
economic capital analysis. The optimal capital structure then will be associated with the 
minimum WACC which makes maximum the value of the bank. The analysis can be further 
extended to take account of illiquid bank assets and non-normal asset returns (see Milne and 
Onorato (2004)); and to the case of multiple business units within the bank. In this latter case 
the interaction of correlations will play a role at different level of the organisation, namely: 
" among business units, 
" 
between business unit and the bank portfolio, 
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" 
between business units and the market, 
between the bank portfolio and the market. 
It will be the chief risk officer that needs to take responsibility of this capital allocation process 
and transform the risk management function from a pure cost centre division to a truly business 
function division. The risk management function will be therefore compensated for the ability 
to allocate consistently the economic capital across BU on the basis of the illustrated risk 
adjusted performance and on the basis of the ability to manage all the previously identified 
correlations. 
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Appendix 1 
If shareholder unlimited liability and target default probability is assumed, the cost of 
equity target risk capital RE depends only on PA. M , i. e RE = g(pA M) and is equal to 
. 
-rf = 
(1+rf 
RE 
)PA. 
M(DM 
dz 
-PA, MOM) 
Proof 
In equilibrium, as shown in (4.1.3), recalling (4.1.4) equation (4.3.11) becomes 
ED d2CA-(RA-rj)=d2-(DÄ 
=(d2-PA. Mq)M A AA l+rj l+rf l+rf 
CA 
consequently 
RE 
-rf = 
A(1+RA)-D(l+rf) 
-1-rf 
- 
AýR j 
-rf)- ARA -rf) Q = PA. M MA A-D A-D E 
rearranging 
A(RÄ 
-rf)- RE 
-r =- 
(1+rfXRÄ 
- 
r) 
_ 
+rf)pA, M(DMoA 
(1+rf)pA. 
MýM 
_ f E :* d2 
-PA. MýM A ** d2 -PA. MýM A d2 -PA. M(DM 
Corollary 
RE is an increasing function of pA. M " 
Because in this case we have assumed the risk-free rate, the market and the volatility of the 
market return, the probability of default constant results 
* 
(1 
+ rf»MPA. M (DMPA. M + der f R +rf= E (d-p. 
MM) 
(d-p. 
MM) 2 
by taking the partial derivative with respect of pÄ. M results 
öRE 
- 
(1+rs»MCd2 
-PA. M(DM)+(DM(1+rfMPÄ. M 
- 
d2 
*>0V 
. 
aPA. M 
(d2* 
-PA. MýMy 
(d2 
-PA. MýMY 
Clearly, because the derivative is always positive for any value of PÄ. M RE it is shown to be 
an increasing function of pÄ., ß 
. 
Summarising, in this set up, the RE is independent ono and 
an increasing function of pÄ. M 
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